When most people think of the Red Army circa 1942 they imagine a war machine on the rise, and blessed with fleets of wordclass T-34 medium tanks. On the one hand it's true that by the spring of 1942 Soviet tank factories cranked out far more T-34's than they had during the nadir of Soviet fortunes late in 1941. But, for a number of reasons (including both T-34 losses at the front as well as the decision to parcel out T-34's in independent tank brigades versus concentrating them in the Tank Corps) there were never enough of these reliable, well armed armored fighting vehicles to go around.

The Michigan War Studies Review (MiWSR) has just published my latest book review. It is of David Stahel's The Battle for Moscow, and unfortunately it is a work that I cannot recommend. This is only the second time I have had to publish a negative review with the MiWSR. Readers will quickly see why.

It is patently obvious that Stahel's latest work is more interested in pushing an agenda. It does not measure up to the findings of countless other military historians in regards to why Germany failed to take Moscow late in 1941.