In recent weeks I have been providing my readers a modest tutorial on the operational art, with an eye toward determining what makes an effective operational level military leader. Let's finish with a final look at those factors that go into determining what makes a particular commander a good one.
Last week I discussed the operational level of war. To summarize, the operational level links strategic objectives to the tactical deployment of military assets. The operational level of war is often referred to as an art, and for good reason. Nevertheless, before we can discuss what makes planning and leading military operations on a large scale an art form we must first start with the set of rules that gives commanders from the same army a common basis of action: that being doctrine.
War fighting has long been dominated by concepts of strategy and tactics. However, in the period between the World Wars a newer concept in military thought fully matured as it's own level of war: the operational art.
Last week I examined the U-boat war in the Arctic. This week I'd like to turn your attention roughly 2,000 miles to the south.
Sorry for the break. It has been a busy summer, but you can now expect a return to regular blogging and articles. To get back into the swing of things I just wanted to highlight for you once more why I fear the US military's position as the planet's dominant military power is slipping to something less (a topic I discussed in my last post before my summer vacation). The labor day celebration of this nation's industrial strength is upon us, so in beginning to answer this question let's focus on
Another Memorial Day has come and gone, and I'm feeling a bit more melancholic than usual. That's for a number of reasons, including an old one: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It appears that many of the things I was very much afraid of happening are coming to pass as a result of the F-35's bloated impact on the defense budget. And this means one thing. The troops are taking it on the chin.
Don't believe me? Several seemingly unrelated news items are demonstrating quite clearly the cracks in
When most people think of the Red Army circa 1942 they imagine a war machine on the rise, and blessed with fleets of wordclass T-34 medium tanks.
Many of you may know that I was born and raised in Michigan. Every once in a while I like to highlight that fact by focusing on Michigan's contribution to our nation's defense during WWII.
For instance, did you know that the federal government granted Michigan contractors ten percent of U.S. spending on war related purchases. This meant Michigan garnered the second most war related funding of any state (The State of New York came in first). What did that money buy? Quite a bit.
The Michigan War Studies Review (MiWSR) has just published my latest book review. It is of David Stahel's The Battle for Moscow, and unfortunately it is a work that I cannot recommend. This is only the second time I have had to publish a negative review with the MiWSR. Readers will quickly see why.
It is patently obvious that Stahel's latest work is more interested in pushing an agenda.
Dr. Boris Sokolov's Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky offers a unique look at not only the life of one of the Red Army's top Second World War era senior officers, but also interesting insight into a Red Army at war.