By July of 1944 (with the Allied success of D-Day coupled with the even bigger Soviet success of Bagration) it was obvious Germany had lost the Second World War. The German military commander-in-chief of the western front was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. By that point in the war Rundstedt had acquired a reputation for saying and doing what he saw fit, regardless of the consequences.
So, perhaps it was no surprise that on July 1, 1944 he bluntly informed Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (the head of the German armed forces high command - OKW) that they had no choice but to make peace
I last commented on the Russian-Ukrainian war about eight months ago. In that article I speculated on whether or not a breakthrough of the first Ukrainian defensive line in the Donbas would lead to a Russian breakout. That could have meant a potential return to the sweeping war of maneuver that had characterized the initial weeks of the Russian invasion (or "special military operation"). Since then quite a bit has changed, not least of which is a reappraisal of Russia's methodology for fighting this war.
Just to recap, Russia opened the war in February by invading with a small force of
One month ago, I wrote of the Battle for the Donbas becoming the focal point of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. I speculated as to Russian capabilties, intentions, and what might occur. It appears that the Ukrainian position in the Donbas is in big trouble. The question is when will that position collapse, and the answer there is as much a product of Russian decision-making as to how it conducts its war as much as it might be a result of any other factors. The following should help explain why.
The campaign in the Donbas has featured an intensive Russian pounding of deeply entrenched
Russian artillery fire and air attacks have intensified in the Donbas region. It appears the next phase of the war has begun. This will be the most important battle of the war.
By all accounts, the bulk of the Ukrainian army's best troops are located in the east (at least 40,000 men if not more of the most experienced, best equipped, and best led soldiers). If the Russians can encircle these forces, then most of the Ukraine east of the Dniepr will be open for the taking.