The War in the Ukraine On The Eve of the Battle For The Donbas

Russian artillery fire and air attacks have intensified in the Donbas region. It appears the next phase of the war has begun. This will be the most important battle of the war.

By all accounts, the bulk of the Ukrainian army's best troops are located in the east (at least 40,000 men if not more of the most experienced, best equipped, and best led soldiers). If the Russians can encircle these forces, then most of the Ukraine east of the Dniepr will be open for the taking. If that happens (a big if given the lack of Russian logistical competence to date) then it will likely create the preconditions for the Russians to force the Ukrainian's to accept terms.

Can the Russians accomplish that goal? The answer really boils down to the Russian ability to:

• Adapt
• Determine the scope of the attack in the Donbas and prepare effectively. This will turn on whether the assault will be a deep operational thrust to Dnipro in conjunction with units moving up from the territory captured north of the Crimea? Or will it be a shallower envelopment envelopment mostly directed south from Izium and north from Mariupol while tracking along the western border region of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts? Or will it be a slow, attritional grind?
• Dramatically improve Russian logistics (particularly in terms of supporting any attempt at a deep operational thrust expected to traverse the Eastern Ukraine);
• Effectively combine arms;
• Concentrate adequate forces to accomplish operational objectives;
• Fix Ukrainian forces in the Donbas;
• Manevour to encircle that same army;
• Then use airpower and indirect firepower to attrit that Ukrainian army down to the point of either surrender or destruction.
• All easier said than done...

If anyone says they know exactly what is going on in the Ukraine you can safely ignore their analysis. However, by all accounts it appears that the Ukrainians have fought better than expected. Conversely, the Russian armed forces have fought poorly to date. To that last point Russian command, control, and communications (along with logistics) have been a mess. Combined arms, especially in the first few weeks of the war, was more of a slogan than actually being practiced on the battlefield. Concentrated force was the exception rather than the rule. I could go on, and yet...

The Ukrainian's appear to be in big trouble. That assessment holds true even though it seems that the invading Russian army is less than half the size of the Ukrainian forces it has confronted. That's because, in spite of actual in-theater Ukrainian numerical advantages the Russian air force has attained air superiority (note that is not the same as air dominance, but it is an important advantage), and inflicted significant losses on the Ukrainian army while doing massive damage to Ukrainian command and control capabilities. There is also some evidence that the Russians may be interdicting some of the NATO aid being sent into the Ukraine. Mariupol is also about to fall,which will free up signficant Russian forces and provide an uncontested land bridge to the Crimea while locking down the entire Sea of Azov littoral.

Russian drone usage has already been far more effective in the Donbas, and with the shutting down of competing axis of operations and additional resources freed for the Donbas they will possibly become more deadly yet. Moreover, the Russian axis of advance that have been defeated or shut down were primarily near Kiev, Sumy, and Chernihiv. The terrain in and around Kiev was very helpful for enabling the Ukrainians to conduct hit-and-run defensive raids against over-extended Russian lines of communications. None of that is true of the fighting in the Donbas - where the terrain is flat, open, and ideal for the usage of massed mechanized formations, heavy artillery and other indirect fires, as well as deadly to an army lacking the ability to truly contest Russian air superiority. It also appears that the effort directed toward Kiev and the northeastern Ukraine involved a sizeable amount of the invading Russian army - an army that has been redeployed to the Donbas.

One should also consider that in the Donbas the Russians will be fighting more within their logistical wheelhouse - with close access to their supply bases. These are still large battlefields with few roads really usable for supporting large mechanized forces. But the proximity to Russian supply bases and rail lines is much better. As the ground dries out in the late spring this will further enable mobile operations.The Ukrainian's will not only have to strike at those supply hubs but have to maneuvour to survive, they can't just dig into cities and towns. To that end, there is evidence that Russian strikes on Ukrainian fuel depots are starting to bite. On top of that, proximity to Russian air bases means sortie rates will be much higher. The heavily degraded Ukrainian ground based anti-air threat will further enable more accurate Russian close air support, and isolation of the battlefield as well as interdiction of Ukrainian reinforcements.

In such a combat environment that means trouble for a Ukrainian army lacking the local mobility and firepower of the Russians. Remember, the Battalion Tactical Group is built for mobile firepower (it is anything but ideal and I believe a brigade sized formation would be more appropriate), and the Donbas is one area where those two traits can best be exploited. The withdraw from the Kiev region and northeastern Ukraine likely freed up as many as 25-30 of the 40 plus BTG's employed there earlier in the war (with the remainder likely staying on the Belarussian and Russian side of the border to tie down Ukrainian troops while they rest and rehabilitate).

Furthermore, for all the success of Ukrainian employed and NATO supplied shoulder fired ATGM's and MANPADS to date in the war these weapons are not nearly as effective if employed in the open against an army effectively conducting reconnaissance and employing combined arms. Even with the clearly lackluster performance of the Russian army in the war's initial six weeks they have only been losing 10-11 tanks per day - hardly crippling given the massive size of the Russian tank park. And most of those losses were not due to NATO supplied ATGM's but abandonment (likely logistical reasons or break downs) and subsequent capture by the Ukrainians.This will be less of a problem in the Donbas.

On top of that, for all their lethality against helictopers and the like MANPADS are hardly that effective against fast moving jets. Without a dramatic jump in the supply of AFV's, self-propelled artillery and multiple launch rockets, and more powerful air defense systems the Ukrainian forces in the east will be under even greater pressure. Worse yet, NATO supplied ATGM's and MANPADS are not limitless. Modern warfare burns through munitions at staggering rates. There is evidence that stocks of such weapons are dwindling. It will take many months to ramp up production to replace those weapons are already used in the war. The Ukrainians don't have those months. They need as much as they can get right now. And that's a problem. The Ukrainians simply do not have the long-range indirect firepower, layered air defense, and mechanized forces needed to not only have better than a puncher's chance of knocking out a Russian advance in the Ukraine but, from there, countering. This is why the Ukrainians have been begging NATO for IFV's, MBT's, MLRS, more powerful SAM's, and self-propelled artillery.

But the Ukrainian's are also fighting extremely well, and are motivated. This is not Libya, Iraq, Syria, or some other second rate army. These are two of the world's best armies fighting it out, and anything can happen when peer competitors are at war. Another Ukrainian advantage is that it appears their armed forces have internalized and/or been taught mission-style command and control whereas the Russians appear to rely on a much less flexible centralized system. The Ukrainian combat forces also still outnumber the Russian invasion force - and by quite a bit. Generally speaking an attacker wants to have at least a 3:1 advantage over the defender. A smaller force can do this via leveraging surprise and mobility to mass force where not expected, but with the ubiquity of drones, open-source intelligence, and the like but that is alot harder to do. There is alot to be said about all of that (as well as the considerable impact of the accurate intelligence the U.S. appears to be supplying) for Ukrianian hopes of stopping this latest Russian push.

However, if the Russians have absorbed the lessons learned in the very bloody nose they got near Kiev and Kharkiv in particular then the Ukrainian's in the Donbas are in for a very rough fight under far from ideal conditions. This ability to throw away preconceptions and outdated plans while adapting to the realities on the ground will be very important to Russian chances. Operationally speaking it appears that they have. Remember, at one point the Russians had been digging in around Kiev. Then they withdrew - likely in recognition of Ukrainian competency and staying power (along with their own inability to maintain an offensive on so many different axis). Thus, if the Russians were going to accomplish anything their effort would have to be much more systematic and concentrated. To that end, a single theater level commander appears to have been put in charge of the war with a mandate to strike hard in the Donbas (Army General Alexander Dvornikov). From a Russian perspective this is all positive. Not so much from the Ukrainian side - who likely would have been more than happy to continue to bleed out overextended Russian forces strung out on multiple axis.

If the Russians actually start to more consistently employ their primary manevour formations (the Battalion Tactical Group or BTG) as coherent combined arms formations (remember, in the initial days the Russians didn't really do this) in conjunction with the massive indirect fire support they enjoy, air superiority, and get back to operational best practices (like reconnaissance, preparing logistical support to exploit breakthroughs, secure lines of communication, effective command and control, concentrated force, and the like) then their chances are good. It is also likely that Russian electronic warfare efforts will have adapted and be more effective in the Donbas.

Because of all of that it would not surprise me at all to see significant Russian operational breakthroughts occur in this key fight for the Donbas (particuarly to the south, east, and maybe even southwest from the region held by Russian forces to the north). But such outcomes will take time, and taking too much time is never good for attempting to achieve strategic outcomes. If the Russians can exploit their previous victory at Izium then they have a strong likelihood of success. From the other side of the hill the key will be if the Ukrainian's can answer, keep the Russian's off balance, and inflict enough damage to shut down this latest phase in the Russian assault.