In examining the how and why of Operation Barbarossa's failure there is still a significant contingent of historians who believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army had doomed Germany to defeat as early as the late summer of 1941. For instance, the vast majority of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt as early as August of 1941. Oftentimes, exhibit A for those making this argument is the manner in which Barbarossa fell apart late in 1941. It is my contention however, that events on
In November 1941, a lull in the year long battle between the Axis and British Commonwealth forces fighting across the North African desert finally allowed both sides to recover their strength. German General Erwin Rommel's command fielded 414 tanks, 173 German, and nine divisions (including two German divisions; the 5th Light - renamed the 21st Panzer Division on October and 15th Panzer Division) with 320 aircraft providing direct close air support.
