Many of my readers probably have an interest in military history and operations in general and not just the Second World War. If so then you may have been paying attention to the advanced nature of the Russian effort to secure a dominant military position in the Arctic Circle. You may have also wondered what this effort entails and why it is such a big deal.
If so, then I have just reviewed a book about the Second World War era ground based military operations of Germany's Mountain Corps Norway that took place during the June to October 1941 portion of Operation Barbarossa.
Here we are again. I had previously sworn off reviewing World War II books written by former German officers. Darn it but don't I have another good one for my readers. This time we get to hear the thoughts of Panzer Group 4's former Chief of Staff - Chales De Beaulieu and his opinion as to why his panzer group failed to take Leningrad during Operation Barbarossa. Please do check out the full review. The analysis within this book's pages are well worth your time.
Since the Second World War ended it has been popular to present the Soviet Union as an overwhelming economic and military colossus that was essentially undefeatable by 1942 if not earlier in the war. The groundwork for this belief was laid by German officers who after the war sought to cast blame for their own failures of leadership. American military leaders then latched onto these aguments. Doubtlessly this occured in part as a response to the Cold War era Communist threat.
In examining the how and why of Operation Barbarossa's failure there is still a significant contingent of historians who believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army had doomed Germany to defeat as early as the late summer of 1941. For instance, the vast majority of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt as early as August of 1941. Oftentimes, exhibit A for those making this argument is the manner in which Barbarossa fell apart late in 1941. It is my contention however, that events on
On June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany launched it's invasion of the Soviet Union (codenamed Operation Barbarossa). The Germans concentrated the bulk of their effort in three massive Army Groups (North, Center, and South). In this article, we shall take a look at Army Group South's operations during Barbarossa as well as examine the condition in which the Army Group stood as several key points in the campaign. In this way we can better assess how and why Army Group South fell short in terms of taking its objectives for Barbarossa.
There are some that believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army and Allies doomed Germany to defeat less than two years after continent wide war resumed in Europe late in 1939. For instance, the vast majority of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt as early as August of 1941. In assessing such claims this article will take a look at the primary component of the German army's striking power - it's panzer divisions.
The Red Army in June of 1941 was very much a product of several distinct eras and experiences. In many ways it represented the fourth iteration of the Red Army in less than fifteen years. First, came the Red Army of the late 1920s - a very basic and stripped down organization that had emerged from the Russian Civil War and was reflective of the fact that the first five-year plan for Soviet industry was just beginning. In comparsion we have the seemingly powerful 1936 edition of the Red Army.
For those of you who don't know Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe is about to be published in the United Kingdom by Casemate. As such, Casemate recently interviewed author Steven D Mercatante regarding such topics as how he became interested in World War Two, whether he was nervous about challenging the conventional wisdom on the reasons for the outcome of the War in Europe, and more.
For instance, the interviewer asks "In contesting a widely accepted theory based upon the inevitability of Germany’s defeat, were you nervous of what the response would be
Tomorrow is the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet counterattack before Moscow that put the final nail in Barbarossa' s coffin. Though the grossly overextended German army in the Soviet Union had long since been ground down to a fraction of its strength from six months prior; this counterstroke would do tremendous damage to a Wehrmacht badly positioned for defending against a strategic level counter offensive.
Russian soldiers of the 90th Special Search Battalion of the Western Military District, along with staff from the Museum of the Battle for Leningrad, have recovered a KV-1 tank from the Neva River near Leningrad. Thankfully no crew remains were found, thus meaning they likely escaped, and the tank itself is in relatively good condition. It is expected the tank will be able to be fully restored and be used in parades as a living historical artifact.
The KV-1 was the primary heavy tank in the Soviet arsenal when Hitler launched his attack on the Soviet Union in June of 1941. No German tank,
