By July of 1944 (with the Allied success of D-Day coupled with the even bigger Soviet success of Bagration) it was obvious Germany had lost the Second World War. The German military commander-in-chief of the western front was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. By that point in the war Rundstedt had acquired a reputation for saying and doing what he saw fit, regardless of the consequences.
So, perhaps it was no surprise that on July 1, 1944 he bluntly informed Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (the head of the German armed forces high command - OKW) that they had no choice but to make peace
I last commented on the Russian-Ukrainian war about eight months ago. In that article I speculated on whether or not a breakthrough of the first Ukrainian defensive line in the Donbas would lead to a Russian breakout. That could have meant a potential return to the sweeping war of maneuver that had characterized the initial weeks of the Russian invasion (or "special military operation"). Since then quite a bit has changed, not least of which is a reappraisal of Russia's methodology for fighting this war.
Just to recap, Russia opened the war in February by invading with a small force of
