By August of 1942 reinforcements sent to assist Army Group B's drive on Stalingrad had transformed the German Sixth Army from a potent assembly of men and machines to the most powerful army in the world, with 22 divisions and supporting units under the command of General Friedrich Paulus. Facing the Sixth Army, and Fourth Panzer Army's seven German and four Romanian divisions, was a Soviet Stalingrad Front that had been decimated in July.
Our prior book reviw focused on the remembrances of German combatants at Stalingrad. This month's review tackles a book focused on the Soviet side. Perhaps even more so than my last book reviewed (and given the ubiquity of German memoirs, interviews, and first-person accounts of the battle), this rare look at what actual Soviet participants in the battle experience and felt is something you should not pass over.
If one is seeking to understand how and why the Second World War ended as it did it's instructive to take a look at Soviet planning during the fall of 1942. It represented everything German planning was not. First, unlike the chaos at OKH during the fall of 1942 (the third full year of war for the German high command and a time when you would have thought a competent leadership team would have been nailed down and in place), the Soviet Union had a stable military and political high command.
In a previousseriesofarticles I examined the state of play on the German Sixth Army's flanks outside of Stalingrad during the Axis assault on the city. In this follow-up article I would like to take a look at the Romanian Third Army's positions opposite the "bridgeheads" that would prove so crucial in the eventual success of the Soviet Southwestern Front's portion of the Red Army's November 19, 1942 counter-offensive. First, let's examine the formation of these bridgeheads over the Don River and why they were so important.
Between July 6th and October 24, 1942 the Red Army launched
Traditional accounts of Germany's 1942 summer offensive on the Eastern Front (codenamed Operation Blue) describe the tyranny of time, space, and distance all working together to undermine German efforts. Couple that with the Red Army's wise decision to pull back, draw the Germans in, and only then stand and fight, using its superior size and strength to beat the Axis forces, and you have a conventional wisdom that proved surprisingly enduring.
As it turns out a huge chunk of this conventional wisdom has already been proven to be more myth than reality.
The initial plans for Germany's 1942 summer offensive, code-named "Operation Blue" called for four sequential operations. The first, Blue I, featured the Four Panzer Army, German Second Army, and German Sixth Army all working together to encircle and destroy Soviet forces before the city of Voronezh along the upper Don River. The second part of the campaign, Blue II, called for the German Sixth Army to turn south in hopes of engineering a planned encirclement at Millerovo on the Donets River.
In October of 1942 the German Sixth Army, under General Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus, came as close as perhaps it ever did to defeating the Soviet defenders of Stalingrad - led most prominently by General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov's 62nd Army. At best, by October 1942 the 62nd Army numbered 50,000 men and 80 tanks. According to those present it was nowhere near these numbers and the Germans held overwhelming advantages in men and machines.
In an assault beginning on October 14th, five German divisions - over 90,000 men, 2,000 guns and mortars, 300 tanks, and waves of Stuka's forged a path
