Field Marshal von Manstein

Reviewed by Steven Douglas Mercatante [1]

Few would argue with the assertion Erich von Manstein ranked among the best operational level military commanders of the Second World War, if not the best. Nevertheless, because of Manstein's decisions during and after the War, he also ranks among the War's most controversial figures. In spite of Manstein's central role in the War however, there has been no official biography written about him. In Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head / A Portrait noted military historian Marcel Stein tackles this void in the scholarship on the War. In doing so Stein has driven a stake through the heart of myths long enduring in regards to Manstein and his role in the War. In addition, Stein also broadened the scope of his work and ably explained the German General Staff's overall moral decay, participation in the Holocaust, and central place in mismanaging the German war effort.

Manstein stood as a symbol of everything that explained the German Wehrmacht's incredible tactical and operational level military prowess during the War, and its moral depravity. Perhaps the most important value Stein's work provides for the military history enthusiast, among many, is in how Stein links his discussion of Manstein to larger themes marking the War and how we have come to remember it.

For example, Stein uses Manstein as a vehicle to explain how deeply implicated the German General Staff and field commanders were in the Holocaust; as well as how they self-servingly shaped a tremendously inaccurate picture of the War. Stein regularly transitions away from his discussion of Manstein's career to explain how the German officer corps' embrace of National Socialist ideology tainted a centuries old tradition of military excellence. As a result, even though the Third Reich could call upon a far more talented officer corps than Imperial Germany possessed in the First World War, the criminal behavior characteristic of the Wehrmacht's officer corps played a central role in leading to the Third Reich's destruction.

Stein demonstrates how Hitler's best military leaders, men such as Manstein, at times delivered stunning victories but, perhaps as a result, consistently underrated and misunderstood the strength and power of a Red Army eventually playing the central role in destroying the National Socialist experiment. For example, and, on the one hand, Manstein was an operational genius. He was the author of the plan that defeated the combined strength of the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch armies in mere weeks. Whereas just twenty years prior and after four years of warfare Imperial Germany had failed to do the same. In addition, Manstein's leadership of a Motorized Corps during Barbarossa's first months clearly established him as among the War's best leaders of large mobile units. Manstein added to this reputation when, early in 1943, he delivered a counterstroke so stunning it knocked the surging Red Army back on its heels. Manstein's counteroffensive, even though it had followed the Red Army's greatest success to date in the War, convinced Zhukov and Stalin they needed to marshal the Red Army's available strength to make a defensive stand later that year and put off their plans for taking the offensive until after the anticipated German summer offensive at Kursk.

Events at Kursk would prove critical to understanding the linkage between Manstein's failings and the mistakes made by his peers in the German officer corps' top ranks. At Kursk, one of the two elements explaining Manstein's often ignored flaws as a military leader were perhaps best revealed; his monumental arrogance and resultant inability to admit when he had made a mistake. Manstein's hubristic approach to fighting the Red Army took center stage in the events at Kursk. Manstein played a central role in convincing Hitler to launch  Operational Citadel even though the Red Army had turned the Kursk salient into one of the strongest fortresses in the world; a fact of which the Germans were well aware. Then, after Citadel had failed to achieve its stated objectives, Manstein disregarded reality and pushed for a continuation of the offensive. Manstein then failed to take responsibility for Citadel's failure even as the Red Army launched its own summer offensive and drove several German armies to the breaking point.

Manstein's second major flaw, as regards his military leadership, was his naked ambition and concomitant desire to head the German General Staff; an ambition prominently presenting itself at numerous times during the War. Manstein's ambition revealed itself most spectacularly in his repeated attempts to cover up his own mistakes. A failure of command most regularly revealed during his leadership of the 11th Army and Army Group Don; when in both instances he avoided making critical decisions. For example, in his role as the commander of Army Group Don, Manstein refused to make a decision ostensibly his to make and failed to issue an unambiguous breakout order from the Stalingrad pocket; an order that may have saved part of the encircled German Sixth Army. Manstein's lack of courage in regards to circumventing Hitler's orders demonstrated how Manstein placed his own career goals first; moral cowardice was part and parcel of his leadership style. Moreover, Manstein frequently threw his subordinates to the wolves; ostensibly from fear of Hitler's wrath even though numerous other high-ranking German military leaders would disregard Hitler's orders during the War, and get away relatively unscathed in spite of their transgressions. These men, such as Hausser and Model, at important times in the War put their men first, even though it might have meant the end of their careers.

Manstein was more than emblematic of the German army's successes and failings on the battlefield. Stein also helps the reader understand the latent anti-Semitism and racism pervading the German officer corps during the War through exploring Manstein's regular participation in the genocide defining the Wehrmacht's campaign in Eastern Europe. Stein's findings help illustrate the German officer corps' criminal depravity in not only ignoring the laws of war, but assisting with the genocide of millions of Slavs, Jews, gypsies, and other innocent human beings.

Furthermore, Stein also examines how following the War Manstein led the way in refashioning the historiography of the War. Under Manstein's influence this historiography flowed from an image and myth created by leading German military figures who survived the War. This myth has, unfortunately, stood up shockingly well over time. A myth that has led millions to believe the Wehrmacht did not participate in genocide, but, instead served as a professional and honorable institution that not only remained above the SS perpetrated slaughter, but also knew almost nothing of it. Moreover, not only did the Wehrmacht allegedly fight with clean hands, according to Manstein and his followers, but these men also planted a myth arguing that had the Wehrmacht directed the War free of Hitler's interference Germany would have won. Stein's book, if for no other reason is important reading in how he  comprehensively takes apart these pernicious myths.

Stein's work spans decades of German military history. The first half of the book offers a summary of Manstein's career, then moves through an in depth investigation into the most important events in his career. These chapters include a look at Manstein's great military achievements, as well as his mistakes; with the Battle for France, Manstein's leadership of Army Group Don, and the German assault at Kursk, including the planning phase, covered in detail. The second half of the book first examines Manstein's decision to stand by Hitler and decline to join the German military resistance movement. The book then describes Manstein's participation in the Holocaust, his trial for war crimes after the War, and finishes by demolishing Manstein's post-War attempts to cast himself in the best possible light.

My complaints with the work are minor. Although not an operational or tactical military history, a few more maps would have been helpful. The book covers events taking place across Europe; in particular, some of the villages mentioned in the Soviet Union are obscure even to the well-informed reader. Additional maps could have helped greatly in understanding where these events took place. In addition, the editing was somewhat sloppy at times, not enough to take away from the book's strengths but enough to prove both mildly annoying, and potentially a cause of confusion for some one with only a casual knowledge of the War.

Overall, Stein's book is a valuable addition to the available literature on the War. Stein's work fills important gaps in what is widely known about the War, adds to what is becoming known about the Wehrmacht's involvement in the Holocaust, and helps destroy decades of myths still prevalent today; more than sixty years after the War ended. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about Germany and the Second World War.

1.Steven Douglas Mercatante's Why Germany Nearly Won, A New History of the Second World War in Europe, is currently scheduled for publication by ABC-CLIO's Praeger early in 2012. Why Germany Nearly Won not only explores how close Germany actually came to winning the Second World War, but also why Germany was defeated. This work stems from over two decades researching and studying the Second World War. Steven's writing in the historical field goes beyond his research, and draws upon his experience as a former history teacher, from his undergraduate studies in history at the University of Michigan, from his graduate work in history at Eastern Michigan University, and from his study of International Law at Michigan State University College of Law. Steven has been published numerous times over in the historical and financial/legal field, both online and in a scholarly journal with an article entitled; The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, published in volume 53 of the South Dakota Law Review.