Death of the Wehrmacht

Reviewed by Steven Douglas Mercatante [1]

For anyone interested in the German method of warfare, or for those that just enjoy a good operational history, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) ranks among the best of today's scholarship. Conventional wisdom has long posited Hitler played the crucial role in turning Germany's stupendous victories during the spring and summer of 1942, in the Soviet Union and North African Desert, into catastrophic defeat in the fall and winter of that same year. European History Professor at Eastern Michigan University, and award winning author, Robert M. Citino challenges this conventional wisdom in his fascinating book, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies).

Even though there is little debate about the importance events during 1942 held for deciding the Second World War's outcome, there is substantial debate regarding how and why the major combatants ran their campaigns in 1942. During the decades following the War debate raged in particular regarding the importance of the two battles some view as the most important during the Second World War in Europe; Stalingrad and El Alamein.

During the Cold War era western historians spent substantial time investigating the fighting in North Africa between the Axis and British Commonwealth forces. Only in the latter stages of the Cold War, and following the Soviet Union's breakup, did a better understanding into what happened in Eastern Europe during 1942 begin to emerge and produce a theretofore-unforeseen level of clarity, although still not comparable to what we know about the war in North Africa. In particular, American military historian David Glantz and British historians, such as John Erickson and Antony Beevor, amply demonstrated the Red Army's importance in defeating Germany's 1942 attempts to subjugate the Soviet Union. Remarkably, in spite of the place held by Stalingrad and El Alamein in the War's historiography, the German side of the story remained incomplete and flawed. This mostly stemmed from a questionable over reliance by historians on memoirs from the German officer corps; especially Erwin Rommel's diary and Erich von Manstein's memoirs. This over reliance on, all too frequently, self-serving memoirs left a glaring hole in the literature for those interested in an objective operational level history of the German campaigns in 1942.

In Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies), Robert M. Citino has filled this hole in the literature. Moreover, Citino's work has delivered a broadside against those arguing Hitler was solely responsible for Germany's defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Citino challenges the conventional wisdom choosing to blame Hitler alone for German defeat. Citino issues his challenge by examining the German method of waging war, and the influence this had on Hitler and his General Staff's decisions during this crucial year in the War.

The mid twentieth century German method of war possessed a long historical antecedent. The German way of making war had emerged as a coherent body of thought during Prussia's 17th-19th century rise as a European power, and then Germany's subsequent rise to European prominence during the half century preceding World War II. In short the German way of war constantly sought to fight and win a war of movement. In Death of the Wehrmacht Citino, among other things, focuses on this historical context to provide a solid framework for explaining what happened on Europe's battlefields in the mid twentieth century.

Death of the Wehrmacht is not Citino's first operational level study, far from it. Although Citino has produced several notable books, this one ranks among his finest for several reasons; including the strong research and historical precedent in which Citino grounds his conclusions. The book's bibliography contains a veritable who's who of German military history. In addition, the footnotes provide much to supplement Citino's engrossing and well-written prose.

Citino writes fluidly, using a style that a layperson can readily follow and enjoy, while making comparisons and using contexts that evoke the fluid, ebb and flow of combat in North Africa and the Soviet Union during the spring and summer of 1942. Citino even brings Manstein's brutal siege of Sevastopol to life, punctuated as it was by the very different and brilliant Kerch campaign Manstein led in the spring of 1942. In addition, Citino has also included a number of simple maps amply highlighting the thrust and counterthrust of the combatants  described in the text.

Citino organizes his work in a logical fashion. First, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) sets the stage for understanding the German method of war and the context confronting the respective combatants in 1942. Second, the book amply documents the magnitude of the German victories at Kerch, Sevastopol, and Kharkov. Third, Citnino walks the reader through Rommel's contemporaneous accomplishments at Gazala and Tobruk in May-June 1942. At this point, the book re-examines events leading up to and at El Alamein and Rommel's subsequent defeat before returning to the epic struggle fought between Germany and the Soviet Union in its final chapters. As does any good operational history, the bulk of the text explores the lead up to each battle and campaign, although Citino does not skim through the actual combat.

Of particular interest for those eager to learn about the fighting on Germany's Eastern Front are Citino's chapters focusing on the German Campaign in the Crimea, fighting near Kharkov, Operation Blue's early phases, and events in the Caucuses. All too often, these crucial months in 1942 are glossed over, or worse, with historians generally fixated on the German Sixth Army's epic struggle to seize Stalingrad.

One of the few flaws in Citino's work, however, is his description of Hitler and the German officer corps as captive to German military tradition when they made their battlefield decisions in 1942. Citino colorfully describes the German officer corps as resembling a group of attack dogs straining independent of each other at the leashes held by Hitler. There is no  question German military tradition, history, doctrine, and training emphasizing fighting a highly aggressive war of movement held an enormous influence in the choices made by the German officer corps. To describe the actions taken by these men as predominately made in a deterministic fashion however somewhat overstates reality.

For instance, Hitler and the German officer corps were capable of rational debate during the War, including regarding when and how to shut down unprofitable campaigns or retreat from untenable positions. Numerous examples of such choices abound including; Hitler's fall 1941 decision to stand down his Arctic army in Finland, the early 1943 pullback from poor positions held by Army Group Center, the retreat from southern France during the summer of 1944, the fall 1944 German retreat from Greece, and the early 1945 evacuation of key German divisions from Courland following the failure of the Ardennes offensive. That said, there is no question, more often than not, the German army chose to attack during World War II.

Citino's study accurately reflects Germany's aggressive approach to war. In addition, Citino's description of the German army's campaigns in 1942 is a must buy for those interested in the War's operational history.

1.Steven Douglas Mercatante's Why Germany Nearly Won, A New History of the Second World War in Europe, is currently scheduled for publication by ABC-CLIO's Praeger early in 2012. Why Germany Nearly Won not only explores how close Germany actually came to winning the Second World War, but also why Germany was defeated. This work stems from over two decades researching and studying the Second World War. Steven's writing in the historical field goes beyond his research, and draws upon his experience as a former history teacher, from his undergraduate studies in history at the University of Michigan, from his graduate work in history at Eastern Michigan University, and from his study of International Law at Michigan State University College of Law. Steven has been published numerous times over in the historical and financial/legal field, both online and in a scholarly journal with an article entitled; The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, published in volume 53 of the South Dakota Law Review.