Bloody Verrieres

The Normandy Campaign was one of the most important of the Second World War. The German inability to fend off the Allied invasion of France was most likely the final nail in the inevitable defeat of the Third Reich. The campaign also featured a dizzying array of combat operations, not least of which being some of the biggest tank battles fought between the Allies and Germany.

The largest armored battles took place on the eastern side of the Allied bridgehead. These battles, fought by the Germans in defense against the British and Canadian attacker's seeking to liberate France, were the key to understanding the outcome of this crucial campaign. Bloody Verrieres Volumes I and II offers unprecedented insight into how the Germans ultimately prevailed against the major Allied Operations Goodwood, Atlantic, and Spring.

As indicated by the title to this review it covers both volumes; they are equally well done and largely follow a similar format. Moreover, the author's intention is that the reader move from Volume I to II; doing so sequentially not just for chronological reasons but analytical as well. And that analysis is what truly makes these books stand apart. This is not a classic accounting of these events, but a break-down of what happened and why. It is also a definitive reassessment of the conventional wisdom surrounding the composition, usage, and leadership of the I. SS-Panzerkorps in accomplishing its defensive goals of preventing the British and Canadian led Commonwealth forces from breaking through the otherwise superior tank country defining the eastern edge of the Allied bridgehead in France established on June 6, 1944.

The geographical focus of these books centers on two ridges: Verrieres and Bourguebus. They dominated the terrain south of Caen. If the Allied could take those ridges then they could create the conditions for an operational break-through of the German defenses in Normandy (and subsequent exploitation and pursuit operation to Paris or beyond). The Germans knew this and concentrated the overwhelming bulk of their armor and strongest formations to stop the Allies. This included the formidable I. SS-Panzerkorps, a veteran unit not only well-equipped and motivated, but as established by Gullachsen's prodigious research effort: also well-led.

In contrast, and though possessing overwhelming air and artillery superiority, the leadership of the British and Canadian infantry and tank brigades conducting the repeated Allied assaults proved not up to the task. These two volumes explain why not only that was true, but also how it was that in spite of German tactical superiority most of the I. SS-Panzerkorps' effort would prove in vain. That being in large part due to the decision of the German high command to strip most armor away from the western section of the front, and thus create the precondition for the overwhelming operational success that would be the U.S. Army's contemporaneous Operation Cobra.

Gullachsen's attention to detail, analysis, and honest appraisal of controversial aspects of this combat are all to be commended. He does not pull his punches. Nor does he attempt to muddle through when a clear answer to a given issue has of yet not been revealed by the historical record. The reader can trust when he speculates that such theorizing is from a well-informed position backed by a considerable effort to get to the heart of the matter in question.

These books are well worth your time; either as stand-alone publications or, and ideally, if purchased and read together.