The Battle of Kursk: Controversial and Neglected Aspects

The Battle of Kursk was quite possibly the turning point in the Second World War. Though that contention is of course debatable, the fact that Kursk can be considered in such terms speaks to its importance.  Moreover, for enthusiasts of armored warfare Kursk featured not only one of the greatest concentrations of armored fighting vehicles in history but, in a battle within a battle, few continue to attract as much interest as the clash of armor that occurred in July of 1943 near the small Russian town of Prokhorovka. In spite of this continued interest however, a considerable amount of misunderstanding continues to cloud the events that led to the defeat of the Third Reich’s last great offensive in Eastern Europe.

Into the breech once more steps Valeriy Zamulin and his latest work; “The Battle of Kursk: Controversial and Neglected Aspects”. Those interested in the events that occurred near Kursk during the summer of 1943 should recognize Zamulin’s name. His previously published “Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative” involved an extensive dive into the events occurring during July of 1943 on the southern facing of the Kursk Bulge. There the Red Army's Voronezh and Steppe Front's defeated Germany's Army Group South’s quest to meet Operation Citadel (the German code name for the offensive) goals.

Zamulin is a former Deputy Director and Director of Research at the Prokhorovka Battlefield Park Museum. He thus writes from the distinctive perspective provided by not only the fact he spent the bulk of his life where these events took place, but also has had access to important archival records; access he has leveraged to do top shelf research regarding the fighting near Kursk. All of which informs and backs this informative study that, among other things, deconstructs the fighting that led up to the formation of the Kursk bulge. In addition, the book also assesses key questions such as: could Germany have won the battle had they attacked in a more timely fashion; Did Vatutin err when he planned the Voronezh Front’s defenses; what assets did Model really have to draw upon as he prepared his part of the attack; how well did the Central Front perform in terms of sniffing out where and when the German offensive would begin; what was the true impact of the Soviet counter-artillery fire plan designed to disrupt the German offensive in its assembly areas; how should events at Prokhorovka be regarded and how and why did they unfold as they did; who fought better at Kursk - Rokossovsky or Vatutin, Rotmistrov or Katukov? There is much more that is covered by the author in this interesting and informative read.

Moreover, Zamulin brings much needed clarity into how the battle at Kursk has been perceived within Russia – including a detailed look at the historiography of the battle. Furthermore, the reader is not only given an exhaustive look into Russian primary and secondary sources about the battle but “The Battle of Kursk” also features a number of tables, maps and pictures – including many pictures otherwise not commonly seen elsewhere.

Perhaps the best part of “The Battle at Kursk” is in the analysis.  And not just the author’s; though that is much appreciated given his unique perspective on the battle. “The Battle at Kursk” features a number of reports from first hand participants in the battle and from the Red Army itself as it tried to understand how and why the Germans, in spite of the immense effort to stop them, still managed to nearly defeat the deeply echeloned defenses on the southern facing of the Kursk bulge. For instance, “The Battle at Kursk” spends a considerable amount of time analyzing command and control within the Voronezh Front. The book finds that Vatutin, though sometimes maligned because Army Group South defeated his strongest defensive belts (and he then required the Red Army’s strategic reserve in the form of the Steppe Front’s strongest formations to stop Manstein’s thrust) performed well in terms of arranging the defensive effort and responding to the situation as the battle evolved. Nevertheless the author uses the Voronezh Front’s experiences as fodder for a detailed discussion of the Red Army’s command and control problems in 1943 as follows:

The majority of the commanders at the level of the Voronezh Front’s army and corps levels, thanks to their talent and combat experience also fully corresponded to their occupied posts. However, a significant portion of the officers on the operational-tactical and especially the tactical level, both of the Voronezh Front and the Red Army as a whole, were poorly prepared in a career sense. They didn’t know how to assess an operational situation quickly and correctly, take adequate decisions and make them known to subordinates, organize the work of headquarters staff to assist them, or arrange cooperation with neighbors. They often became lost in combat situations, demonstrating elementary helplessness. This was one of the main reasons for the high losses in the troops subordinate to them. A weakness of the command staff up to the corps level inclusively was the inability to organize the coordinated action of all types of troops during a battle….these commanders had difficulty getting the army’s components working together productively and poorly handled the operations. Similar problems existed in the German Army, but in the Wehrmacht the training of officers was more rigorous and given primary significance, as incidentally was the case with the individual training of the soldier. Thus its tactical commanders, at the very least, demonstrated an excellent level of professional skill in the course of the Battle of Kursk. This enabled the German divisions and corps to operate successfully with forces that were significantly outnumbered by the Soviet side.

What’s more, Zamulin not only takes the time to illustrate in detail - but he has managed to build upon his previous effort. This is a book that in spite of delving deep into the weeds of battlefield leadership and combat operations is an enjoyable experience. Furthermore, the translator Stuart Britton has again done a solid job, and his efforts must be commended. Overall, “The Battle of Kursk” provides the kind of balanced and well-reasoned insight that Zamulin has come to be known for: all of which helps the reader to understand how and why events at Kursk unfolded as they did.