Soviet Cavalry Operations During The Second World War

Soviet Cavalry Operations During The Second World War offers a unique perspective on the fighting between Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II. In addition, the reader also gets a brief look into the developmental genesis of such operations and their impact on modern Soviet and Russian ground forces.

The strength of this book is in showing a reader otherwise confronted with a blizzard of works emphasizing the role of the tank on World War II's Eastern Front that in fact cavalry often proved decisive in the success of Soviet defensive and offensive operations. A key takeway from reading this book is that in many ways the Red Army did a much better job of evaluating the terrain and conditions in which it was operating and then employing effective use of available assets than did the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) in opposition. All too often the Red Army's cavalry launched deep raiding operations behind Axis front lines. Though never operationally decisive in and of themselves these daring raids at a minimum required the redeployment of substantial Axis resources while creating countless headaches for Axis commanders.  

One of the more unique claims made by this book (and one convincingly backed) is that the U.S. Civil War and the use of cavalry therein had an influence on the Soviet employment of cavalry during World War I, the Russian Civil War, and World War II. This forms a large part of the initial chapters looking at the use of cavalry within Soviet deep operational doctrine. From there, the author provides a window into how this cavalry tradition evolved during the Second World War to become a foundational element of Soviet era Operational Manoeuvre Groups.

A significant portion of the book details Soviet cavalry operations during Barbarossa and the Soviet Winter Counter-Offensive of 1941-1942. These are the book's strongest chapters, frequently including an honest assessment of what worked and didn't work on these bloody battlefields. This can be seen in this excerpt from the section covering the Soviet Southwestern Front's defeat of the German XXXIV Corps during December of 1941 (and the lead role played by the 5th Cavalry Corps in this victory):

An analysis of this battle illustrates the danger of failing to properly plan the transition from attack to defense. The Germans were slow to establish defensive positions following the culmination of their attack. Lacking air or panzer support, the XXXIV Corps was at a severe disadvantage against the more mobile Soviet cavalry. German reconnaissance failed to detect the 5th Cavalry Corps' concentration on the flanks of the XXXIV Corps' attack...Well-executed Soviet combined arms tactical doctrine resulted in the defeat of the German XXXIV Corps.

This part of the book transitions into the final third, showing how the Red Army leveraged unique traditions and often overlooked resources (like cavalry in what was already an age dominated by the internal-combustion engine) to allow the Soviet Union to hold on against the otherwise overwhelming Axis onslaught until the Red Army was able to take the initiative and carry the war to the Germans. In addition, the author is not afraid to take somewhat controversial positions. For instance, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budenny frequently takes a healthy dose of criticism for his often maligned role in undermining Deep Operational Thought and the needed modernization of the Red Army. Nevertheless, the author singles out Budenny for praise in preparing the Red Army for war and his performance during the war. Harrel even finds that Buddeny's leadership was instrumental in the success enjoyed by the Soviet cavalry during the war. 

Soviet Cavalry Operations During The Second World War offers the general military history enthusiast an instructive and informative look at a little understood aspect of the Soviet-German war. I recommend it to my readers.