Sixth Army’s Flanks Outside Stalingrad: The Red Army Plans It’s Counterstrike

If one is seeking to understand how and why the Second World War ended as it did it's instructive to take a look at Soviet planning during the fall of 1942. It represented everything German planning was not. First, unlike the chaos at OKH during the fall of 1942 (the third full year of war for the German high command and a time when you would have thought a competent leadership team would have been nailed down and in place), the Soviet Union had a stable military and political high command. Now, one must remember that this Soviet high command certainly had not been a seamless grouping early in the war. As late as the spring of 1942 the Red Army was still reeling as a result of several incredibly poor decisions - most notably during that year being Stalin's insistence (over Zhukov's complaints) on launching his battered armies on a front wide offensive in January of 1942 that would exact a frightful toll from the Red Army while accomplishing negligble results in comparison to those that had been wrought in the prior month. Nevertheless, by the fall of 1942 (or in just over a year after entering the Second World War proper and again compared to a German high command of Hitler/OKW/OKH still in flux three years into their war) the Soviet high command was doing a better job of working in a collaborative fashion that involved evaluating competing viewpoints toward best developing a coherent plan of action. In this instance that meant planning for countering German Army Group B's assault on Stalingrad. Moreover, unlike the Germans (who had either cashiered or marginalized many of their best military minds) the Red Army had gathered its brightest military leaders on the most important front in the war and tasked them with tackling the problem of how to best turn the tide at Stalingrad. From there, and also unlike the Germans, they also not only then fleshed out a coherent plan of action for accomplishing their goals but made sure that the Soviet Fronts involved were given the resources needed for success.

It must be remembered that througout the fall of 1942 Hitler, OKH (and its intelligence arm - FHO), Army Group B, and Paulus himself at Sixth Army often held varied and disjointed views on how to address not just closing out the Stalingrad battle but the Sixth Army's flank security outside the city. Needless to say the end result of this failure to come to an acceptable agreement was a series of half-measures but no coherent overall plan for handling these important issues. Today many look at the attritional battle in Stalingrad and in the Caucasas (Army Group A) as evidence of Blue's complete failure. Nevertheless, had the Germans been able to appropriately address Sixth Army's flank security needs (taking into account every other way in which Blue had not met its goals in 1942) then the Soviet position during the winter of 1942-1943 and the years that followed would have been far more dire than in reality. As such, in examining how the Red Army approached the issue of cracking Army Group B's defensive positions we glean a number of insights into the state of the Second World War at that time plus see a clear contrast to the muddled German leadership situation.

Planning for a counter-offensive to encircle the German Sixth Army and defeat Army Group B began shortly after German troops penetrated into Stalingrad during September of 1942. That is if one is to believe Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgii Zhukov's claims. On the other hand there is a significant body of evidence to the otherwise. More to the point that regardless of Stavka's interest in cracking Army Group B's long and thin defensive front, the planning for the Soviet counter-offensive in the region actually stemmed in large part from the efforts of the Stalingrad Front's commander, General A.I. Eremenko (pictured here).

Eremenko asserts that he started thinking of a grand counter-offensive and encirclement of the German Sixth Army when it was still approaching Stalingrad. It is known that he made a proposal to Stavka regarding a counter-offensive, doing so on October 6th and 9th of 1942. From there, and according to Soviet archival evidence, Eremenko is telling the truth in regards to the general concept of his early role in establishing the outline of what would become Operation Uranus (the plan to encircle the German Sixth Army). The bottom line is that the Red Army had to do something different, and Eremenko (as well as others) very much recognized that fact.

That's because throughout the summer and fall of 1942 Stalin and Stavka had sought to derail Operation Blue by launching a relentless series of hastily planned and inadequately supported counterstrokes. Ultimately, the Germans parried virtually all of them in a relatively easy manner. This included eight such counterstrokes against Army Group B's flanks from July to early November of 1942. All of them failed, and at great loss to the Red Army. The attacks against Sixth Army's flanks had been particularly costly. A number of senior Soviet military officers had begun to realize that further attempts at striking Sixth Army's flanks just outside of Stalingrad would similarly end in failure - as the German defensive front near the city was just too strong. As such, they began to come together around a plan that would move their attempts at penetrating Sixth Army's flanks to a location much further removed from the Stalingrad city limits - in effect greatly broadening the scope of operations through a much more dramatic grand encirclement (rather than the attempted shallow encirclements that had failed so spectacturlarly to date).

At the same time Zhukov reorganized the Soviet fronts in and around Stalingrad. On September 28th he created a new Don Front (the 1st Guards, 21st, 24th, 63rd, 66th Armies, and 4th Tank Army) positioned along the Don River northwest of Stalingrad. To lead it he brought in one of his best commanders, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky. A smaller Stalingrad Front (the 28th, 51st, 57th, 62nd, and 64th Armies in and south of Stalingrad) would be led by Eremenko. From there, and during the first weeks of October, Eremenko and Rokossovsky worked with Zhukov and Vasilevsky to flesh out a plan for Uranus. As a result, during October's first week Eremenko, Rokossovsky, and Khrushchev (Eremenko's political commissar at the time) made their recommendations to Stavka. One week later Zhukov submitted the final draft plans for both Operations Uranus (the attempt to encircle and destroy the German Sixth Army) as well as the even more massive Operation Mars (the attempt to encircle and destroy the German Ninth Army). In addition, Stavka gave its own input. Collaboratively and collectively the plan took shape.

The key point, (as pushed in particular by Rokossovsky, Eremenko, and Khrushchev) was to make sure Uranus did not repeat the ongoing failings of the other counterstrokes outside Stalingrad - i.e. in being inadequately planned, prepared, resourced, and then launched into the teeth of the German defensive front just outside of Stalingrad. Rokossovsky in particular took great pains to educate Stavka on the losses and overall weakness of his Don Front following the bloody repulse of its Kotluban offensives. Though Stavka seemed to lean toward doing much of what had been done (and failed), just better resourced - the triumvarate of Rokossovsky, Eremenko, and Khruschev pushed their arguments. The three of them put additional emphasis on attacking through the Romanian held portions of the front outside of Stalingrad, already evident as being notably weaker than the German positions. To be fair, both Stalin and elements of Stavka quickly became interested in these proposals and opposition to this broader approach quickly evaporated. Zhukov, Vasilevsky, the Stavka, Stalin, and the Soviet General Staff all recognized the potential game-changing impact of attempting a broader envelopment along the lines of what their local Front commanders were proposing. The recognition of the merits of the "Eremenko plan" and is subsequent adoption (albeit in a modified form following additional input and planning) in and of itself offers a stunning contrast to the all too often the German approach when confronted with a split in regards how to approach a particular strategic or operational problem.

The German political and military leadership, for all of their cold-blooded single-mindedness when it came to committing genocide against Jews (which was at its murderous height in the fall of 1942), proved repeatedly indecisive throughout the Second World War during a considerable number of instances in which a genuine debate existed about how to approach a crucially important problem. The most salient such examples include the following:

• The deeply flawed Barbarossa plan that never decided on what the primary goal should be (destroying the Red Army in the field or denying the Soviet economy and Red Army its indusrial and natural resource base)
• The indecision over how Barbarossa should proceed during the late summer of 1941 when it became apparent the Soviet Union wasn't just going to roll over and die
• The failure to put in place an effective plan for wrapping up Barbarossa as it became obvious none of its goals were going to be met in 1941
• The horribly fractured German command regarding any number of a litany of decision points during Operation Blue - including most critically during its pursuit and culmination phases
• The indecision regarding Operation Citadel (the attack on the Kursk salient)
• Against the Western Allies most notably during the 1941-1942 time span was the failure to settle on an approach for dealing with Malta
• The planning for and conduct of the Kasserine Pass counter-offensive which effectively divided command and control between Arnim and Rommel so much so as to undermine an otherwise golden opportunity to inflict a major defeat on the Western Allies
• The never settled debate (and disastrously so as it would turn out) regarding how to stop Operation Overlord (on the beaches as per Rommel or inland as preferred by much of the German high command in the west)

And on and on...All of these offer salient examples of a consistently muddled approach to decision-making regarding some of the war's most important decision points.

Thus, and in particular, the decisive Soviet approach to strategic decision-making during the fall of 1942 stands in stark contrast to the German approach as to how to not only wrap up Blue but secure its gains. The most important of those decisions revolved around what was to be done in terms of supporting the assaults on Stalingrad, at Ordzhonikie, and bolstering Stalingrad's flanks. All of these were goals the German had more than enough resources to accomplish, but which they were failing to prioritize. Instead, while Army Groups A and B were starved of resources the German high command chose to substantially reinforce or pursue tangential and decidedly less important goals. For instance, via bolstering the forces holding onto a stretch of strategically worthless desert at El Alamein or actively maintaining powerful air elements in the Arctic even though the PT convoys had been largely shut down months earlier in July. Furthermore, the German high command's dilution of the Ostheer's efforts was perhaps most notably made obvious during the Operation Whirlwind debacle. This ostensible offensive accomplished next to nothing in Army Group Center's area of operations (a second-tier command during this stage of the war) at the expense of the far more strategically important effort in Southern Russia.

In contrast, during the fall of 1942 the Soviet military leadership acted with alacrity, purpose, and ruthlessness in locking down the resources needed to not only stave off Army Group B and A's assaults but gather the needed assets to give Operation Uranus the backing needed to achieve success. In just the second and third week of October alone a flurry of directives emanated from Zhukov, Vasilesvky, Stavka and the General Staff to this end. This included broadening the major reorganization that had begun in September. This was most prominently done via the formation of the Southwestern Front on October 22nd (to be commanded by Lieutenant General Vatutin). The Southwestern Front would go on to rank as perhaps the most important Soviet front during the winter of 1942-1943 as well as serve as the driving force behind Operation Uranus' northern pincer in November. Stavka on October 23rd also ordered the formation of the Red Army's first two guard armies, the 1st and 2nd, to spearhead Uranus (each would include two guards rifle corps and a guards mechanized corps). Additional Stavka directives focused on finally bringing the Stalingrad regions logistics up to a level commensurate with such an effort all while shunting more and more reinforcements, including armor and airpower, into the region to turn the new Southwestern Front into a powerhouse while bolstering the Stalingrad Front to the southeast of Stalingrad for its also important role as the southern pincer of Uranus. All told, the three Soviet fronts (including the Don Front) involved in Uranus would by November 18, 1942 total over one million men, 1,500 tanks, 22,000 artillery pieces, and 1,500 combat aircraft. Deployed northwest to southeast, the Southwestern Front, Don Front, and Stalingrad Front were thus put on solid footing to conduct Uranus - all told ten field armies, one tank army, four air armies and a massive number of lesser supporting formations.

The bulk of these forces would be deployed against the Romanian portion of Germany's Axis allies, themselves providing the bulk of Army Group B (and A's for that matter) flank security. Army Group B in November of 1942 included the German Second Army far to the northwest and located east of Kursk and Kharkov where it was holding relatively strong defensive positions near Voronezh. From there and winding down a 360 kilometer front mostly tracking along the Don River were decidedly weaker defensive positions held by the Hungarian Second, Italian Eighth, and Romanian Third Armies - with the Romanian troops tying into the edge of the German Sixth Army's northwestern area of operations. From roughly the Kletskaia region on the Don River, east to Stalingrad and south of the city were the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army (with two corps set to become the Romanian Fourth Army) guarding the lake region south of Stalingrad. From there, Army Group B's area of operations peetered out on the steppe north of Elista. There the German 16th Motorized Division. buttressed by locally raised battalions of glorified militia. patrolled a veritable no-mans land between it and the northern edges of Army Group A's area of operations. All told Army Group B in November of 1942 included six armies, an air fleet, and a total of 49 divisions (26 German) that just barely covered its 840 kilometer front. The German allies were the biggest weak point here. They were not poor soldiers - but they were poorly equipped, supported, and in some cases, led. On top of that, and in such open terrain as dominated the region the German allies guarded, they were in no shape to face a mechanized opponent the likes of the Red Army.

Moroever, in preperation for Uranus the Red Army spent considerable amounts of time and energy concentrating on intelligence, counter-intelligence, and organizational matters throughout October and November of 1942. This Soviet intelligence effort largely outpaced what the Germans were doing. In particular, an intensive planning process involved Zhukov and other Soviet high-level military officials meeting with virtually every senior general officer that would be a part of Uranus. The Germans did nothing remotely comparable in terms of preparing Army Group B for Stalingrad's endgame and solidifying the army group's flank security.

For instance, while the Red Army radically reinforced the Soviet Fronts involved in preparing for Uranus and defending Stalingrad the German command virtually ignored Army Group B in terms of reinforcements (no less doing anything more supportive of the German Sixth Army). As it was Rommel's forces at El Alamein would receive far more reinforcements in September and October of 1942 than the paltry trickle of men and machines going to the Sixth Army. This was in spite of the fact the Sixth Army was then fighting the most costly and potentially important battle of the war to date, while Rommel's command spent the bulk of those two months in static largely unchallenged positions. As a result by November of 1942 the German Sixth Army's seventeen infantry, jager, motorized, and panzer divisions (including 113 infantry, panzer-grenadier, and pioneer battalions) could only classify 21 infantry, panzer-grenadier, and pioneer battalions as strong or medium-strong - everything else was average or weak. Furthermore, the three panzer and two motorized infantry divisions were not only woefully short of fuel (something the Germans had been sending in spades to Rommel regardless of how many tankers were lost at sea) but could only field 218 tanks (180 operational) and 68 assault guns (43 operational) on November 16, 1942.

Moreover, the worst of the fall-off in the Sixth Army's strength occurred from October 18th to roughly one month later on the eve of Uranus (when the ten divisions within Stalingrad city proper fell from a ration/combat strength of 114,443/44,842 men to 87,153/38,245 men. Had even a fraction of the tens of thousands of men being sent to Rommel in September and October of 1942 instead been sent to Sixth Army its likely Soviet forces west of the Volga would have been wiped out within the Stalingrad city limits by early in November at the latest. The German Sixth Army still wouldn't have been ready to fight a mobile battle on the steppe outside the city in such a scenario. However, its response to Uranus if given even as little as a week or so of breathing space between a potential fall of Stalingrad and the onset of Uranus may have been enough to have made Uranus the failure its twin offensive Mars would become. Nevertheless the Sixth Army's weakness in and around Stalingrad in November of 1942 was a product of two things - neither of which had anything to do with available German manpower or equipment.

One was the German decision to forego reinforcing its premier army at the time it most needed those reinforcements in lieu of bolstering decidedly secondary fronts of importance. Second, was the fact the Red Army had a plan and was executing it. Thus, the Red Army was not only building up its assault elements for Uranus but did all of this while dealing with Sixth Army's relentless battering of Chuikov's command. To be fair, the Red Army still nearly lost this gamble, there being multiple occassions in September and October of 1942 where the Germans came fatally close to taking Stalingrad. But the Red Army ultimately didn't. In part they can thank the Germans for failing to reinforce Sixth Army. In part they can thank themselves for reinforcing 62nd Army just enough to keep it a viable combat army. And in part they could thank themselves for putting in place a strategic level system of command that was the polar oppposite of the jumbled, distracted, and bi-furcated German command apparatus. Unlike the German chain of command during the fall of 1942 (when Hitler spent a significant amount of time in direct command of Army Group A - which really meant no one commanded Army Group A) the Soviet command chain was clearly defined. At the top existed Soviet Defense Committee (GKO) and Stavka. The General Staff coordinated and led the tasks as promulgated by Stavka in conjunction with Stavka representatives helping to coordinate and work with the Front level leadership. The key actors as Stavka representives were Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Voronov. The worked closely with the three Fronts in and around Stalingrad. From there, and at the army level the most important formation was Chuikov's 62nd Army - which was being funnelled enough reinforcements to hold in place and grind down the German Sixth Amy (which in contrast the German high command was starving of reinforcements).

From having established a clear chain of command, to uniting around a common plan early in the process and not splitting the difference as the Germans were prone to do, to bringing in enough reinforcements to meet their strategic and operational goals (unlike the Germans starving Army Group B of otherwise available manpower), to learning from past mistakes (by not launching Uranus as a glorified fifth Kotluban offensive into the teeth of the German defensive front), to bringing in the best and brightest of the Red Army's operational leadership (including Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, and Vatutin) the Soviet response to Army Group B's attack on Stalingrad was everything the German plan of attack and attempts to consolidate Blue's gains was not. For all of the focus that is often put upon the forces gathered by the Red Army in and around Stalingrad in the fall of 1942 the simple fact is that without proper strategic and operational level planning, attempts to improve command and control, and the provision of ample time for preparation it is likely that Uranus would have been a failure even in taking shoddy German decision making into account.

As to this last point, we also need to consider how poorly Army Group B, OKH, and Hitler were being served by Colonel Reinhard Gehlen's Fremde Heere Ost (FHO or Foreign Armies East). FHO, the German army's intelligence organization, repeatedly throughout the fall of 1942 failed to appreciate or understand the Red Army's gradually improving ability to conduct deep ranging mechanized operations and, even more importantly, come close to grasping Soviet strategic intentions. FHO and Hitler, perhaps both reinforcing the other, believed the Red Arm was exhausted by the fall of 1942. And it was. But not to the extant they believed. It was still capable of conducting large scale counter-offensives and FHO completely misunderstood, downplayed, and missed that reality. Moreover, active Soviet combat opeations against Army Group Center further led Gehlen to believe the Red Army's main efforts would be there and not against Army Group B in spite of the fact nothing Army Group Center was doing posed anywhere near the existential threat to the Soviet Union that did German Army Groups B and A. To that end, Gehlen mishandled considerable local intelligence from Army Group B, including from the Romanians, that the Red Army had significantly reinforced its troops in the bridgeheads along the Don far beyond pure defensive needs. By November 3rd (or nearly three weeks before Uranus began) Army Group B was convinced a large scale attack was coming and both Weichs (commanding Army Group B) and Paulus (commanding Sixth Army) would become increasingly active in attempting to bolster the defensive front along the Don. But with Hitler and OKH's eyes focused elsewhere it wouldn't be enough.

Once again, more than numbers would be the deciding factor in victory and defeat on the Second World War's most important battlefields.