The Ostheer Races to Rebuild: 1942 Edition

The German army in the east (Ostheer) had taken a beating during Barbarossa in part but even worse during the Soviet winter counter-offensives beginning in December of 1941. The first six months of 1942 featured a series of massive battles that would continue nearly up to the start of the second large-scale German summer offensive: Operation Blue. Meanwhile, and amidst this near continuous combat, particularly in sector of the German Eastern Front held by Army Group North's Sixteenth Army and much of Army Group Center's left wing, the Germans and the Red Army were attempting to rebuild their exhausted legions - with mixed results for each. In this article I will examine the shape and scope of the Ostheer's rebuilding efforts as it prepared for the summer campaign season. Given the larger context of Operation Blue the special  emphasis here will be on the Axis forces designated for meeting Blue's objectives: German Army Group South. In addition, we will need to take a brief look at the state of Nazi Germany's economy.

By early in 1942, and in spite of Germany having been at war for well over two years, the German war economy still represented a work in progress. On the one hand it was more than capable of providing Army Group South with all of the tools it would need to meet nearly all of, if not all of, Operation Blue's goals. This was true in spite of the fact the German economy was still very much being restructured. On the other hand, Germany's military and political leadership continued to pay little more than lip service to the idea of concentrating military and economic assets at the decisive place on the continental sized battlefields the Axis and Allies fought across. Known as Schwerpunkt, this was a guiding German military concept of operations dating to the nineteenth century whereby all other goals were supposed to be subordinated to the main effort. Ironically, and as we shall soon see, German assets that were more than sufficient to bring about a strategically impactful outcome on the war would instead once again be stretched in pursuit of competing rather than complementary goals. As a result of the German failing to curtail questionable initiatives this would detract from what should have been the German military establishment's center of gravity in what had become a global world war - that being a focus on both taking from and denying the Soviet Union access to the economic resources found in Southern Russia and the Caucasus.

For that matter, early in 1942 the German economy had not yet been fully mobilized for total warfare. But it was moving in that direction under the capable leadership of Fritz Todt, the Third Reich’s Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. This was in spite of the fact that the German economy struggled under largely self-inflicted raw materials bottlenecks, lagging steel output, and the failure to streamline the German armaments industry. As to the latter, there were plenty of excellent weapons and weapons systems otherwise available to the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) that could have been produced in even greater numbers than in reality had a myriad of competing designs not been allowed to remain in production. For instance, even in the spring of 1942 German manufacturers were still producing 23 different truck models. But that was only a part of the problem. 

The biggest impediment to the German economy operating even near its peak potential revolved arond the decentralized nature of the Third Reich's economic base itself. A blizzard of different bureaucratic entities competed for Hitler's attention as well as resources. Among these organizations included The Ministry of Economics, the War Economy Office, and the Four-Year Plan Organization as the biggest such players. In addition it must be noted however, that there were a full twenty-seven other offices beneath that larger umbrella. Todt had initiated a process whereby by early in 1942 that mess of organizations would be re-organized into Five Main Committees for ammunition, weapons, tanks, engineering and general military equipment. However, in February of 1942 Todt died in a plane crash. In a move that in and of itself could have crippled the Third Reich Hitler chose to replace Todt with his personal architect; Albert Speer.

As it turned out Speer proved an inspired choice who made up for his lack of relevant experience with formidable organizational acumen and the political wherewithall to navigate the German political establishment's savage Social Darwinian waters. From there, on March 21st Hitler also appointed Fritz Sauckel to bring Germany’s seeming continual labor crisis under control. Together the two new appointees worked from Todt's outline to put the German war economy on stronger footing. To that end Speer and Sauckel helped resolve labor issues by inducing or press ganging 970,000 foreign laborers into the German economy during 1942 alone. However, they could have done much more. For instance, over five million German men were still in 1942 being held back from military use by economic and other such deferments. Now, though these deferments ultimately were as a result of the German leadership's decisions there was not nearly a strong enough effort made to overcome not only this situation but take advantage of opportunities that had presented themselves from the fruits of Barbarossa's early victories. For instance, there was no large-scale push to put to work the remaining prisoners of war from the great hauls of 1941 (3,355,499 such prisoners taken) who were otherwise then dying by the hundreds of thousands each month (sixty percent of the 3.35 million prisoners dead by February 1, 1942) due to neglect and starvation. As it was only 166,881 of these prisoners were working as laborers within Germany by March 1, 1942 in spite of an order from Hitler on October 31, 1941 to use such manpower for economic use and thus free up German manpower for the military. So though many like to point to 1942 as a big turnaround year in the German economy it could have taken even stronger strides. As such the German war machine remained a far too byzantine and highly inefficient system of management that was part and parcel of the German economy and military establishment in 1942. This would be one of many reasons it is possible to show that the Germans ranked among their own worst enemies.

Nevertheless, for all of the labor issues Speer was not able to address he did better at rationalizing the economy. For instance, he lined up the work done by the part-supplier industry (including 3.8 million workers in 51,000 small firms) to match the goals being set by the main committees for each armaments sector. From there, he removed underperforming managers, wrung greater efficiencies from the steel industry, and ordered the slack taken out of Western European factories, steel mills, coal mines and other production centers otherwise working at less than full capacity. In addition, Speer oversaw cuts in domestic coal production while greater leveraging existing coal output to further rejuvenate steel production. In addition, better access to stocks of raw materials also helpd considerably. As a result of these combined changes economic productivity doubled even though the labor force had only grown by thirty-three percent.

That said, in laying the economic groundwork for building up the 1942 edition of the Ostheer the Germans were not doing enough to respond to two big military lessons with economic impacts that they had learned during Barbarossa. First, mobility had once again proven to be absolutely crucial to German military success and a lack thereof forming a big part of the corresponding failures that caused the 1941 campaign season to end in failure. Second, the cost of waging war within the Soviet Union and against the Red Army had imposed dramatically higher logistical requirements on the Ostheer than had been expected at the onset of Barbarossa. Fuel, ammunition, horse feed, and other such supplies had been exhausted at levels beyond which German planners had prepared. As such, if Case Blue were to be a success then addressing issues of mobility would be paramount. In addition, losses in motor vehicles, prime movers, and horses were so high during Barbarossa that in February of 1942 Army Group South’s new commander, Field Marshal von Bock, reported that the German eastern army was “not combat-ready for a war of movement”. This was a damning indictment for an army whose lifeblood was its maneuverability. In response the German army had speeded development of tracked cross country transport and towing vehicles – the Maultier, or Mule, and Raupenshlepper Ost; or Caterpillar Tractor East. Output of both these vehicles rose dramatically throughout 1942, but they only provided a partial solution to the deficiency in prime movers.

From there, and more importantly yet, not only were there not enough trucks or tracked vehicles being delivered to the Ostheer (availability was another story), but shortages of rolling stock hindered resupply by rail. It was well known that Germany had to deal with repeated shortages in raw materials and labor throughout the early years of the war. But why this was so is often missed or explained as a natural outcome of the mid-sized German state trying to compete on a global stage against continental sized powers. What many don't understand however, is that a big chunk of the German problems in industrial output and productivity could have been addressed if they had taken the time to straighten out transportation issues that among other things aggravated in particular the raw materials issues. For example, during the 1930s build-up for war the Third Reich had consistently underallocated resources to transportation infrastructure. As a result and though the German economy consistently grew, even shrugging off the labor and raw material shortfalls to increase production of key weapons systems like tanks in 1941 over 1940 - the failure of transportation capacity to keep up undermined the steadily increasing efficiency with which German factories operated. Making matters worse the length of track laid down and managed had also grown at a steady pace. Though the Reichsbahn's stock of locomotives, fright cars, and passenger cars grew - the pace did not match what was needed to respond to the burdens being put on the German supply of rolling stock. This meant that existing locomotives and cars were quickly run down and needed to be removed from usage for longer periods of maintenance. Moreover, the German military needed thousands of trains to mobilize for the campaigns of 1939-1941 (with the preparation for Barbarossa relying upon 2,500 trains per day). This meant that the amount of rolling stock being used to shuttle among other things, coal (which constituted 84 percent of German electricity generation in 1941) proved insufficient every time trains were requisitioned for military use. 

Transportation issues are often glossed over but are vitally important to understand if one wants to know what key elements were really hindering German economic and thus military performance during 1941-1942. For instance, those that say Germany lacked the raw materials to challenge the large Allied/Soviet economies are missing the point. Though Germany was not blessed with the same bounty of resources that their enemies enjoyed, they didn't need to be had they managed their existing resources in a more optimal manner. The failure to invest in rolling stock during the 1930s played a huge role in the economic dislocations afflicting the German armaments industry during 1941 in particular. Moreover, the heavy-handed German management style in relation to its most important acquisitions (meaning Western Europe) further undermined the German economy. For instance, a May 1941 strike by 50,000 Belgian coal miners impacted a quarter of all coal production in the German dominated sections of Europe. This strike unfolded as such on the eve of Barbarossa. Meaning that elements like this strike and other factors, such as the German decision in the summer of 1941 to reallocate existing resources away from armaments production for the army and instead toward the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, proved as important if not more so to the ensuing fall in military oriented production the German economy experienced during the summer and early fall of 1941 than did elements such as an absolute weakness in the numerical quantity of raw material availability.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the huge Ostheer began moving hundreds of miles east pre-existing German decisions going back to the 1930s to not invest in building enough locomotives and freight cars for the expanding German economy were finally magnified. For instance, in the fall of 1940 and when rail transport was not yet stressed by the demands of invading the Soviet Union it had taken eight days to move the entire 11th Panzer Division by rail from Germany to Romania. To make a corresponding move east one year later when munitions, POL (petroil, oil, lubricants), and other such supplies were competing on limited rail lines simply could not happen given the scale of German underinvestment in rail based resources. German mismanagement decisions which superceded other commonly cited logistical problems for Barbarossa's failure as created by factors like the weather in the fall and winter of 1941-1942 or the need to convert Soviet rail lines to match German. For instance, by December of 1941 Germany's Eisenbahntruppen (railway construction troops) had already converted 15,000 kilometers of track to fit German needs and they would continue to convert track at a rapid pace in spite of shortages of manpower and equipment (especially motorized vehicles). This is all the more frustrating from a German perspective in that the Ostheer had captured 2,173 Russian locomotives and 53,850 freight wagons during Barbarossa. Had the Germans made the proper investments in rolling stock to match increased economic output such a haul should have made up most of the shortfall in terms of what was needed to supply the front. But of course the Germans had decided on other economic priorities of a dubious nature during the 1930s. Notable white elephants included the Kriegsmarine's massively expensive battleships and the huge amounts of concrete, steel, and transportation resources used to build the largely irrelevant Siegfried Line.

Furthermore, with only one double-track rail line per each of the Ostheer's army groups (whereas during the French campaign each German army had such a high capacity rail line) and the competing demands of the various German military and non-military organizations in Russia there weren't enough supply trains available to supply the combat troops. A problem made all the worse when the Germans did allocate more trains but failed to increase the resources going to the overworked Eisenbahntruppen and Reichsbahn personnel. As a result it was not uncommon to find supply trains backed up at stations behind the front waiting ever longer to be unloaded by the few supply services workers then available. For instance, during August and September of 1941 Army Group South received only 14.5 of the 24 supply trains per day it otherwise needed. Though it is fashionable to blame the weather for the halting nature of the German drive into the eastern Ukraine during the fall of 1941 the reality is that German supply management decisions (including the decision to contemporaneously fund the logistically costly battle for Italy's Libyan colony) were far more consequential. In fact, one can argue German mismanagement of existing resources would be the difference between an exhausted 1st Panzer Army bludgeoning its way into Rostov in November of 1941 and what could have been possible weeks earlier - when the entire eastern Ukraine and doorway to the Caucuses stood wide open after the September destruction of the Soviet army's in the Ukraine near Kiev.

For that matter, as the weather deteriorated German troops began to freeze not because the German command had failed to prepare for a winter war but because when they did the rail network couldn't accomodate it. As a result in October of 1941 some 130 trains assembled by the German army quartermaster for resupplying the Ostheer for winter combat instead were snarled in traffic around Warsaw. This is more evidence that the German economic, logistical and thus military problems were mostly self-inflicted. Barbarossa's failings did not arise out of German forces being hopelessly out-resourced and out-numbered by a Red Army that during the fall of 1941 the Ostheer actually outnumbered in many key metrics - like operational armored fighting vehicles deployed at the front.

The Germans would spend the winter of 1941-42 sorting transportation problems out and as the Reichsbahn sent more locomotives east and assigned more men to address the problems. As a result, by January of 1942 the Reichsbahn had sent 4,280 more locomotives to Russia. Though unsnarling the increased traffic represented a resultant hurdle the end result of finally paying more adequate attention to transportation matters was what one would expect. For instance, in Army Group South the critical exploitation phase of Barbarossa had come following the Red Army's epic defeat near Kiev in September of 1941. However, because of the rail crisis caused by underallocating resources to Eastern Europe (while in comparison rail delivered supply into Italy for loading onto ships for use in the Mediterranean and North Africa had climbed throughout the fall of 1941) a period of time during which Army Group South should have been able to move rapidly east instead saw the total number of trains delivering gas, oil, lubricants, munitions, and the like to the army group stagnate at a paltry 1,162 trains per month. Thus, the logistically handicapped drive east slowed and instead degenerated into the dogfight that it would become. First Panzer Army's reduced pace allowed the Red Army to partially rebuild its force in the Ukraine and thus involve Army Group South's spearheads in a series of battles near the Sea of Azov that dramatically slowed their drive on Rostov as well as 11th Army's efforts in the Crimea.

It would not be until the Reichsbahn was prompted (by the chief of Wehrmacht Transport and head of the Army's Transport Branch) to increase its involvement in the Russian theater of operations that the number of trains going east climbed. As a result, Army Group South went from receiving only around 1,162 trains per month in the final quarter of 1941 to getting four hundred trains more in February 1941 (1,576 trains that month) and a stunning two and a half time as many trains in April of 1942 (3,139 trains that month). One could only wonder where Army Group South would have spent its winter quarters had that level of support been available months prior. Of course, given the poor planning for Barbarossa, its logistical requirements, and the decade long underinvestment in the Reichsbahn's stock of rail cars and locomotives the result of sending more trains east undercut the larger German economy. For instance, rail traffic within Germany declined by 16.4 percent in November of 1941 versus the same time the year prior. It fell further to 25.4 percent lower in February of 1942 than it had been in February of 1941. Though the situation was addressed and rail transport was back to normal in Germany by May of 1942 this is once again a situation entirely indicative of poor German decision-making - not because Germany had lacked the capability to invest in enough transportation resources to both fuel the Third Reich's economy and supply the Ostheer. 

The self-inflicted transportation issues are even more galling given that as early as the fall of 1941 Barbarossa was already bearing sizeable fruit for the German economy. Manganese ore exported to Germany from the mines in the Krivoi Rog region had already in the second half of 1941 constituted 40 percent of the manganese used by German industry. This total would rise to 70 percent by the middle of 1942. Had the Germans not so badly mismanaged their economic, transportation, and logistical resources and then procrastinated into early 1942 in terms of streamlining modes of production and importing labor then there is no reason why Germany's armaments output couldn't have been dramatically higher in 1941 no less 1942. Making matters worse the Germans had thus handed back the Soviet Union important breathing space as Stalin was relocating the bulk of his factories east during the same period the clown show that was the Third Reich's management team was seemingly striving to give its enemies every opportunity to get back into the game. There is no question that the Germans missed a golden opportunity to have dramatically expanded the burgeoning but as it would turn out brief quantitative advantages over the Red Army in important weapons systems that occured during the final three months of 1941 and initial months of 1942.

Nevertheless, even as the rampant mismanagement of the 1941 era German economic, transportation, and logistical base improved early in 1942 and as a result the production of new weapons for the Ostheer expanded (albeit only in part given the decision to reinforce the draining commitment in North Africa and the Mediterranean), German inefficiencies in allocating existing manpower also boded poorly for the Ostheer. Most point to Barbarossa's losses as the direct reason for the Ostheer's diminished status early in 1942. But manpower losses were only proximate to the larger issue of German decisions that would play a far larger role in undermining German fighting strength in Russia. In particular Army Group North and Center paid the biggest price for Germany's failure to reign in its various economic, political, and military fiefdoms. To that end, in 1942 and of the 75 infantry divisions in Army Group’s North and Center 69 saw their organic complement of infantry battalions reduced from nine to six apiece. Moreover, the artillery complement in these infantry divisions fell from four guns in each battery down to three - or a twenty-five percent reduction in vital long-range firepower. In comparison, the Red Army was doing the opposite - pulling out all the stops in attempting to increase firepower in it's formations and done mostly via the ramped up production of cheap but reliable rockets and mortars as an adjunct to manufactured artillery pieces. Though the Germans would do so as well, they moved much slower in this regard. In addition, the Germans had further undermined the Ostheer by shunting a tremendous amount of large bore artillery production into anti-aircraft weapons to stop the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command thereby playing a critical role in the large reduction in artillery pieces assigned to front-line infantry divisions stationed in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Luftwaffe consumed tremendous quantities of ammunition spent far more inefficiently than had these munitions been used on the German Eastern Front. It has been shown that for every 16,000 anti-aircraft shells fired only one enemy aircraft was destroyed.

Now, many like to point to these facts as indicative of the German economy's inability to keep up in the quantitative arms race against the Allies. However, in doing so, and describing this as yet more reasons brute force was carrying the day would be to make a huge mistake. For instance, if we look at the historical record we find that significant portions of Army Group's North and Center bore the brunt of the Soviet winter offensive. What's more, these same two German army groups were forced to launch numerous counter-attacks attempting to clean up Soviet penetrations, relieve surrounded troops, and generally straighten out the front. Needless to say, the comparatively high tempo of operations along the border of Army Group North's and Center left little time for rest and rebuilding. Furthermore, there is something else to consider. Had the Germans shut down operations in non-strategically important theaters it is likely that even with the ongoing early 1942 rapid tempo of operations Army Group's Center and North could have been rehabilitated to the same extant as would Army Group South during the late spring of 1942. But the German command chose otherwise.

In particular the German leadership chose to increase manpower assigned to the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine (in direct contrast to what the Soviet Union had done in terms of shunting most available military manpower to the Red Army's ground foces) and to the Wehrmacht's sizeable forces in the Mediterranean. Most problematically, during the winter of 1941-42 the Luftwaffe began expanding its ground combat role beyond anti-aircraft weaponry and parachute infantry. These new ground combat formations included the two-battalion strong Luftwaffe Infanterie Regiment Moskau and four battalion strong first to fifth Luftwaffe Field Regiments. Though these were obviously small scale initial commitments they laid the groundwork for the disastrous shunting of manpower into the Luftwaffe field divisions created only months later and at a time when the tens of thousands of men thus assigned could have been put to far better use bolstering the German army's veteran combat formations.

In addition, the Germans also decided to allocate manpower into expanding the army with new divisions rather than fully rehabilitating existing ones. For instance, from December of 1941 to the spring of 1942 OKH created seventeen new divisions (including three new panzer divisions: the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th). In addition OKH formed a slew of smaller units. Not least of which being the 203rd Panzer Regiment sent to Army Group North and which included 142 tanks that could have been put to far better use repacing losses in the far more well balanced combined arms panzer divisions. But instead of incorporating available tank replacements and manpower, the German army withdrew from the Ostheer the veteran 6th, 7th, and 10th Panzer Divisions (sending them to Western Europe to be rebuilt) as three of the eighteen German divisions in total disbanded or withdrawn from the Ostheer from late in Barbarossa up to May of 1942. Again, these are decisions the Germans made. This meant veteran divisional command staffs and the other core elements decimated divisions often retained after even the awful winter fighting of 1941-1942 were being replaced with fresh divisions lacking experience. As a result of this process whereby the Germans formed new divisions and allowed the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to bloat up ever further instead of shunting available manpower directly into the Ostheer's existing ranks the Germans compounded their errors by relying upon their allies to take up greater roles for which they were not fully ready.

Axis allied contributions could have been exraordinarily useful had they been properly managed toward bolstering the existing Axis presence rather than being asked to carry more of the effort than they were really capable. But that's not what happened. Instead, twelve Romanian, seven Hungarian, three Italian, and two Slovak divisions had been sent east by June of 1942 (and twenty more Axis divisions followed after Operation Blue had begun) in part replacing (rather than bolstering) part of the German dominated Axis presence in Russia. The Italian commitment would eventually rival even the Romanian one - with the Italian forces in Southern Russia peaking at 229,005 men. Nevertheless, the percentage of Axis forces in Russia that was German largely held steady with that of Barbarossa (at 82 percent of Barbarossa's divisions being German in 1941 with 81 percent of the Axis divisions in June of 1942 being German). However, had the Germans employed their own manpower more efficiently the Axis forces in the Soviet Union on the eve of Blue likely would have been even more German and larger than had they been during Barbarossa.

Thus, though most point to the heavy reliance on Germany's Allies (with the Romanians also bringing up to divisional status two mountain and three cavalry brigades then in Southern Russia) as a sign of a lack of available manpower - that is a mistake. As we can see here that was only marginally true and not nearly to the extant it has been otherwise remarked upon in the past. Simply put, the Germans were making other decisions as to how to allocate existing manpower pools that had they been used as efficiently as say the Red Army was might have seen most of the Ostheer's divisions fully restored to their spring 1941 manpower levels. What's even more remarkable is that had Hitler and OKW/OKH reigned in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine's demands (with the Luftwaffe's poaching on traditional army core competencies particularly eggregious) the contributions of Germany's Axis allies might have been even that much more effective. This is because for the most part the other Axis forces fought hard and with bravery. What mostly held them back was a lack of modern weaponry. For instance, there is no question that giving 88mm dual purpose anti-tank/anti-aircraft weapons to Romanian forces in Russia (who spent much of the winter of 1941-42 retraining in anti-tank tactics and taking over large stocks of captured Soviet 45mm anti-tank guns) would have produced far better outcomes in the months to come (most notably for the German Sixth Army) than using surplus such weapons to stand up the new Luftwaffe field regiments and then the Luftwaffe field divisions that followed.

However, even while suffering such self-incuded errors, given the resources poured into Army Group South by May of 1942 the overall Axis situation on the eve of Blue hardly looked hopeless. Axis forces in the Soviet Union numbered 3,580,000 men, 950,000 from Germany’s Axis allies, against 5,449,898 men fielded by the Red Army. Given Case Blue was the focus, Army Group South contained the bulk of this strength. In it's ranks had been massed 71 German divisions. These included nine panzer divisions and seven motorized divisions equipped with 1,700 tanks and self-propelled guns (or as many as 1,934 such vehicles and thus again the totals are dependant upon the source). The renewed strength of Army Group South's tank park was in large part due to the increasing numbers of panzers the German high command were sending east. For instance, between June of 1941 and January of 1942 only 1,140 armored fighting vehicles had been sent to the Ostheer. This in spite of the fact that the German forces in Russia had lost 2,839 tanks and assault guns during Barbarossa. Another 415 tanks and assault guns were lost during January of 1942 and only 159 of those replaced. This being another result of the decision to push Barbarossa past its culmination point and forcing Army Group Center in particular to fight in the open and not from prepared defensive positions.

From there however, and with the transportation difficulties largely sorted out, in just five months (between February 1, 1942 and July 1, 1942) the Ostheer received almost twice as many replacement panzers as it had in the previous seven months - or 2,332 tanks. As a result, on July 1, 1942 the German army had 6,854 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns. It was actually in stronger condition than it had been one year prior when it only had 6,344 such vehicles. More importantly, of the 2,332 tanks sent east well over half (1,221) were far more capable models than those fielded during Barbarossa - when the Germans had virtually nothing that could stand up against the nearly 2,000 T-34 and KV-1 series tanks then deployed by the Red Army. In comparison, by July of 1942 the Ostheer had 237 Panzer IV's with the new 75mm L/43 high velocity cannon and 185 similarly armed StuG III Ausf. F assault guns as well as 293 comparably armed Marder II and III self-propelled anti-tank guns (armed with the 75mm Pak 40 and captured Russian 7.62mm gun respectively). The bulk of these weapons went to Army Group South and the nine panzer divisions and four motorized infantry divisions assigned to it for the start of Operation Blue. Albeit, transportation issues resulted in many of these tanks as well as other types of weapons arriving in some cases not until after Blue had begun. In addition, this still meant Army Group South's tank park was roughly 200 tanks short of establishment strength when the campaign launched.

This is yet another reason why the decision to shunt panzers to places like Africa represented not such a waste of resources but given German transport difficulties the incredible effort involved in maintaining the large Axis army sitting in the Libyan desert would have been better spent putting the logistical base for Operation Blue in order first and foremost. For instance, the strongest of Army Group South's panzer divisions on July 1, 1942 (the 24th Panzer Division with an Iststarke of 181 mostly modern panzers or 79% of its Sollstarke of 230 panzers) was still less than that of either the 15th or 21st Panzer Division in Libya in late May of 1942. Moreover, the 13th, 14th, and 16th Panzer Divisions would all play key roles in Operation Blue and yet combined the three had significantly fewer available panzers at the beginning of Blue than did the 15th and 21st Panzer before the beginning of the battle of Gazala in May 1942 (305 versus 363 tanks).

That said, in terms of equipping Army Group South's armor quality was definitely up. Long-barreled 50mm guns equipped most Panzer IIIs and an increasing number of the newest high velocity 75mm gun equipped Panzer IVF2 had been assigned for the campaign. As a result, its panzer and motorized divisions included anywhere from four to twelve of the upgraded Panzer IV's possessing the hitting power to challenge Soviet T-34s in head-to-head combat. Of Army Group South's 1,635 tanks on the eve of Blue there was a much higher percentage of medium tanks than during the year before - with 936 Panzer III, 156 Panzer IV with the short barrel 75mm gun, and 121 Panzer IV with the long barrel 75mm guns equipping the Army Group (easily identifiable not just because of the cannon's length but the new muzzle brake to reduce recoil). The new 75mm L/43 gun equipping the Panzer IV F2 was a notable improvement over the 75mm L/24 gun of the Ausf. A-F Panzer IV's from years past. With a muzzle velocity of 2,248 feet per second (740 meters per second) it could defeat a T-34's frontal armor at stand-off ranges of 1,000 plus meters (with the same gun now equipping the StuG III). In addition though the Panzer III J's 50mm L/60 was becoming increasingly dated it still had a muzzle velocity of 2,700 feet per second (823 meters per second) and could at least take on early models of the T-34 with a good chance at defeating even its frontal armor at combat ranges of under 500 meters. Moreover, the Panzer III Ausf. J had more adequate 50mm thick armor than its previous models (with the H Model for instance having to make due with bolted on plates) and a strengthened suspension to handle the excess weight of the additional armor plus wider tracks for better negotiating Russian mud and snow.

In addition, German anti-tank weaponry was considerably more advanced in 1942 over 1941. The obsolete 37mm Pak had finally ceased its production run in December of 1941. In lieu far greater numbers of 50mm Pak 38 and 75mm Pak 40/41 anti-tank guns equipped the German armies in Russia as did captured French 75mm Pak 97/38(f) and 76mm Pak 38(r) with the latter converted from Soviet use as the M1936 divisional gun. As a result, by June 10, 1942 the Ostheer had taken delivery of 1,671 anti-tank guns of the 75mm or 76mm variety. These weapons were more than capable of successfully defeating the T-34's armor at standard combat ranges. The lion's share of these weapons went to Army Group South (360 of the 75mm Pak 40, and 425 of the Pak 97/38(f)). From there, the losses in field artillery during December 1941 to January 1942 had been one of the more significant negative outcomes of the German decision to push Barbarossa past its logical culmination point. Nearly half of all the 105mm and 150mm artillery pieces lost during Barbarossa were lost during the biggest months of the Soviet counter-offensives during December of 1941 and January of 1942 (49.9 percent of 105mm guns and 44.8 percent of 150mm guns). Such losses were the direct result of the German high command's decision to leave its army's strung out in the open, crawling forward way past the point of diminishing returns. Even with the addition of 15cm Nebelwerfer rocket launchers to many of the infantry divisions in the east there still remained shortfalls in indirect firepower. However, Army Group South, having received priority in terms of weapons replacement, stood in far better shape than its peers further north.

Moreover, Army Group South's panzer and motorized divisions were also organizationally much stronger than the mobile divisions in Army Groups North and Center. Not only did Army Group South's four motorized infantry divisions each get a panzer battalion, but the panzer divisions were given three panzer battalions instead of two - with this mostly done by robbing the panzer divisions from Army Group's Center and North. For instance, the 11th Panzer Division, slated for a prominent early role in Blue, received it's third panzer battalion from the 4th Panzer Division of Army Group Center. Each of Army Group South's fast divisions also received integral anti-aircraft battalions (three batteries with eight 88mm and eighteen 20mm guns total). Moreover the motorized infantry regiments (termed panzergrenadiers as of July 1st) would also get twelve truck mounted 20mm anti-aircraft guns (including four of the incredibly lethal four-barrell variants of these weapons). The motorized infantry regiment Grossdeutschland for instance was now a divisional sized organization with its own panzer and assault gun battalion. In addition, the nomenclature for the armored infantry was in the process of being updated to address those troops as panzergrenadiers (armored infantry). Motorized divisions would be redesignated as panzergrenadier divisions in 1943.

Of course this reorganization took time and time was in short supply as even "quiet" periods on the German Eastern Front featured massive combat operations of a scale scarcely imaginable today. For instance, and in another questionable decision given the importance of the German campaign in Southern Russia, Army Group Center launched three signficant offensives during the spring and summer of 1942 (Operation Hannover which ran from May 21 to June 21, Operation Seydlitz which ran from July 2nd to the 27th and Operation Whirlwind which ran from August 11th to the 24th). Now, though one could argue that these offensives resulted in the taking of 77,000 Soviet prisoners of war they are still very much ignored by those arguing that the Germans put their all into Operation Blue and came up short - thus proving that once again the Germans lacked the resources to accomplish their goals in the face of Allied brute force strength. These contextual operations mattered. Given the timing of Army Group Center's three summer offensives they absorbed significant resources at a time when every drop of oil, ton of munitions, armored fighting vehicle, and truck literally meant the difference between, for instance and in Army Group B's case, walking into Stalingrad in July of 1942 or being forced to spend four months bludgeoning its way through the city as occured in reality. Moreover, within Army Group South's area of operations four major operations occured in May and June of 1942 (including the huge second battle of Kharkov - albeit as initiaited by the Red Army). Though outside of the costly fight for Sevastopol losses were low (with only 140 panzers lost completely during the spring of 1942 and across the entire German Eastern Front) these operations still interfered with the training, maintenance, and rebuilding process. However, the German inability to focus on what should have been the preeminent task at hand proved they retained an astonishing propensity for shooting themselves in the foot.

To that end, perhaps the most scandalous decision over the past year had been to reinforce the effort in Libya even at the expense of the strategically crucial battle in Russia. German forces in North Africa received 369 panzers between June 1, 1941 and July 1, 1942. Again, though many denigrate the fighting in North Africa as a sideshow involving a couple of German panzer divisions hardly a fraction of the forces fighting in Russia - those 369 panzers for the Afrika Corps two panzer divisions represented more replacement tanks than the total number received by entire panzer army's in Russia during the entirety of Barbarossa. In fact, and all told during Barbarossa the German army's in Russia (which initially included 151 divisions of which 19 were panzer and 13 were motorized infantry) received 627 replacement panzers and assault guns. Meanwhile, in Libya one panzer and one light division (with the 5th Light Division becoming the 21st Panzer Division during the summer of 1941) received well over half of that total. Had just the four panzer army's in Russia been as lavishly resupplied with armor as the two division Afrika Corps one can only imagine what would have happened to the Red Army. Beyond the German propensity for lavishing Rommel with more support than that received by entire panzer army's in Russia received there were other poor decisions being made by the German command.

In the year following the onset of Barbarossa the German command would send 2,375 tanks to forming new panzer divisions (the  22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th, upgrading existing formations, supplying Germany's allies, and to Africa). Though some of these decisions, like supplying Germany's allies with more modern tanks, make eminent sense given their role in Russia - others are hard to swallow (and not just the throwing of more tanks into the African dead end). For instance, of the three panzer battalions assigned to Waffen-SS motorized divisions two would participate in Blue. But by the most crucial phase of the campaign in the fall of 1942 none of the three panzer battalions would be deployed in Russia but instead be in France (where the Wehrmacht had 226 tanks in total as early as July 1, 1942 in spite of there being a near non-existent chance the Allies could pull off a cross-channel invasion of any substance) while the SS motorized divisions refitted and were upgraded to full panzergrenadier division status.

Moreover, these decisions left the ten panzer divisions in Army Group's North and Center averaging a mere 67 operational panzers per division. In comparison those assigned to Blue averaged 145 tanks per panzer division. That said, the Africa Corps panzer divisions represented the cream of the crop with 189 tanks in the 15th Panzer Division and 174 tanks in the 21st Panzer Division on May 25, 1942. As a result, of the failure to invest in Army Group North and Center's panzer divisions, and as the fighting raged across the front, Army Group Center and North would be so hard pressed significant assets would be stripped from Army Group South during Blue. Decisions that not only would have a deleritous impact on Operation Blue but wouldn't have been necessary had the large stocks of existing panzers available for assignment during the spring of 1942 (remember the German army had well over 6,000 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns at that time) been prioritized as for replenishing the existing panzer divisions in Russia first, foremost, and not only in part as in reality. Finally, it must be remembered that any reasonable accounting of the numbers of panzers available on all fronts still leaves 2,109 tanks/assault guns/self-propelled anti-tank guns unaccounted for. Regardless of the byzantine nature of the German military's accounting methodology most reasonable estimates as to the location of these missing panzers is that many were in repair and thus out of service (spare parts shortages would be a huge problem throughout the war). If that does prove to be the case then it is just another example of the Germans shooting themselves in the foot given it is far cheaper to allocate the resources to repair an existing tank than to manufacture a new one and ship it to distant battlefields.

Of course tanks are only part of the German army's mobility. And mobility would be important if Army Group South was to reach its most distant goals. For instance, Baku was roughly 900 miles from the easternmost German positions on the Mius River near the Sea of Azov. Though that fact is often cited as a reason Case Blue was destined to fail (as part of the larger argument that Germany circa late 1941 didn't have the resources to compete with Allied numeric economical and military superiority no less by the summer of 1942 when according to the brute force theorists Germany was in even worse shape) one must remember something. That distance was actually slightly closer than the mileage traversed by 1st Panzer Army during Barbarossa and between its mobilization zone in what was then southern Poland (an area that now lies just east of the current Polish-Belarusian border) to its deepest penetration at Rostov on the Don River in November of 1941. Moreover, 1st Panzer Army accomplished that drive at the same time the worst of the German transportation crisis was unfolding and while three entire army groups were maneuvouring across near equivalent distances.

In comparison during 1942 only one German army group in Eastern Europe was scheduled to be moving anywhere of significance. Moreover, the distance between Army Group South's frontline units and Baku was actually 100 miles shorter than the distance Axis forces in North Africa would find themselves removed from their main supply base at Tripoli when they first reached El Alamein in the summer of 1942. All of which helps illustrate that such a drive was well within German means - the questions were: would they actually commit the available logistical resources to back the campaign that would decide the fate of Europe? Or would they split their efforts between two contemporaneously run campaigns seperated by thousands of miles (In North Africa and Southern Russia) and thus making even Barbarossa's scattershot plan that spread the Ostheer across Western Russia look like a vision of Moltkean (the elder) focused military genius?

To begin examining the answers to those questions we have to start with trucking. Or, more to the point the state of the truck fleet in Army Group South by June of 1942. To get there though, we first must understand that Army Group South's truck fleet had been decimated by in particular the final lunge east during Barbarossa's last weeks and the Soviet counteroffensives that had followed. All told, by February of 1942 (a period where unlike in Army Group Center and North's sectors the Soviet winter counter-offensive had largely subsided in Southern Russia) Army Group South had lost 23,526 motor vehicles since the start of Barbarossa - or just over a quarter of its truck fleet. Moreover, the bulk of the remaining motor vehicles (70,969 of 86,757) were non-operational due to a lack of spare parts. The situation was no better in Army Group South's three panzer divisions at that time - which reported shortages of 6,147 motor vehicles early in 1942. In addition, the German armies in the east as a whole had lost 264,854 horses killed between June 22, 1941 and March 20, 1942. Nevertheless, what the available data shows is that the German economy, even though still shrugging off the self-inflicted labor and transport shortages, managed to replace the bulk of these losses. For instance, between June of 1941 and June of 1942 the German economy produced 127,918 new motor vehicles and captured 52,238 more such vehicles from the Red Army. In addition, 227,000 horses had been sent east or taken from the newly occupied Russian territories since the start of Barbarossa. Thus, though the Ostheer as a whole had suffered losses of 142,660 motor vehicles (either totally destroyed or non-repairable in anything under five days of extensive maintenance) between June 1941 and March 20, 1942  the replacements were available to completely re-equip it with motorized vehicles (though there was still a sizeable shortfall in horses) needed to return it to near total mobility.

One of the questions remaining given all of that is - where did all the trucks go? For instance as late as January 31, 1942 the German army reported that only 6,584 of the vehicles captured from the Red Army had been put in service with the Ostheer. On top of that, the German army reported that its total stock of motor vehicles had actually expanded from 664,522 in January of 1942 to 860,228 in July of 1942. In addition, tracked vehicle production had soared. In addition to the aforementioned Maultier, or Mule, and Raupenshlepper Ost; or Caterpillar Tractor East that had gone into production the German economy also produced 1,146 SPW (armored half-tracks) in the first half of 1942 (while only losing 123 in combat). The simple truth, and in answer to the question of missing trucks, was Germany wasn't failing to produce what the Ostheer needed. Rather it was making different choices (read: poor strategic planning and the scattershot allocation of assets like trucking) in lieu of an all out effort to center the German military effort exactly where the it strategically needed to be - that being on Southern Russia and the Caucuses. To be fair, the rail transportation mess outlined earlier also played a big role here. Once that was sorted out by the spring of 1942 deliveries of motor vehicles began to flow again into Russia, but this ended up being fairly late in the campaign season. In addition, it must be noted that things like the campaign in North Africa was diverting signficiant trucking assets in terms of logistical support (with Rommel running a modified version of the 1944 era Allied Red Ball Express to fuel his army) and thus providing more evidence that the Germans greatest problems were self inflicted. That said, with 3,139 trains per month arriving in Army Group South's area of operations the commitment to Case Blue was not insignificant; it was just less than the focused effort a campaign with potentially war deciding strategic significance needed.

For instance, the incredibly expensive battle to take the isolated Soviet fortress of Sevastopol (conducted by the German 11th Army and lasting from June 7 to July 4) consumed 29,234 tons of munitions from the total of 68,000 tons of munitions delivered to all of Army Group South to stockpile for Blue's initial phases. Now, Army Group South managed to amass 39,600 tons of fuel and lubricants for Case Blue's first weeks and that sounds great. However, to put total that in perspective by late in 1941 the Germans were shipping 9,000 tons of fuel per month to help keep the Italian air force in the sky (which needed 20,000 tons of fuel per month but only had access to 6,000 tons per month from Italian controlled sources - primarily a refinery built at Bari). From there, and early in 1942 this total fuel shipment to Italy rose to between 10,000 and 16,000 tons of German oil per month. Moreover, this rise wasn't to make the Italian air force whole in terms of meeting its needs but was in response to the Italian navy's fuel needs which were highly exacerbated by the need to protect convoys to North Africa. Ironically the Italian navy's fuel crisis and ability to operate more fully would only be eased with the fall of Tunisia in May of 1943 but of course by then they had much bigger problems. Moreover, the fuel totals being stockpiled for Blue also represented a mere three months consumption by Axis forces stationed in Libya. The total for Libya was thus in addition to the tens of thousands more tons of fuel needed by the Axis to not only wage war across the Mediterranean Littoral but also ship supplies to Africa and propel the corresponding naval convoy escorts and air umbrella attempting to fight those supplies through the British air and naval interdiction efforts centered around Malta. This is again all the more reason why when someone denigrates the size of the German commitment in North Africa as being insignficant next to that in Russia (with such comments typically revolving around the fact that there were only two panzer divisions in North Africa versus the huge comparative number of such divisions in Russia) they need to be reminded of the supreme importance logistics played throughout the Second World War. This is particularly true when analyzing a campaign such as Operation Blue that ended up coming within a whisker of meeting the bulk of its goals.

Nevertheless, even with Germany literally pouring oil into the Mediterranean and thus making a less than optimal effort to prepare Army Group South the corresponding motor vehicle stocks of the German divisions massing in the Eastern Ukraine and Southern Russia improved dramatically during the spring of 1942. For instance, 11,000 tons of lift capacity had been gathered in terms of transportation resources. By June 1st the German 2nd Army could report that five of its six divisions were nearly full mobile. More importantly the 4th Panzer Army's 9th and 24th Panzer Divisions, 3rd Motorized and Grossdeutschland Motorized Divisions, as well as the 82nd and 385th Infantry Divisions reported in as fully ready for mobile operations by June 28th. Nevertheless, the 9th Panzer Division though reporting itself ready for mobile operations did so with only 85 percent of its assigned trucks and other motorized vehicles available. Considering that a typical panzer division at this time included around 2,650 motorized vehicles (for instance the German 2nd panzer division's 1,940 vehicles on hand on July 11th represented 705 fewer vehicles than needed to be full strength according to its reports from that date) a shortfall of nearly 400 motor vehicles is significant. This highlights once more how much the ongoing campaign in North Africa was hindering the prep for Case Blue - as Rommel's Panzerarmee was perhaps the most motorized force in the entire Wehrmacht. Rommel was using a tremendously high proportion of motorized vehicles to not only propel but suppy his legions who were then campaigning through the most infrastructure poor large scale theater of combat where the German army was then actively waging war. The additional burden of fighting in the desert not only wore out Rommel's vehicles at a tremendous rate but also demanded even more vehicles be sent to North Africa as replacements because of the inability to rely on horse drawn transport in the same way the comparatively more efficient German armies in Russia could operate.

Of course, beyond armor and mobility we also have manpower. We discussed some of this earlier but just to flesh out that conversation note that the continuation of Barbarossa past its culmination point had certainly cost the Ostheer. For instance, in November of 1941 the Germans suffered 157,143 casualties (combat or those lost to sickness/frostbite) in the Soviet Union (or 3,088 more than that figure if you go by OKW numbers - with differences between OKW and OKH numbers far from uncommon and representing a reoccuring problem for modern researchers trying to nail down what the costs to the Wehrmacht of ongoing operations had been in any given month). Moreover, such casaulty rates would continue throughout the winter of 1941-42 as the Red Army's counter-offensives did far more damage than otherwise would have been possible against an Oshteer that had wrapped up Barbarossa in a more sensible fashion than just leaving its armies dangling in the open at the end of horribly overstretched supply lines. To rebuild the Germans had since 1941 turned to a number of measures that included taking wasted manpower from within the army in Germany and Western Europe, recruiting, inducing, or simply impressing "volunteers" from the conquered territories or the surviving prisoners of war taken in Russia, and making better use of women in industry and the military. By all accounts, measures such as these vastly increased the stock of available military age manpower.

Ultimately, between June 1, 1941 and May 31, 1942 the Wehrmacht took in some 3,098,400 men. On its face, such totals were more than enough to rebuild the Ostheer. However, not all of these inductees went to the Ostheer. By July 1, 1942 the Germans had sent only 1,492,000 replacements east for the 2,018,881 combat casualties and sick suffered by the Wehrmacht in the eastern campaign up to that point. Thus, and because of internal German decision making the Ostheer had not been completely rebuilt even though it appears that the capability had existed to at least numerically return the entire Ostheer to something very close to where it had been the day before Barbarossa had begun. For instance, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe had seen their combined size grow by 520,000 men from the start of Barbarossa and up to July 1, 1942. This total was one equivalent to the shortfall in manpower the Ostheer was making up by relying more upon Axis allies and voluneers from within the captured Soviet territories, but with obvious tradeoffs in combat capabilities that would ultimately play a pivotal role in events later in the year. What is most remarkable here is it appears that even after the savage fighting during Barbarossa and the first six months of 1942 the Germans actually had the means to rebuild the Ostheer to the size it had been in June of 1941 - a time when they had used an entire year of relative peace (at least from the army's perspective given the lack of large scale campaigns it was forced to participate in between late June of 1940 and April of 1941) to create the Ostheer. What this really tells us is that the German leadership was simply making decisions that not only frittered away ample existing resources available for meeting its goals but stood in stark contrast to a Soviet leadership team ruthlessly focusing its efforts where needed (as we shall see in a future article).

As a result, instead of the Ostheer being readied for major operations across the front it would mostly only be Army Group South that was restored to its full combat capabilities at least in terms of manpower - with Army Group South by July of 1942 ranking as the largest Axis combat grouping in the world (at 1.25 million men). Of that total 950,000 were German (when including the Eleventh Army). Many of the army group's key mobile formations, such as the 9th Panzer Division and 16th Motorized Infantry Division could report not only having their full Sollstarke on the eve of Blue but reserves of 1,000 and 750 men respectively in their integral Feldersatz battalions. As it was the divisions of the German First and Fourth Panzer Army's as well as the Seventeenth and Second Army's were overwhelmingly in good shape or full strength on the eve of Blue. Even the German Sixth Army, which had seen significant combat during the Second Battle of Kharkov and Operation Wilhelm (during May and June 1942 respectively - suffering just over 33,000 casualties) was still in relatively good shape (though some formations, such as the 305th Infantry Division were much worse for the wear than their peers). Overall, however Army Group South had received far more replacements than it had lost in combat (219,400 replacements arriving between March 1st and July 1, 1942).

On the other hand, the German Eleventh Army had taken dreadful losses in the fight for Sevastopol. These losses reached an appalling 25,020 men during June alone - or over one quarter Army Group South's entire 93,641 man casualty total from March 1st to July 1, 1942. Manstein, much like Patton, all too often gets a free pass from those extollling their virtues as operational miastros but then ignore things like Patton's bloody and unimaginative slog through Lorraine in the fall of 1944 (particularly around the fortress of Metz) or Mantein's actions around Sevastopol. And though Manstein eventually cracked Sevastopol via a daring and bold move it wasn't until after he had bled Eleventh Army white. One can only wonder what might have been had a fresh Eleventh Army (which had otherwise taken the rest of the Crimea by early in June of 1942) been able to fight from day one with Army Group South at the forefront of the drive to the Volga or into the Caucuses (while being ordered to merely leave elements behind to screen Sevastopol until Blue's success had been secured). 

Overall however there is no question that Army Group South represented a far stronger collection of combat power than it had months earlier. It's component divisions were in some cases markedly stronger than they had been early in the spring. For instance, the 11th Panzer Division (which had been transferred back to Army Group South from Army Group Center where it had been sent for Operation Typhoon after beginning Barbarossa with Army Group South) in April of 1942 had a Gefechtsstarke (fighting strength) of 5,046 men with six operational panzers and two artillery pieces. By the end of June 1942 however it was back up to a Gefechtsstarke of 13,297 men (with a total ration strength or Verpflegungsstarke of 17,463 men - this latter number included medical and radio personnel, truck drivers, Russian volunteers termed "Hiwis", supply & maintenance personnel, Russian prisoners of war, and though it did not include men on leave). The 11th Panzer Division's Panzer Regiment had 156 panzers in running condition (5 Panzer II, 124 Panzer III of which 110 mounted the 50mm L/60 cannon, 13 Panzer IV of which 12 mounted the new long barrel 75mm L/43 cannon, and 4 command panzers). The two panzergrenadier regiments contained 2,254 and 2,190 men respectively (fighting strength). The artillery regiment had 2,038 men with 18 of the 105mm howitzers, 6 of the 150mm howitzers, 4 of the 100m guns, and 8 of the vaunted 88mm guns. Nevertheless, as we have seen the overall position of Army Group South and its combat divisions could have been much stronger and well supported yet.

In opposition to Army Group South's 1,250,000 men stood 1,715,000 Soviet soldiers. The Red Army's fronts in southern Russia held a significant edge in medium and heavy tanks: 2,300 such tanks (of 2,959 tanks initially deployed in total against the Axis forces then part of Blue) confronted 1,327 German medium tanks and no German heavy tanks. On the other hand, Army Group South could rely upon Colonel General Wolfram von Richtofen’s elite Fliegerkorps for close air support. Overall, the Germans could count on a tremendous advantage in airpower; 1,640 machines against only 758 Soviet combat aircraft. Given how important this air support would prove to the Army Group's success one can only wonder if even a fraction of the significant Luftwaffe assets redeployed into the Mediterranean, Arctic Circle, and elsewhere had instead been assigned to Army Group South. When it came to veteran leadership the Germans continued to hold an advantage over their foes, from Bock and List to Army Commanders such as Hoth (Fourth Panzer Army), Manstein (Eleventh Army) and Kleist (First Panzer Army). Seven experienced Panzer Generals led the panzer corps spearheading Operation Blue; Geyr, Kempf, Kirchner, Langermann, Mackensen, Stumme and Wietersheim. However, the Germans would also make some head scratching decisions in regards to the commanders assigned to several of Blue's most important combat formations. The elevation of both List and Paulus to key command roles in particular would prove of a questionable nature - leaving one to wonder for instance what an experienced and aggressive combat commander like Rommel would have done with the German Sixth Army instead of a staff officer like Paulus. Lastly, though quantitative enthusiasts like to point to the massive power of the Soviet Union and Red Army in fact the Soviet economy was far from a production juggernaught. The Red Army’s rearmament was certainly a process in motion rather than a completed fact. But we shall leave those last points for the focus of another article.