Stalingrad: Why the Factory District Assault Failed

By September 26, 1942 the German Sixth Army had taken the bulk of Stalingrad's southern and central sectors. Though the 62nd Army stood nearly as strong on September 26th in terms of personnel as it had two weeks prior it's tank strength had dropped considerably from where it had once been. For instance, the primary armored reinforcements sent into the city consisted of light tanks that failed to replace the much more valuable T-34 medium tanks and KV-series heavy tanks lost in the September fighting. In short, the 62nd Army was in trouble.

However, Paulus was not able to build on the momentum granted by the September victories and maintain the pressure on the 62nd Army. Instead, the only major reinforcement he received late in September consisted of the 100th Jager Division - a light division short of the men and hitting power offered by a full-strength infantry division. As a result, Paulus' horribly weakened assault elements (the 24th Panzer, 29th Motorized, and 71st, 94th, 295th, 389th Infantry Divisions along with three assault gun battalions) failed to entirely eliminate the 62nd Army's defensive positions in the Workers Villages, at that time shielding the factory district against direct attack from the west. Though the Sixth Army largely cleared central Stalingrad of Soviet troops and took most of the Mamaev Kurgan - it was only after a tremendous and costly effort. An undertaking matched in its intensity by the desperate battle to destroy the salient in and around the village of Orlovka held by 62nd Army in Stalingrad's northwestern suburbs; all neccessary pre-conditions to taking the Factory District itself.

What was remarkable is that this battered German force, in conjunction with the 100th Jager Division was still able to accomplish all of the above, and punch into and substantially loosen the 62nd Army's hold on the approaches to the Factory District while virtually destroying the 23rd Tank Corps (Chuikov's primary armored force), 112th Rifle Division, and kill or capture nearly all the 6,000 plus men that had been fighting in the Orlovka salient anchoring the 62nd Army's hold on Stalingrad's northwestern suburbs. However, as much as the western and northern approach to the factory district were delaying the German advance, the 62nd Army's defense of the factory district's southern approaches crumbled in the face of the 24th Panzer Division's kampfgruppe's blasting their way through central Stalingrad.

During late September, and in spite of being able to put no more than two dozen tanks into the battle, the 24th Panzer Division had plowed a nearly six kilometer path toward the Factory District. Then in early October it came within 1.5 kilometers of the Volga and nearly split Chuikov's defenses in two. This success came at a huge cost to the division's panzer-grenadier regiments in particular (see the exhausted appearance of the German infantry in Stalingrad in the picture accompanying this article) but if the Germans could exploit this advance then the 24th Panzer could have raced to the Volga and seized the landing stages north of the Red October Factory as well as take Chuikov's command post. To that point, had there been available even a weak panzer or infantry division to exploit 24th Panzer Division's thrust the 62nd Army's defense of Stalingrad likely would have been made untenable by as early as October's first days - given an exploitation force could have turned north along the Volga and surrounded the 62nd Army's main body. Nevertheless, that wasn't the case. Instead, and as Sixth Army's assault groupings did their greatest damage late in September and early in October (having cut 62nd Army's personnel in the city to under 45,000 men and only 21 operational tanks) the German divisions leading the way suffered irrepairable short-term damage. Paulus was thus forced to largely suspend his attacks and await more meaningful reinforcements; granting vital breathing space to Chuikov.

The reinforcements for Sixth Army's forces in Stalingrad included the belated re-introduction of the 14th Panzer Division into the battle. The 14th Panzer Division had spent the critical days in mid-late September resting for a planned drive southeast toward the Caspian Sea of all things, once again showing how much the Germans were at times their own worst enemy. This was followed by 14th Panzer's commitment against the heavily destructive Soviet attacks on mostly Romanian positions south of Stalingrad (the Red Army absolutely mauled the poorly equipped Romanian VI Corps on the open steppe). Only on October 9th did the 14th Panzer Division finish stablizing and repairing the hole blown in the Romanian lines, disengage, and head north into Stalingrad. Such was the battering the 14th Panzer Division had taken that it took four more days to rest and refit before being ready for combat operations within the city. In addition, during October the Sixth Army's assault elements within Stalingrad finally received the 79th Infantry Division (taken from Sixth Army's XVII Army Corps) and the 305th Infantry Division (taken from Sixth Army's VIII Army Corps). The problem was that these reinforcements came two weeks too late.

That's because the Sixth Army's main combat grouping in Stalingrad was a shattered shell of it's former self. In particular, the 24th Panzer Division, which had played such a key role in breaking the 62nd Army's defenses in southern and central Stalingrad, was a panzer division in name only. It deployed a tank park averaging around 20 vehicles in operating condition, but just as importantly the continuous fighting had whittled the panzer division's 21st and 26th Grenadier Regiments down to a mere 896 and 923 men. By October 1st the 24th Panzer Division as a whole was down to thirty percent of its authorized combat strength. Remember, the 24th Panzer Division had achieved its successes during September by mostly operating while divided into two complementary combined-arms kampfgruppen possessing the strength and flexibility to shatter dug-in Soviet defensive positions. Those days were gone by early October. In comparison, one should note that during October of 1942 the 15th and 21st Panzer Division's (who had been parked in Egypt for the better part of two months) Panzer-Grenadier Regiments averaged over 1,500 men apiece while fielding almost 120 tanks per each division's panzer regiments. All of this as Rommel's armor waited for the British 8th Army's inevitable attack as part of the ongoing strategically insignificant yo-yo that was the war in the North African desert.

It is important to step back at this point and take a look at the overall state of the war in October of 1942. Though Blue hadn't yet accomplished all of its goals, it was coming exceedingly close not just in Stalingrad but in the Caucuses where Army Group A was grinding its way to the threshold of completely destablizing the entire Soviet defensive effort in the region. And though the Germans had chosen to pursue Blue on a shoestring it was still succeeding. Moreover, even though the Red Army had from July to October of 1942 repeatedly attempted to penetrate Army Group B's flanks it had just as consistently failed to do so and at enormous cost to boot. Therefore it seemed unlikely that any additional Soviet counterstrokes would do any better. In fact and unlike the previous year the entire Ostheer was largely dug in along strong defensive positions with only Army Group B and A needing additional resources. It therefore would have seemed to nearly all military observers at that time that the Germans were well positioned to fend off a second year of Soviet winter offensives, consolidate their hold on Southern Russia and be well positioned to drive the remaining Soviet forces from the Caucuses in the new year thereby crippling the Soviet economy and Red Army's abilty to fight a fluid mobile war. And lest one think that the loss of oil, no less the loss of the other resources in region, wouldn't have hurt the massive Red Army they need to think again.

During 1942 the Red Army had gone through a significant qualitative evolution. Though it was still not taking on German forces on anything like a one-to-one basis by November of 1942 the Red Army was a much more experienced army with greater offensive capability than earlier in the year. This is in spite of the massive personnel losses the Red Army had endured, so much so that on November 1, 1942 the Red Army's strength had actually declined from 10,936,631 men on May 1, 1942 down to 10,609,083 men. And though much is often made of the Red Army's regenerative ability due to the large cohorts of men becoming military age each year during the war the simple fact was that the Wehrmacht was doing enormous damage to the Red Army. For instance, the Red Army was not only down 327,548 men by November from where it had been in May but its 937,583 man increase in personnel strength on the front against the Germans had come from reducing the Stavka reserves and the forces deployed in the Soviet Far East and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. This reduction had been by a staggering total of 1,255,131 men (1,239,820 from the Soviet interior and Far East and 15,311 men from Stavka reserves).

Unless the Red Army didn't just hold on, but actually went on the offensive, and took back not only land but population centers, it was facing a reality where at its 1942 rates of casualties that within a matter of years it would be bled out. Moreover, even with the massive reinforcements rushed west many of the best Soviet armies were still understrength. For instance, at the beginning of Operation Uranus most of the Soviet units participating (and ostensibly rested, reinforced, and ready for the offensive) had strength returns of around 75% their authorized manpower - and this was on day one. Moreover, even though the Red Army could deploy 6,605,498 men against its opponents in November of 1942 it must be remembered that the Axis armies numbered 4.1 million men of their own (2.9 million of which were German). As a result the Red Army could no longer rely upon the sheer power of mass-wave assaults as it had in the past. Now, though such rough tactics continued to be used by late in 1942 significant portions of the Red Army were well led enough, experienced enough, and equipped well enough that bringing Deep Operations from doctrine and concept to life was becoming increasingly possible. In particular there were enough veteran troops, junior officers (for that matter the Red Army had dramatically expanded its training programs during 1942), and operational level leaders to create an environment where the Red Army was improving as a practitioner of not only concepts like combined-arms operations and operational level deception but pushing the German forces in a way they hadn't truly been able to threaten them before.

Beyond experience however the second key to all of this was an increasing reliance on mobility and firepower to accomplish what brute force strength could not in the past. Throughout 1942 the Red Army not only stood up new tank corps and then entire tank armies but also restructured its artillery assets in such a way that it could bring dramatically enhanced levels of both indirect (artillery, rockets, and mortars) and direct (anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons) firepower to play on the battlefield. Along with artillery, armor was of course a central component in the ability of Soviet forces to create true shock armies and begin countering German defensive tactics predicated on successive lines in depth. With Soviet factories largely concentrating their output on key weapons systems this means for instance formations like tank corps not only increased from 14 in May of 1942 to 20 in January of 1942 but the addition of new mechanized corps (eight of which were formed in 1942 with 175 to 224 tanks each). This made it possible for large armored formations to be inserted into the breach after a breakthrough had been wrought by near equivalent strength combined-arms but armor heavy shock elements blasting the holes in German lines. And though doing so still very much remained a work in progress late in 1942 as it turned out the one big success didn't just ameliorate months of desultary results but shifted the strategic equilibrium from the Axis back to an equal setting in the first half of 1943.

The Red Army Air Force was also in the midst of a large-scale transformation during 1942. Though in 1942 the Red Army Air Force lost 14,700 aircraft in combat increased factory output and Lend-Lease aid not only made up the difference but allowed Soviet aviation forces to grow by one third (from 14,967 aircraft on May 1, 1942 to 19,797 by November 1st). This meant that the assets were available to support Soviet offensives in the latter half of the year in a way they hadn't been earlier. Close air support was a core mission of these aircraft and the Red Army dramatically expanded its air-ground liason teams and communications all capable of challenging a Lufwaffe that though still capable of achieving air superiority on localized sectors of the front was being whittled down by German decision-making that saw fit to funnel thousands of aircraft into the Mediterranean at a time when it was increasingly obvious Axis forces could accomplish next to nothing of strategic value in North Africa.

Given this increased reliance on airpower, tanks, and artillery in lieu of sheer numbers of men it was all the more critical that the Red Army stop Army Group A's drive in the Caucuses, which in November of 1942 was creeping within hundreds of meters of cutting the main supply lines for the Soviet Fronts then desperately hanging on against the German attack. And if they couldn't do so directly against Army Group A then there were more indirect methods of stopping the German advance - such as via hitting Army Group B harder than it had been to that time in the war. Thus, it was imperative that at a minimum the Sixth Army needed to finish taking Stalingrad and lock down Army Group B's position protecting Army Group A's northern flank. And in that regard the Germans had chosen to under resource the one part of their front most in need of additional support. Though this was the result of many decisions the bottom line is that the Germans continued to consistently underrate the Red Army's capabilities. And contrary to past assertions this was a collective failure. The upper echelons of the German political and military establishment (Germany's leadership elite), fed by grossly inaccurate reports from the Army's intelligence services (Fremde Heere Ost or Foreign Armies East led by Reinhard Gehlen), refused to believe the Red Army could pose an existential threat to the Axis armies in Southern Russia. Furthermore, Gehlen's intelligence services even posited as late as October 31st that if the Red Army did launch a second large scale winter offensive that it would be against Army Group Center and not Army Group B. Tellingly, Gehlen wouldn't revise this estimate to include the danger to Army Group B until November 18th (the day prior to the Red Army's grand counterstroke that would encircle the German forces in and around Stalingrad) and by then it was thus far too late. But this is not to excuse the German Army's high command. Halder himself and up to his dismissal as Army Chief of Staff spent much of September of 1942 arguing that the Red Army was nowhere near the threat it had been the previous winter. As did his replacement - Kurt Zeitzler, most seriously so in a briefing on October 27th. Ironically, Hitler would be the one to finally push for Army Group B to reinforced but too late. It was only on November 3rd that Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer Division and two infantry divisions to move from France to take positions backing the Romanian Third Army and Italian Eighth Army - a move that would take over three weeks to complete (with the 6th Panzer Division's lead elements arriving in the region on November 26th and several days after Sixth Army had been encircled). In addition, he ordered Army Group B to form blocking detachments behind the lines and bomb Soviet bridgeheads over the Don River. Why such decisions were not made earlier is yet another mystery regarding German decision-making as the 6th Panzer Division was ready for deployment in October and given events during the preceeding months, when even one run-down panzer division had often played a key role in stopping major Soviet attacks against Army Group B's flanks, it is likely that if in place it would have proven capable of halting any one of the Soviet drives ultimately launched as part of Operation Uranus in November. More head scratching yet was the fact that when the Red Army surrounded the German forces in Stalingrad it was only then that the Germans in spite of being in the midst of rushing reinforcements to Army Group Center (facing the even larger Soviet offensive code-named Mars) and North Africa (including the 10th Panzer Division and elements of a Tiger battalion to counter the Operation Torch landings in Morocco and Algeria) all of a sudden also came up with four panzer (the 6th, 11th, 17th, and 19th), three infantry (the 62nd, 294th, and 336th), and two Luftwaffe field divisions (the 7th and 8th), to help form a new Army Group Don which was able to field a total of 471 tanks and assault guns by December 12, 1943. Had even a portion of that force been made available in late October or early November of 1942 Operation Uranus would have likely been stopped in its tracks and World War II could have been even more horrifyingly destructive and lengthy than it already would become.

Moreover, and just as important as what the Germans weren't doing was what the Soviet command had done. As Chuikov's command reeled under the German body blows, the 62nd Army received (now part of Eremenko's Stalingrad Front - renamed from the Southeastern Front with the old Stalingrad Front now the Don Front under it's highly capable new commander - Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky) the 37th and 39th Guards Rifle Divisions and 308th Rifle Division along with the rebuilt 42nd and 92nd Rifle Brigades. In one fell swoop Chuikov's teetering army had once more been replenished. This allowed him to stiffen his defenses and consolidate his hold on the Factory District in preparation for Sixth Army's increasingly delayed assault.

Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that when Paulus finally rebooted his attack on the factory district it would move at a glacial pace, with a lack of mobile firepower and infantry alike causing formerly formidable kampfgruppen deprived of reinforcements to devolve into battalion sized elements lacking the striking power needed to root the Soviet defenders from the factory district. When help did arrive, in mid-October and in the form of the 14th Panzer and 79th and 305th Infantry Divisions - it hardly mattered. These reinforcements, instead of serving as an echelon for exploiting the assault force's efforts, became the assault force. The battalions from these three divisions, as well as numerous pioneer battalions stripped from the Sixth Army's division's outside Stalingrad, replaced worn out units as the spearhead instead of capitalizing on success and collapsing the 62nd Army's defenses in the factory district. All of which would have been possible late in September but whose window had nearly slammed shut by the middle of October. Remarkably enough, by October 14th Chuikov's 62nd Army was in perhaps its worst position to date. The ferocity of the German assault was such that casualties had soared. The 62nd Army evacuated 3,500 wounded across the Volga - the highest single day total of the battle. Moreover, the 62nd Army's command post had been struck by air attack that morning and other communications hubs had fallen with radio being the only communications left. But worse was to come. In a disastrous early afternoon development at 13:10 Chuikov's command post was hit again. Thirty personnel died and by 14:00 all telephone communications between Chuikov and his CP and the rest of the 62nd Army had been cut. And even though Chuikov's men held on - even after that, by early in November even the increasingly small German assault groupings had pushed the 62nd Army back into a tiny strip of land along the Volga; with virtually all of Stalingrad in German hands. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed and due to the tremendous blood and sacrifice of the Soviet 62nd Army - Stalingrad's factory district would never completely fall. This is why when dawn came on November 19th the German Sixth Army had been ripened for an epic defeat.