The Briansk Front Versus the German Second Army: July 1942

Last year I published a series of articles examining some of the significant but often overlooked Soviet counterstrokes directed against the Sixth Army's flanks outside Stalingrad. To this day, when one thinks of the exposed northwestern shoulder of Germany's drive into the Caucuses, and Soviet efforts to penetrate that flank, they think first and foremost of events exactly like those. However, what one needs to understand is that from Case Blue's first days the Red Army proved far from a passive defender. Here we shall examine one such instance - in this case an effort launched by the Soviet Briansk Front late in July 1942. This offensive sought to collapse Army Group B's northwestern shoulder by striking at elements of the defending German Second Army, who were at that time entrenched not far from the city of Voronezh.

In examining this eight day battle we can also explore larger themes driving my work - including the ongoing analysis of whether qualitative measures proved more important than the quantitative in achieving victory on the Eastern Front's battlefields. I have singled out this battle as worthy of attention for several reasons. Not least of which is that not only is it not well known, and thus would be of interest to many of my readers, but also because it in many ways is a microcosm of those elements driving outcomes on Germany's Eastern Front during 1941-1942.

For instance, in this battle we have Soviet forces holding enormous numerical advantages in men and tanks over their German foe. These advantages were so significant as to at times even exceed the disparity in armored assets the Red Army enjoyed over the Wehrmacht during the war's crushing final campaigns that led to the capture of Berlin, Hitler's suicide, and the Third Reich's capituation. Yet in spite of these numerical and material advantages the results here would be anything but positive for the Red Army. Beyond offering yet another example as to the futility in relying upon numerical determinants as the predominant factor for identifying outcomes - this battle is also illustrative for another near equally important reason. It offers further insight into what extant secondary theaters of the war undermined the German war effort. This provides additional insight into the bankruptcy of the German strategic effort in 1941-1942.  A period when Nazi Germany otherwise had every opportunity to cement its hegemony over continental Europe. First however, a brief bit of background.

The second German summer offensive launched against the Soviet Union began on June 28, 1942. Code named Case Blau (mostly known to English readers as Operation Blue), it was a potentially war changing drive directed at nothing less than permanently hamstringing the Soviet war effort and securing Germany's position in Eastern Europe while providing the Third Reich key economic resources (not least of which oil) needed to lock down hegemony over Europe and the Mediterranean littoral. Conducted entirely by the German Army's reinforced Army Group South (the most powerful German army group at this point in the war) this massive campaign spread across much of Southern Russia. The basic thrust of the plan was for Army Group South to first take and consolidate defensive positions in Southern Russia. Second, these positions could then be used to shield the decisive German drive to be launched further south and into the Caucusus. Even though the German campaign immediately found success, the Red Army fought as ferociously as it had during much of Operation Barbarossa (Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union).

To that end the fighting on Operation Blue's northern flank is often overlooked. This is especially true once the main weight of the German armies moved southeast. Nevertheless, it is vital to remember that these battles in and around the Russian city of Voronezh were particularly intense. Even after the Germans had largely taken their regional objectives the Red Army was determined to avoid letting the Germans consolidate their new gains. German forces in and around Voronezh spent much of July fighting a series of battles directed at stopping Soviet counterthrusts. So significant were these Soviet efforts that they ended up tying down the German Fourth Panzer Army, among significant other Axis forces, for the first half of the month.

Perhaps the biggest of these battles involved the German decimation of and subsequent forced Soviet break-up of one of the Red Army's newest and largest armor heavy formations: The 5th Tank Army commanded by General A.I. Liziukov. Stavka ordered the formation of 5th Tank Army only on May 29, 1942 and thus it was a very raw formation, a fact which doubtlessly played a role in its subsequent defeat. On the other hand it represented, on paper at least, a powerful grouping of firepower. The 5th Tank Army consisted of the 2nd and 11th Tank Corps, an independent tank brigade, the 340th Rifle Division, a light artillery regiment, a mixed rocket-mortar regiment, and an anti-aircraft division. Attached to the Briansk Front on June 15, 1942 the 5th Tank Army subsequently had attached to it the 7th Tank Corps and all told could deploy more than 500 tanks. However, from the get-go there were serious problems with the army's ability to operate as an effective combined arms force. First, the 340th Rifle Division simply did not have the motorized transport to keep up the tanks. Second, as late as July 4th the 5th Tank Army was still taking direct orders from Stavka and thus not cooperating all that well with the Briansk Front's command to which it had ostensibly been attached. From there, the 5th Tank Army and its attached elements were never really used as a concentrated force but rather dribbled into counter-attacks that in turn were parried by local German units. For example, by July 10th elements of 5th Tank Army had been in combat for the better part of a week and yet the 2nd Tank Corps was just arriving at the battlefield. Moreover, the actual deployment of the army's combat elements was done in a far from optimum manner. Conducting frontal attacks was bad enough but oftentimes the Soviet tankers deployed in a column with only the lead tank battalion being able to engage the German defenders without the support of other combat arms or even tanks and thus being duly decimated. Consequently, German forces in the region crushed the 5th Tank Army even though the bulk of what was Army Group South (split into Army Group's A and B during July) had driven off to the southeast. Nevertheless, the German Second Army had remained behind to not only carry the load in facing the initial Soviet counterstrokes but take the lead role in setting the northwestern part of Army Group B's defensive shoulder.

The German Second Army was at that time led by General Hans von Salmuth. He faced a tall order in not only securing his defensive positions but also because his chief antagonist was none other than K.K. Rokossovsky - the new commander of the Soviet Briansk Front and one of the best field generals and operational level commanders of the Second World War. Needless to say, Rokossovsky was not a man who sought to avoid taking the initiative. To that end, on July 17th Rokossovsky ordered General N.E. Chibisov (somewhat ironically the former commander of Briank Front and a man Rokossovsky had replaced just days earlier) to form an Operational Group (soon to become the new Soviet 38th Army - with the old 38th Army having been smashed by the Germans and then disbanded by Stavka after the fighting of Operation Blue's opening weeks) and penetrate positions held by the seemingly weak German VII Army Corps. This was to be followed by a thrust deep into the German operational rear that would not only destabilize the German Second Army's front, but potentially hamstring Army Group B's larger efforts. At that time the Second Army's VII Army Corps contained the 340th and 387th Infantry Divisions. It was commanded by General Ernst-Eberhard Hell.

On paper Chibisov's Operational Group held a number of advantages over Hell's VII Army Corps. For one thing Chibisov's command was much stronger than the 5th Tank Army that had been just defeated by the Germans. Rokossovsky in particular sought to give Chibisov much greater manpower and indirect firepower than Liziukov had fielded. In terms of manpower this included five rifle divisions (the 167th, 193rd, 237th, 284th, and 340th), the 106th Separate Rifle Brigade, as well as a number of other units scheduled to support Chibisov's main shock groupings. Regarding artillery assets Chibisov's Operational Group had been substantially strengthened over what the 5th Tank Army had fielded. For instance, above and beyond the integral artillery components in the rifle divisions Chibisov received seven additional artillery regiments (including one a piece of 122mm and 152mm heavy artillery regiments). Chibisov also had two gun brigades from the 2nd Destroyer Division (45mm and 76mm guns respectively) and three regiments of Katyusha rocket launcher's (versus the 5th Tank Army's one). On the other hand, when it came to tanks the 5th Tank Army had deployed with three tank corps and one separate tank brigade. Chibisov in comparison came up two tank brigades short - having been assigned two tank corps and two separate tank brigades. That said, Chibisov would also receive substantial reinforcements during the battle (including several more tank corps).

Given the central role Chibisov's armored units would play in the battle, it's worth examining them in greater detail. The 5th Tank Army had fought with the 2nd, 7th, and 11th Tank Corps. Following it's disbandenment the remnants of the 7th and 11th Tank Corps had been put into reserve to rebuild. This had left the 2nd Tank Corps - which Chibisov received and would be counting on greatly in exploiting any pentrations engineered in the lines of the German VII Army Corps. Interestingly enough the 2nd Tank Corps was led by a man, like Chibisov, who had recently been demoted - in this instance the 5th Tank Army's former commander - General Liziukov. As it turns out the 2nd Tank Corps had survived the 5th Tank Army's mauling in much better condition than it's peers. However, that was not saying much. 2nd Tank Corps had initially been equipped with 183 tanks as part of 5th Tank Army. By the time it had been assigned to Chibisov's command it was down to 78 operational tanks. In the days following its reassignment, Rokossovsky directed the bulk of his available replacement armor to 2nd Tank Corps' three tank brigades. As a result and by the eve of the offensive 72 tanks had arrived - roughly broken down into one third T-60 light tanks, one third T-34 medium tanks, and one third KV-1 heavy tanks (pictured here). This gave the 2nd Tank Corps roughly 150 tanks. However, this left the tank brigades still understrength. Making matters worse, the motorized rifle brigade was also short on infantry. Nevertheless, in rebuilding 2nd Tank Corps Rokossovsky had sought to rectify another problem that had plauged 5th Tank Army. Whereas 5th Tank Army had no reconnaissance assets, the 2nd Tank Corps received the 205 man strong 12th Separate Reconnaissance battalion - which included 12 armored cars and 20 armored personnel carriers.

Major General M.E. Katukov's 1st Tank Corps had also been assigned to Chibisov's Operational Group. Along with 2nd Tank Corps it represented Chibisov's primary combat groupings. 1st Tank Corps was far from full strength, but had been rebuilt enough that it too represented a powerful collection of armor. Moreover, Katukov was one of the most talented generals in the Red Army, although for much of the battle he was so sick that Soviet doctors thought he should be hospitalized (which he refused to do). As for the two independent tank brigades Chibisov had also received; the 118th Tank Bridage was at full strength. It included 8 KV, 16 T-34, and 20 T-70 tanks (with the latter a new light tank superior to the T-60). Finally, the 201st Tank Brigade was less well equipped. It featured 18 British Lend-Lease Matilda II tanks as well as 16 T-60 tanks in its ranks. Though, Briansk Front would supply substantial reinforcements to Chibisov during the battle, including several more tank corps - these rifle divisons, artillery regiments, and tank units were his primary assets during the critical first days of the attack. 

Hell's VII Army Corps (again, the 340th and 387th Infantry Divisions) faced Chibisov's Operational Group. One German advantage came from the terrain. Hell's men had set up their defensive positions amongst a set of rollling hills offering great observation points and interspersed with some steppe but also featuring plunging heavily wooded ravines mostly impassable to armor, and forests equally problematic for armored heavy units to negotiate. In addition, both the Bol'shaia Vereika River and Bystrik Creek provided additional barriers that could be leveraged by the German defenders. Both water obstacles were surrounded by marshland and mud - this meant crossing sites were few and far between. Moreover, before being driven east by the larger German offensive the Red Army had previously constructed a number of field fortifications and concrete bunkers in the region. The Germans were only too happy to occupy and improve upon these fortifications, and they had a full week to do exactly that following the decimation of the Soviet 5th Tank Army.

Nevertheless the German 340th (led by General Otto Butze) and 387th Infantry Division (led by General Arno Jahr) were hardly elite formations. Both had been formed only in 1942 and each division arrived at the front only in June of 1942. They had been blooded in combat, thus shaking off their otherwise green status. As a result of this combat experience they were less than full strength. Worse yet, they occupied wide defensive fronts stretching 20 and 24 kilometers (with the 340th in the former and the 387th the latter). Divisional reserves were nearly non-existent (amounting to the equivalent of roughly a battalion of infantry for each unit). Although both divisions occupied a well constructed network of defensive fortifications they did so in a long, thin, single defensive echelon possessing no real depth in which to respond to a Soviet offensive. That said, the Germans did control two of the larger hills in the area - each offering great overwatch positions. In addition both divisions contained artillery regiments featuring 105mm and 150mm howitzers as well as a plethora of German 37mm, 50mm, and 75mm anti-tank guns along with stocks of captured French 75mm and Soviet 76.2mm guns.

Accordingly, and even though the Soviet forces held overwhelming advantages in deployed armored fighting vehicles (since the Germans had virtually none), the Germans still had enough towed weapons and the terrain was broken enough by natural obstacles that the Soviet tankers couldn't just overrun their foes. In the days to come whichever side reacted the fastest to developments on the battlefield and played the combined-arms game the best would have an enormous leg up on its opponent. To that end, the Second Army stood ready to support Hell's command with significant armored and anti-armor assets including; one company (four SP guns) from the 201st Sturmgeshutz battalion, the 654th, 559th, and 560th Panzerjager Battalions and, most importantly, the 9th Panzer Division (which along with the 11th Panzer Division had played the key role in crushing the 5th Tank Army the week before). But that support wouldn't come until after the battle had been joined, and as a result Chibisov had an available window to make his move.

To that end, and in spite of being given hardly more than a day to prepare his new command, Chibisov constructed a solid plan of attack along classic Deep Operational lines. H-hour was scheduled for very early in the morning of July 21st. Chibisov assigned the rifle divisions (supported by the two independent tank brigades: the 201st and 118th) the primary task of creating the initial holes in the German lines. From there the 1st and 2nd Tank Corps would be committed into the breach as a second echelon and, ideally, penetrate deep into the German rear - hoping to advance at least 20 kilometers by the end of day one while severing the VII Army Corps lines of communication and smashing vital soft targets such as supply depots, headquarters, repair shops, and the other such infrastructure. The Soviet 193rd and 340th Rifle Divisions with one independent tank brigade formed one such axis of attack (with the full 1st Tank Corps waiting to exploit its planned success). Chibisov assigned the 2nd Tank Corps to exploit the 167th Rifle Division's penetration (with the other independent tank brigade subordinated to it). Overall, Chibisov's Operational Group would have four days to reach its geographic goals. Chibisov's Operational Group was not attacking alone, but acting as part of a larger series of attacks Stavka had ordered launched by the Voronezh and Briansk Fronts against the German penetrations in the region.

There was nothing wrong with the plan per se; it was the execution that would prove problematic. For starters, everything was far too rushed. Not only was reconnaissance near non-existent - but the ranking Soviet officers barely had time to form their orders, no less issue them, and get them to their subordinate commanders. For instance, Chibisov's operational group had only been formed on July 17th. That same day Rokossovsky had ordered him to plan an attack. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1400 hours on July 20th (or fourteen hours prior to the planned start of the attack) that General Liziukov issued orders to his 2nd Tank Corps - commands not fully received by his tank brigades until two hours later. And this was the norm throughout Chibisov's Operational Group. Thus, for what was a fairly large-scale army sized offensive, the component rifle divisions, tank corps, and tank brigades in the first two echelons had roughly twelve hours to prepare an attack across inadquately scouted and unfamiliar terrain held by a dug-in enemy. Worse was yet to come.

The initial overnight deployments into the Soviet assembly areas quickly degenerated into a mess. The 118th Tank Brigade, assigned a key breathrough role in support of the 167th Rifle Division, saw two of it's T-34's collide. Another tank crushed a couple of men from the 167th Rifle Division who had been sleeping by the side of the road. From there, an officer was hit by friendly fire from the 104th Rifle Brigade. All told, the 118th Tank Brigade lost track of one KV, one T-70, and two T-34's during the night march. Other units arrived in their assembly areas far too early. That's because the attack had been originally planned to begin on the 20th before Chibisov had delayed it one day due to the larger lack of readiness. Consequently, the Germans were able to observe what was coming with nearly a full day's notice in some cases. Meanwhile, one of Chibisov's rifle divisions, the 284th had only been reformed in the previous days (having been briefly encircled in the previous fighting of the prior weeks and suffering heavily). Equipment shortfalls were dreadful. Though having received 1,312 men to replenish its ranks there was nothing much to arm them with. As it was the entire rifle division only had 1,921 rifles, 98 automatic rifles, 202 PPSh submachine-guns, 7 of the 108 heavy machine guns called for the unit's TO&E and similar shortages of light machine guns and anti-tank weapons plus only 21 motorized vehicles of 114 that the unit was supposed to have on hand. Half of the division's men would go into battle unarmed.

Regardless of all of this, the attack began at 0430 hours on July 21st; kicked off by a thirty-minute artillery barrage. In spite of featuring far more gun tubes than the 5th Tank Army had assembled weeks earlier the barrage ended up pretty much missing everything. This was because the artillery regiments had sited most of their observation posts as far as four to six kilometers from the German lines and thus had no idea where the actual German defensive positions were. Nor were they allowed to get closer, as the Germans wisely maintained their forward outposts in place until the very minutes the attack began. As such, the Soviet artillery fired at grid coordinates and continued to do so given that there were no aerial spotters provided to offer another avenue for adjusting fire. Perhaps it was no surprise then that all but one of Chibisov's attacks bogged down in a hail of interlocking fire from German heavy weapons free of suppressive interference from Soviet artillery, rocket, and mortar fire.

However, as for the single axis of attack that found success - it really produced results. Concentrated on a two kilometer front, two regiments from the 167th Rifle Division and approximately 40 tanks from the 118th Tank Brigade slammed into part of a single German battalion spread out across far more terrain than it could handle. Though the Germans fought well (on this first day alone the 118th Tank Brigade suffering total losses of five tanks destroyed and four more tanks knocked out while the 167th Rifle Division suffered over 500 casualties), the addition of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade enabled the Soviet first echelon to force the Germans into retreat. Even before this hole had been ripped in the German lines, Liziukov had ordered the 2nd Tank Corp's 26th and 148th Tank Brigades to move up (doing so only three hours after the offensive began). Thus, and regardless of the fact the Germans had stymied the rest of Operational Group Chibisov by 1045 hours (or only six hours after the offensive had begun) - thanks to the efforts of the 167th Rifle Division and 118th Tank Brigade the 2nd Tank Corps had its opportunity to run wild and completely unhinge the German VII Army Corps defensive front.

Enter the bridge.

The 2nd Tank Corps 26th and 148th Tank Brigades had only needed to conduct a roughly ten kilometer road march to get into position to pass through the breach torn by the Soviet first echelon in the German defensive front. The first nine kilometers went fine. Then, at the town of Surikovo, they had to cross a bridge over a stream. That's where the offensive began to run off the rails. This is mostly because the Luftwaffe had responded to events in the field as quickly as Liziukov. These air raids not only damaged the bridge but continued all day; hindering repair efforts and forcing the two tank brigades to disperse. Though the tankers found a crossing site, they were forced to move one tank brigade at a time and one tank at a time in painstaking fashion into assembly areas outside Surikovo. It took most of the afternoon for just the 148th Tank Brigade to fully cross. Meanwhile, its commander waited for the 26th Tank Brigade to finish crossing while Liziukov and Chibisov sent a stream of commands ordering the 148th Tank Brigade to advance with or without its sister brigade.

By all accounts the Luftwaffe played a key role in slowing the Soviet advance. First person accounts from Soviet officers and soldiers from in particular the 167th Rifle Division, 118th Tank Brigade, and the 2nd Tank Corp's 26th and 148th Tank Brigades describe incessant bombing and strafing (as well as accurate and effective German artillery fire). Interesting enough, though the Luftwaffe did not have a particularly large presence in the region, it was able to maintain a high sortie rate over the battlefield in an airspace it dominated at the expense of the Soviet 2nd Air Army - whose efforts would prove mostly ineffectual largely due to the dispersion of its otherwise numerically adequate assets.

Among other things this is further evidence that the substantial reinforcements the Luftwaffe was ordered to send to the Mediterranean theater of operations late in 1941 and early in 1942 had a disproportionate impact on Operation Blue's failure to maintain the pace it had sought. For instance, the first echelon rifle divisions had orders to build bridges over water obstacles (in particular the Bol'shaia Vereika River) before the second echelon tankers arrived. However, in spite of having adequate bridging equipment on hand the 167th Rifle Division simply couldn't get the job done in the face of the constant German air strikes. Nor could the engineers devote adequate attention to clearing German mines which had been laid in large numbers in the wake of the retreating German units. The Germans even mined river banks and potential crossing sites at rivers and streams. As a result mines blew up four tanks from the 26th Tank Brigade at the crossing site it had found in lieu of using the bridges being hammered by the Luftwaffe. Moreover, the neighboring Soviet 193rd and 340th Rifle Divisions had been stopped in their tracks by withering fire from German defensive positions. The 167th Rifle Division found its breakthrough greatly circumscribed by the inability to widen the breach in the German lines as intense flanking fire came from the bulk of the German defenders that had not been forced to retreat. It must be said that there was a distinct lack of communication and cooperation between adjoining Soviet units. This would remain a problem for a significant part of the war whereby commanders of regiments, divisions, corps, and even armies often failed to work together in any meaningful fashion. As it would in other instances this lack of cooperation, all part of a larger lack of effective command and control, would be a significant element in the attack's ultimate failure.

By the evening of the 21st most of the 167th Rifle Division and the 118th Tank Brigade had crossed the Bol'shaia Vereika River (again the key obstacle in the region) and driven back the local German defenders. Meanwhile, it had taken the 2nd Tank Corp's 26th and 148th Tank Brigades well over six hours to cross the river. On the plus side, the three tank brigades had 104 operational tanks that surived the first day's fighting (23 KV, 44 T-34, 12 T-70, and 25 T-60), were through the German defensive line, across the river, and assembled to lead a deep operational strike.

Meanwhile the 1st Tank Corps and 193rd Rifle Division still languished on the river's eastern bank having failed to duplicate their peers success (while also taking significant losses - including 3 KV, 12 T-34, and 2 T-60 tanks from the 1st Tank Corps). As did the 340th and 284th Rifle Divisions and Operational Group Chibisov's remaining rifle units forming the line leading up to the boundary with the Voronezh Front - all of whom had failed to achieve any meaningful advance in the face of stout German resistance. The German 340th Infantry Division had been substantially bolstered by the presence of the 654th Panzerjager Battalion (which included 30 heavy 75mm anti-tank guns and numerous 37mm and 50mm anti-tank guns). On the other hand, if the Russians played their cards right their setbacks did not matter given that the 167th Rifle Division and 118th Tank Brigade had taken advantage of the German 387th Infantry Division comparative lack of anti-tank weaponry enjoyed by its neighbor (with the division having only fourteen 75mm guns in its anti-tank battalion) and plowed a path for 2nd Tank Corps to exploit.

Nevertheless, Chibisov was livid and Liziukov was becoming increasingly exasperated - both for good reason. From Chibisov's perspective, none of his Operational Group's efforts had come anywhere close to achieving the first day goals they had been assigned. Only the aforementioned left flank had come close and even there was coming up short by a distance of over 20 kilometers (or roughly four times further than they had actually advanced). Worse yet, the 2nd Tank Corp's shock grouping, the 26th and 148th Tank Brigades had followed their crossing of the Bol'shaia Vereika River (which had been completed by late in the afternoon of the first day) by doing next to nothing. So exasperated was Chibisov that he went around Liziukov and sent a radio message to 148th Tank Brigade to get moving. The window for achieving even a single breakthrough into the depth of the German defensive position was rapidly closing.

This was because the Germans were reacting with alacrity to the single penetration and overall pressure on VII Army Corp's positions. At 0930 hours (or about five hours after the Soviet offensive began) the VII Army Corps dispatched a company from the 559th Panzerjager Battalion to bolster the weakening 387th Infantry Division (whose 542nd Infantry Regiment had suffered very high casualties of 475 men on the first day) while the VII Army Corps chief of staff reached out to the 9th Panzer Division commander in anticipation of the Second Army ordering it to assist. Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the German Second Army command had also directed air support to the VII Army Corps (which progressively increased in intensity throughout the day). It also, at 1345 hours, reacted as expected via ordering the 9th Panzer Division to shift into positions nearer to VII Army Corps as well as sending Hell's command significant artillery while requesting Army Group headquarters give the 385th Infantry Division to the VII Army Corps. In addition, in the area of the lone Soviet breakthrough the 387th Infantry Division's 542nd Infantry Regiment had halted its retreat and, bolstered by additional anti-tank assets was digging in on a heavily wooded hill overlooking the Russian penetration.

The Germans were responding aggressively, but the 2nd Tank Corps commander, General Liziukov, was also not willing to sit idle. Late in the evening of the 21st he ordered all three of his tank brigades to make a night advance - to be led by the 148th Tank Brigade and followed by the 26th and 27th Tank Brigades. When combined with the 118th Tank Brigade this meant that all told Liziukov had approximately 130 operational tanks  as well as the infantry from the 167th Rifle Division to strike in a concentrated fist. If quantitative factors really are the dominant elements in determining victory than this large grouping of armor should have been able to not only irrepairably destabilize the German 387th Infantry Division's positions but completely unhinge the VII Army Corps entire defensive front.

Nothing of the sort would happen.

First off, the 118th Tank Brigade had followed its river crossing by assembling some distance from the 2nd Tank Corps. Moreover, the 167th Rifle Division was in no condition to advance. Furthermore, at nightfall Liziukov's third tank brigade, the 27th, was still not across the Bol'shaia Vereika River. This meant Liziukov only had the 76 operational tanks in the 26th and 148th Tank Brigades. Worse yet, Liziukov had given his men only twenty minutes to formulate a plan of advance. The 148th Tank Brigade commander quickly assembled a forward mobile detachment to lead the way - a platoon of KV heavy tanks from the 260th Tank Battalion and a platoon of T-60 light tanks from the 89th Tank Battalion. The rest of the tank brigade would follow, to itself be followed by the 26th Tank Brigade. At 2310 the forward mobile detachment set off. A litany of mini-disasters quickly blew everything up. German small arms fire that continued throughout the first few kilometers forced the tanks to travel buttoned-up.  When the lead tank of the forward mobile detachment (tha brigade chief of staff's tank) finally made it past the German positions he emerged from the top hatch to find that only a single KV tank had followed his. He spent much of the night tracking back and forth behind German lines looking for the rest of his command, and for good reason.

The bulk of the 148th Tank Brigade failed to move out on time. When it did not only couldn't it find the forward mobile detachment, but given the lack of reconniasance - got lost. In the process the brigade's two tank battalions seperated. Somehow the trailing battalion ended up in front of the lead battalion while also stumbling into the forward mobile detachment. That mess wasn't sorted out until late into the night/early morning hours of July 22nd (when the 148th Tank Brigade's chief of staff finally found his wandering command and helped put things in place). At this point the attempted deep operational strike had covered a mere six kilometers with nearly three times as far still needing to be traversed to reach their initial objective. At this point the forward mobile detachment once more took the lead. Meanwhile, many of the following tanks made wrong turns. Some stumbled into German anti-tank positions resulting in Soviet losses of at least two T-34's. Meanwhile, and unbeknownst to the men in the 148th Tank Brigade, the 26th Tank Brigade had been stalled out only one kilometer from the assembly area. This was due to the brigade's finding of a disabled KV tank from the 148th Tank Brigade that was in the process of being guarded by two other KV tanks. The 26th Tank Brigade commander had apparently decided to wait for the two KV tanks from the 148th Tank Brigade to take the lead as it was his orders to follow the 148th Tank Brigade and he didn't want to circumvent orders! This lack of initiative and slavish devotion to pre-existing orders would sadly for the Russian side prove the norm at the brigade level rather than the exception.

As a result, by 0400 hours and as the sky began to lighten Liziukov's armored fist was down to a single tank brigade. It was at that moment that the 148th Tank Brigade's luck really began to run out. That's because the early morning sky allowed German heavy anti-tank gun crews to spot the lumbering KV tanks. The well camouflaged German gunners promptly began knocking them, and their attendant T-60 light tanks, out. Ultimately, the 260th Tank Battalion and most of the T-60 light tanks from the 89th Tank Battalion engaged the German guns, with 7 KV and 6 T-60 tanks becoming total losses or knocked out and the 148th Tank Brigade's commander being killed. At the same time, a portion of the 89th Tank Battalion slipped past the now raging battle and, under full sunlight, continued the advance. What should have been the entire 2nd Tank Corps rampaging in the German rear was now down to elements of a single tank battalion.

The bad luck continued as the Russian tank crews just missed stumbling onto the German 387th Infantry Division's headquarters before finally, eight hours after moving out late the night before, four KV and two T-60 tanks reached their initial objective a full 15 kilometers behind German lines: the town of Medvezh'e. There they waited. An hour passed and the rest of the 2nd Tank Corps, the 148th Tank Brigade, 26th Tank Brigade, and 27th Tank Brigade, failed to appear. Instead, motorized German infantry drove up, unloaded, and began surrounding the isolated Russian tank crews. While this happened, command and control disintegrated throughout the Soviet ranks.

Day two of the attack found Rokossovsky and Chibisov trying to figure out what was going on and Liziukov striking off on his own to find out what happened to his tankers - a decision that would lead to his death and decapitate the 2nd Tank Corps at the worst possible time. The 2nd Tank Corp's 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade remained on the defensive as it had all night with heavy German air attacks and artillery fire freezing the 2nd Tank Corps and 167th Rifle Division mostly in place. Meanwhile, the 26th Tank Brigade fell back under heavy anti-tank fire and air strikes as Russian combined arms efforts remained deplorable. The 2nd Tank Corps lacked effective indirect fire assets and needed the 167th Rifle Division's artillery to supress the German anti-tank and artillery fire. But the Soviet rifle divisions had been allocated insufficient stocks of ammunition - a problem compounded when German bombers found and destroyed the 167th Rifle Division's ammunition depot. As for the 148th Tank Brigade, it was hopelessly spread out, with the brigade commander dead, the rest of the headquarters only retaining control over the brigade's motorized rifle battalion, and it's tank battalions being systemically taken apart by German anti-tank weapons. To that last point the 260th Tank Battalion had already been largely destroyed and the survivors was retreating back to Soviet lines. The 89th Tank Battalion was also in its final moments. As the German infantry pressured the six of the 89th Tank Battalion's vehicles that had made it to Medvezh'e they too fell back in staggered leaps interspersed with pauses - hoping to see their comrades rushing forward to exploit their initial advance. Instead, they came under fire from German SP and anti-tank guns arriving in the area. Within minutes the Germans had blazed up two of the KV tanks. The other four tanks fled straight into the German SP guns, and were knocked out and set on fire, one after the other. With their deaths the 89th Tank Battalion had been destroyed. The night raid had failed, the 2nd Tank Corps deep operational strike had gone nowhere. Worse yet, spurred by the fact that Russian tanks had penetrated fifteen kilometers behind their lines, albeit ineffectively as it turned out, Salmuth and Second Army weren't taking any chances. German reinforcements were arriving to assist VII Army Corps.

Liziukov didn't know any of this. As he attempted to round up his command Chibisov's offensive further faltered. The 118th Tank Brigade led an attack that went nowhere. The 1st Tank Corps and 193rd Rifle Division didn't attempt to advance again until the afternoon of day two - having sat in place for nearly twenty-four irreplaceable hours. The Luftwaffe dominated the skies, not only over the battlefield but up to 80 kilometers behind the Soviet lines. To its credit the Soviet 2nd Air Army was attempting to supress and degrade the German defensive positions in support of Chibisov's increasingly fragmented army but the German pilots largely had their way with their Soviet opponents. Moreover, the 2nd Air Army's efforts were not exactly being targeted where they could be of most use. During the second day of the offensive both the 1st and 2nd Tank Corps reported virtually non-existent air support.

It was at this time that Chibisov's Operational Group was formally renamed the new 38th Army, though this did nothing to solve the command issues, if anything worsening them. Part of this transition saw the appointment of a new chief of staff to the army in spite of being in the midde of a major offensive. Worse yet, Chibisov directed the battle from a different location to that of most of his headquarters. Meanwhile, German losses had sharply fallen as Soviet losses rose. The battered German 387th Infantry Division suffered half the casualties of the day before (240 versus nearly 500) and the German 340th Infantry Division endured lighter casualties yet (22 dead and 69 wounded or missing in action). On the other side of the hill and in just the 167th Rifle Division - 471 men had been killed and 1,705 wounded in the first two days of fighting. Then, at 2300 hours on July 22nd Salmuth released the 9th Panzer Division to Hell's command. The panzertruppen had orders to either respond to a full Soviet breakthrough of 387th Infantry Division's positions (as such was the weak state of 387th Infantry Division that the Germans anticipated it might not hold out) or lead an enveloping attack of the Soviet advance depending upon the circumstances.

The third day saw Soviet command and control fall further apart as a Luftwaffe raid hit the 2nd Tank Corps forward command post. This mostly severed radio communication between the tank corp's headquarters, it's component brigades, and both army and front level leadership. The 2nd Tank Corps largely spent the day sitting idle and trying to hide from German aircraft. The 2nd Tank Corps remained essentially rudderless as Chibisov tried in vain to find out what had happened to his missing tank corps commander (who in all likelihood was already dead at this point - having disappeared in his KV tank the day before). Across the front Chibisov's attacks went nowhere. The 1st Tank Corps had managed to advance a mere four to six kilometers through three days of ination interspersed with tough fighting. Katukov was livid at the caution of his brigade commanders, their inability to organize their men and advance - as well as the continuous breaks in communication.

In summary and by the third day of the offensive the right flank of the 38th Army's offensive had gone nowhere. Well sited Germany heavy weapons, including ample indirect fire and air support, and cross-fire from machine guns had cut the Soviet infantry to the bone. As mentioned earlier and from day one the German 340th Infantry Division has also received towed anti-tank support far surpassing that initially offered to the 387th Infantry Division. That said, the Soviet 340th Rifle Division's 1244th Rifle Regiment and 203rd Tank Battalion had managed to reach the crest of a key node in the German defense: Hill 213.8. There they had bogged down. Overall, there was simply nothing that had occured on the 38th Army's right flank that even hinted at an opportunity to unhinge the VII Army Corp's defensive front. And yet, it was here, instead of against the staggering 387th Infantry Division's defenses on his left flank, that Chibisov decided to commit a significant part of his reserves: the 237rd Rifle Division and 201st Tank Brigade.

Once again, and on paper these two units in conjunction represented a combat grouping far more powerful than that of the German defenders in opposition. The 237rd Rifle Division numbered 12,500 men on July 22, 1942. The 201st Tank Brigade also committed 10 Lend-Lease "Matilda" tanks and 10 T-60 light tanks to the 237rd Rifle Division for the main part of it's planned attack. However, if we go past the numbers, and look at the qualitative elements explaining the make up of this otherwise imposing force we can readily see many of the same problems that had bedeviled many of the other Soviet units leading the 38th Army's counter-offensive. First off, and only in February of 1942 had the 237th Rifle Division finished forming up and began training. It included three rifle regiments and one artillery regiment; like the majority of its peers formed early in 1942. Nevertheless, the men didn't receive their weapons until June and the division wasn't dispatched to the front until early in July. It was green as could get.

Detraining on July 14th the division was forced to march across a significant portion of the Voronezh Front (where it had been initially assigned) to the Briansk Front (where it was reassigned). Because the division was short of horses and vehicles the men were forced to march in the heat and dust of mid-July. They did so over roughly 80 kilometers in three days while not only carrying their own combat loads and weapons, but also manhandling the division's heavy weapons; including heavy machine-guns, mortars, and ammunition. Needless to say, by the time the men reached the Don River they were completely exhausted. It took two days to cross the Don as there were no bridges in the area, only a ferry. This was used for the artillery, horses, vehicles, and the like. This meant that most of the men were forced to swim across the Don. Upon completing this ardous task they were put to work building fortifications before being ordered to the 38th Army.

As a result the 237th Rifle Division's planned introduction into the attack (initially scheduled for July 22nd) was pushed back to July 23rd at 0700 hours. The division's commander only received this order from Chibisov at 0340 - meaning he had about three hours to prepare his inexperienced and exhausted division for its baptism into combat against now veteran and dug in German infantry that had othwerwise stymied the best efforts of several rifle divisions and tank brigades in the two days prior. The division's commander was able to get the attack order postponed again, by eight hours to mid-afternoon at 1500 hours. But his problems were significant. The artillery had still not caught up with the rifle regiments and the gun batteries were still finding firing positions. Moreover, there was only a brief period of time to reconnoiter the planned axis of advance and the German defensive positions. Logistics was an absolute mess. The artillery had only three fourths of an authorized combat load of ammunition (meaning it would not be able to provide an effective bombardment prior to attack nor support the riflemen during the attack), and because of a lack of food the men would fight on empty stomachs. The 201st Tank Brigade was located only three hours prior to H-Hour. Thus integrating the artillery, infantry, and armor support into a cohesive combined-arms grouping proved a pipe dream.

When the attack began the Germans responded with heavy artillery and mortar bombardments coupled with interlocking and withering machine gun fire that shredded the Russian infantry. On top of that the Russian division's located next to the 237th did virtually nothing to help. In particular the Soviet 284th Rifle Division not even offer a hint of attacking to at least force the Germans to account for its presence. The Soviet 340th Rifle Divison on the other flank similarly passively remained in its positions. As a result the Germans massed ever greater amounts of firepower, including ample air support, to rain death down on the 237th Rifle Division's men. This was made worse when the inexperienced Russian artillery and mortars made no efforts to coordinate with the attacking rifle regiments. They instead just blindly blasted away; pounding the Russian infantry that had actually made it to the German defensive positions and doing so until the artillery ran out of shells. As the Russian artillery fell silent due to a lack of ammunition, the Germans poured it on - further pinning the depleted Soviet rifle regiments in place. By the day's end, and of the three rifle regiments and tank brigade, the deepest penetration reached 1.5 kilometers. German counter-attacks erased this meagre accomplishment late that evening.

The exhausted Russian riflemen fell where they lay. The combined efforts of a 12,500 man rifle division and entire tank brigade had been frittered away due to poor planning, inexperience, a lack of logistical support, virtually non-existent combined arms coordination, and even worse coordination vis a vis the two rifle division's flanking the attack. This is how a force with crushing numerical advantanges gets defeated by a quantitatively inferior opponent. This also provides yet another example as to what truly decided victory and defeat on the Second World War's largest battlefields.

And yet in spite of the fact that the Soviet 38th Army had hardly covered itself in glory, in terms of taking enormous advantages in manpower and firepower and translating that into anything remotely resembling victory, the German VII Army Corps was in a precarious state. To be sure the 340th Infantry Division's defenses were holding up. But the 387th Infantry Division, was, two days into the battle - in big trouble. And this was in spite of the huge break VII Army Corps had received when Chibisov doubled down and reinforced his failing effort against 340th Infantry Division (when in all likelihood the introduction of even the green 237th Rifle Division and 201st Tank Brigade would have meant a breakthrough in 387th Infantry Division's defensive sector). Thus, and from the German Second Army headquarters on down, it was imperative to bolster 387th Infantry Division's defenses as much as it was to leverage Army Group B/Second Army's primary reserves in the region, the 9th Panzer Division and 385th Infantry Division, and potentially turn the tables on the Soviet 38th Army.

When it came to the German infantry reserves they again came up poorly in a strict numerical comparison to, for instance, Chibisov's 237th Rifle Division. The German 385th Infantry Division (which had begun its march to VII Army Corps on the first day of the Soviet offensive) was not a full strength unit. It had only two infantry regiments. Nevertheless it nearly ended up beating the 9th Panzer Division to VII Army Corps in large part because not only had it received its orders a day earlier (and marched 40 of the 70 kilometers it needed to cover to reach VII Army Corps area of operations) but because an ongoing German problem was inhibiting 9th Panzer Division's own march to VII Army Corps: inadequate fuel.

The combat area was only about 35 kilometers from where the 9th Panzer Division had been resting and refitting (this would be the third time in three weeks it had been thrown into action as a fire brigade). However, not only was not enough fuel available for movement but the division was in the process of changing the engine oil in its armored vehicles; a process delayed as well by long wait times for the delivery of oil. It was only at mid-day on the 22nd that a supply train finally arrived at Second Army carrying 420 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel. From there however, the logisticians were forced to load trucks up with 150 tons of fuel and lubricants for delivery to 9th Panzer Division itself. Rain and the poor condition of the road network meant that it was only early in the morning the next day that the column of trucks reached 9th Panzer Division. As a result the entire panzer division had been immobilized for over a day all while the 387th Infantry Division was entering crisis mode.

Such delays in years to come would prove far more disastrous to the German war effort. However, given the 1942 era Red Army's inability to coordinate its large reserves of infantry and tanks into effective combined arms combat teams logistically backed with the resources to be used effectively the Germans ended up being able to overcome the inability to act as timely as they had desired. However, this was another reason that in spite of the Red Army's already growing numerical superiority over the Ostheer that elements far more important than numbers were still in play in determining the war's outcome. Moreover, this represents another example as to how much the fighting in the Medterranean was draining the Axis war effort. That's because more than enough fuel to have moved 9th Panzer Division (and alleviate the fuel shortages that in general were playing a key role in hindering Army Group A and B's exploitation of their initial successes during Blue's first month) was at that time being burned on the end of a thousand mile supply line in the wastes of the Egyptian desert outside of El Alamein.

Meanwhile the Germans had assigned to the beleaguered 387th Infantry Division the 559th Panzerjager Battalion (including about 10 highly effective 75mm anti-tank guns) as well as the 201st Assault Gun Battalion (six operational assault guns at that time). But time was running out. At 2145 hours on June 22nd General Hell received a report from the 387th Infantry Division that its situation was critical. This prompted Hell to send the 387th Infantry Division the 221st Pioneer Battalion from the corps reserve as well as the reserve battalion from the 340th Infantry Division; albeit thus leaving the 340th Infantry with no reserves. Perhaps as a result the 387th Infantry Division somewhat stablized its position on the 22nd; stopping the attacks launched against it that day. At the same time Hell took operational control of the 9th Panzer Division which planned to counter-attack on July 23rd. Meanwhile, additional German infantry and anti-tank reserves arrived in the region to form a backstop in case the 387th Infantry Division's front caved in.

Nevertheless, because of how long it took to wait for fuel and oil the 9th Panzer Division didn't move out until mid-morning on the 23rd. It then required further supplies of fuel after the road march. Though those supplies (170 metric tons worth) arrived from another truck column it is important to note that the panzer division had not been able to accumulate any reserves of fuel neccessary for actually launching a counter-attack. Wastage played a role as well, leaky barrels meant as much as ten percent of the fuel had been lost en-route. This provides further evidence as to how problematic it was for large armored formations to rely upon trucking over rail in terms of resupply. Nevertheless, the 9th Panzer Division did arrive near the front and by 1700 hours on the 23rd the division had organized a powerful kampfgruppe to attack and relieve the 387th Infantry Division whose positions were finally cracking under the Russian onslaught. The 9th Panzer Division's kampfgruppe was, as usual at this time of the war, a model of combined arms teamwork. It included: The 33rd Panzer Regiment, a battalion from the 11th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, an anti-tank battalion and two artillery battalions. The kampfgruppe quickly attacked and advanced without pause. Within an hour and a half it had relieved the 387th Infantry Division (whose 542nd Infantry Regiment had been encircled). This greatly diminshed the overall Russian pressure on the embattled division, which had suffered another 160 casualties that day - bringing it's three day casualty count to a significant 850 plus men.

Having stabilized the 387th Infantry Division, the kampfgruppe from 9th Panzer Division then turned and moved into position to rejoin the rest of its parent formation (which was still experiencing significant fuel shortages) and deliver what was hoped would be a devastating counter-attack into the rear of the attacking Soviet units. Meanwhile a significant portion of the 385th Infantry Division had arrived and along with elements of the 340th Infantry Division would also participate in the counter-attack via in particular by screening 9th Panzer Division's flanks. In notable contrast to the lack of coordination between Russian units, all of the various German commands worked together virtually seamlessly - greatly multiplying their available combat power. For that matter, after a week of refitting the 9th Panzer Division was the strongest it had been since Case Blau had begun on June 28th. At the start of the German summer offensive the 9th Panzer Division had approximately 150 tanks. It had suffered total losses (meaning tanks completely destroyed) of 39 panzers in the month that had followed. As it stood on the eve of the German's planned July 24th counter-attack the 9th Panzer Division thus had 96 operational tanks (5 Panzer I, 22 Panzer II, 64 Panzer III, 9 Panzer IV (8 with the long-barrel 75mm gun), and 2 command tanks). Nevertheless, in terms of numbers and qualitative strength this still meant that the 9th Panzer Division was vastly inferior to Chibisov's armored park (predominantly composed of powerful T-34 and KV tanks and about to get significantly stronger).

Regardless, July 24th opened with the long awaited German counter-attack. A series of German airstrikes battered the 237th Rifle Division's positions. Though these airstrikes averaged only 9-12 attack aircraft each (flying at a high operational tempo from airfields nearby and thus able to rearm and strike repeatedly in a short period of time) by all accounts they were devestatingly effective. This once again shows how important even small numbers of attack aircraft could be when flying in close support of German ground forces. It also illustrates how much the decision to divert hundreds of aircraft from the Eastern Front and to the Mediterranean had hurt German chances in Eastern Europe during the summer of 1942. German artillery and mortars had also opened up on the still green, exhausted, and depleted Soviet riflemen that had survived the previous day's failed attack on the German positions.

Neither Soviet aircraft, artillery, or the 284th Rifle Division (whose commander could see what was about to happen) responded to support the 237th Rifle Division all while the German kampgruppen deliberately formed up before the shocked Russian defenders. Having deployed into their assualt groupings the overwhelming weight of the 9th Panzer Division then fell upon the 237th Rifle Division's 835th Rifle Regiment. It immediately crumbled and fled. The Germans then rolled up the 841st Rifle Regiment, encircling and annilihating two of its battalions in fierce fighting (with only 200 surivors emerging from the cauldron). With communications cut, many soldiers fleeing in disarray (including from the 201st Tank Brigade), the 237th Rifle Division fell apart when the 9th Panzer Division hit its last rifle regiment, the 838th. This put the bulk of the division into a full blown retreat that for many only ended around 20 kilometers east of where they had begun the day. With this massive hole blown in the Soviet lines, the neighboring 284th and 340th Rifle Divisions were now horribly exposed to an enveloping move while one rifle regiment from the 193rd Rifle Division was already falling back under German pressure. Nevertheless, the Soviet 340th Rifle Division was, in contrast, to the 237th Rifle Division, a veteran formation and largely was able to hold its ground (though its game attempt at continuing the offensive failed).

Meanwhile Chibisov had frantically redeployed the 2nd Tank Corps (which still had 60 operational tanks on the morning of the 24th and thus could have posed a significant challenge to the 9th Panzer Division) but they failed to engage. Instead, and under Chibisov's orders, they idled not more than six kilometers removed from the battlefield where the German panzers were decimating what remained of the 237th Rifle Division. Chibisov also redeployed the 118th Tank Brigade (which still had 14 operational tanks) but again failed to commit it. Only late in the day and as nightfall approached did Chibisov order a single tank brigade from the 2nd Tank Corps, the 26th, to attempt to support the encircled remnants of the 237th Rifle Division. It appears the commander of the brigade (who was also the commander of 2nd Tank Corps at this point given Liziukov's disappearance) refused. The Germans finished mopping up what remained of the 841st Rifle Regiment while the remnants of what the day before had been a full strength 12,500 man rifle division streamed east. In comparison the bulk of the VII Army Corps had suffered only 746 casualties on the day; split between the 9th Panzer Division, 340th, 385th, and 387th Infantry Divisions. Worse yet, the 38th Army's offensive had ground to a near halt. Only Katukov's 1st Tank Corps had continued to attack on the opposite flank of the debacle. However, Katukov's men had suffered heavy losses (with only 24 T-34, 9 T-70, and 12 T-60 tanks remaining) and couldn't accomplish anything of significance. Again, German aircraft interdicted all lines of communication to and from the battlefield. Though small in number, with on average three to five German bombers wheeling above roads and crossing points over water obstacles, the constant presence of even these small numbers of German aircraft greatly slowed and hindered Soviet efforts to move effectively.

While all of this was going on, the Briansk Front commander, Rokossovsky had acted with an alacrity and decisiveness the 38th Army commander apparently lacked. At 0800 hours on July 24th (and thus just as the 9th Panzer Division's attack was getting going) Rokossovsky ordered the 7th and 11th Tank Corps (the final remaining elements from the disbanded 5th Tank Army) to move up from where they had been resting and refitting in Front reserve roughly 40 kilometers east of the 38th Army. Apparently, Rokossovsky wanted to throw the two new tank corps into a massive late evening counter-attack. Had these two tank corps been able to carry out Rokossovsky's orders it would have posed a huge problem for 9th Panzer Division. Combined, the 7th and 11th Tank Corps could put 200 tanks into the field (half of which were T-34 and KV tanks). Moreover, the 7th Tank Corps was commanded by another rising star in the Red Army, General Pavel Rotmistrov (the future commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army) and Rokossovsky ordered him to be ready to attack by 1400 hours. However, it ended up taking 7th Tank Corps over three hours to assemble, as it would 11th Tank Corps. From there the road marches took so long that neither tank corps were able to even reach their jumping off areas until 2200 hours, mooting Rokossovsky's original orders.

July 25, 1942 (or day five of 38th Army's offensive) dawned with Chibisov trying to take the initiative the Germans had regained largely through 9th Panzer Division's counter-stroke. To that end he now had available the combined strength of the 7th Tank Corps, 2nd Tank Corps and 201st Tank Brigade which he planned on using with the 237th Rifle Division (not understanding the full scope of the disaster that had largely destroyed the division) and 284th Rifle Division to restore his former lines and push back 9th Panzer Division. Problematically, Chibisov decided to return the 118th Tank Brigade back to the 167th Rifle Division, which was to resume its part of the general offensive. Meanwile the 340th Rifle Division and 193rd Rifle Division were also to go back on the attack. As was the 1st Tank Corps, which was suppossed to break through the German front and threaten the German 9th Panzer Division from the rear (which for its part was seeking to continue to similarly envelope the bulk of 38th Army). One must commend Chibisov on his determination. One must also note that as so often was the case in the German-Russian war, both sides were maneovering aggressively for advantage. Ultimately this meant that the opposing forces were performing a balancing act, each side attempting to parry its foes blows while finding an opportunity to drive home its own strikes. 

Needless to say, the 237th Rifle Division had been scattered across the map and would be unable to offer much of anything to the 38th Army's efforts. Nevertheless, Chibisov's restarted offensive began at 0800 hours with the 7th and 2nd Tank Corps launching concentric attacks at the German positions. At the same time the German 9th Panzer Division continued it's counter-attack, slamming into the 38th Army for a second straight day. The massive battlefield turned into a swirling sea of action. In regards to the Soviet attacks, the 7th Tank Corps was led by the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade, 7th Motorized Brigade, and 87th Tank Brigade (with 62nd Tank Brigade) in reserve. The 3rd Guards Tank Brigade chose to lead with the bulk of its KV tanks (16-18 vehicles) whose massive bulk absorbed and deflected a tremendous amount of anti-tank fire. As a result, the Guardmen and motorized infantry rolled up the German defensive lines in a sharp three hour battle. The II Battalion of the 9th Panzer Division's 10th Panzer Grenadier Regiment lost much of it's 5th Company (with the Russians capturing 60 men in total).

However, and here we are again, the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade and supporting motorized infantry failed to follow up this success. Instead, they let the opportunity opened by ripping this small but significant hole in the German lines fall by the wayside and instead wallowed in their victory while awaiting ammunition and fuel resupply. Nor did Rotmistrov push them to do more. Meanwhile the 87th Tank Brigade failed to match its sister unit's initial success. As a result, by late in the morning the 7th Tank Corps had ceased its advance with only desultory attempts to get restarted. Some 110 operational Soviet tanks forming an otherwise significant shock grouping did next to nothing for the remainder of the day.

At the same time, the Soviet 2nd Tank Corps had initially advanced quickly, covering ground, but then it's 27th Tank Brigade ran into a buzzsaw of German armor and airpower, losing five T-34, two KV, and two T-60 tanks while suffering 41 casualties. The attacks by 38th Army's rifle divisions proved equally unfruitful. Shortages of artillery shells were especially detrimental to the infantry heavy attempts to resume the offensive. Logistics and the failure to get that crucial component of military operations right, had undermined the Soviet effort on yet another day. But that wasn't even the worst of it. Because of heavy pressure from the German 9th Panzer Division the 193rd Rifle Division had cracked, it's artillery was withdrawing, command and control had disintigrated and Chibisov wasn't even sure what was going on. In addition, the 167th Rifle Division, which along with the supporting 118th Tank Brigade had forged the only and as it turned out temporary break through in the German lines on day one, was exhausted and facing a disaster of its own. The German panzers had flowed behind it and threatened to completely encircle the division. Inevitably, some of the men of the 167th joined the elements of the 193rd Rifle Division in full retreat.

Meanwhile the 1st Tank Corps had continued to attack, and though ostensibly part of a larger plan with the other two tank corps to break up and push back the 9th Panzer Division (now firmly ensconsed in the midst of 38th Army) was really operating on its own. It's unsupported attacks faltered as well, but command issues were a major issue. All too often the attacks launched by its brigade commanders followed the same pattern. German artillery and air attacks helped pin the infantry. Given the infantry's inability to keep up the Soviet armor remained mostly content to stand off and trade pot-shots with German anti-tank guns; eschewing the tank's mobility and failing to simply by-pass dug in pockets of resistance. As a result the 1st Tank Corps was gradually being whittled down. For instance, by the end of the day on July 25th it's 89th Tank Brigade only had 14 operational tanks (1 KV, 2 T-34, 11 T-60). The 1st Guards Tank Brigade and 49th Tank Brigade had fought in an uncoordinated fashion further seeing 1st Tank Corps strength dissipated. Worse yet, Katukov, watching the 193rd and 167th Rifle Divisions retreating, ordered his tankers to begin falling back. At the same time, the 9th Panzer Division had broken the veteran 340th Rifle Division into two groupings. Two of it's rifle regiments were in one. In the other, the 1142nd Rifle Regiment along with part of the 118th Tank Brigade were isolated as communications had been severed. Moreover, they were getting pounded almost round the clock by rolling groups of approximately a dozen German attack aircraft (all told the Luftwaffe flew 357 sorties over the key operational areas of Second Army that day). Only the efforts of the rest of the 118th Tank Brigade and part of the 167th Rifle Division eased the pressure on their comrades.

The 9th Panzer Division (supported by the 385th Infantry Division and elements of the 340th Infantry Division) had not only dealt a series of heavy blows against the 38th Army but by the end of the day on July 25th had driven to within 11 kilometers of completly cutting off a significant chunk of the 38th Army and encircling it. This was in no small part because unlike the Soviet tankers who had followed their hard won successes by resting on their laurels, when the Germans attained an advantage they prosecuted it ruthlessly. Thus, the commander of the 9th Panzer Division had recognized early on that the destruction of the 237th Rifle Division had offered him a golden opportunity. He had promptly reinforced his 33rd Panzer Regiment with another artillery battalion and ordered the 11th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to support the armor as well, while the 340th Infantry Division's battalions also joined in. Note here how seamlessly the German commands worked together, with the 340th Infantry Division did not hesitate to turn over two battalions of sorely needed infantry to assist the 9th Panzer Division's breakthrough. But not everything was going well. The Soviet 284th Rifle Division as well as elements of the 237th Rifle Division fought hard. It also took some time to mop up the remnants of the 237th Rifle Division who had been trapped. Moreover, the 385th Infantry Divison's attack had been a disaster - going off late, without the promised assault gun support and running into the veteran 340th Rifle Division holding strong defensive positions on Hill 213.8 and in the surrounding woods. The Germans quickly regrouped. In spite of now knowing the 7th and 11th Tank Corps were very much presen and adding to the lopsided imbalance in armor favoring the 38th Army; the Germans pressed their advantage and the attack. A decision doubtlessly made easier by the fact that when the 2nd and 7th Tank Corps had the upper hand they had failed to press it. The Germans thus perhaps felt confident they could pull off a larger victory before the 38th Army finally figured out how to assemble and employ its hitting power in a coordinated fist.

The 9th Panzer Division organized yet another ad hoc kampgruppe on the fly. It was comprised of two panzer battalions from the 33rd Panzer Regiment, the 10th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (minus one battalion) and the 59th Kradshutzen Battalion. This time however, things didn't go as planned. Fierce Soviet resistance, the ongoing inability of the 385th Infantry Division to advance, and a friendly fire incident involving a Luftwaffe air raid driving the German infantry to seek shelter at the very moment they were supposed to be attacking all brought the day's operations to a close. This exchance offers up yet another lesson. Combined arms wasn't everything. But as we've seen (and shall see) the use of combined arms helped amplify German combat power against an enemy struggling not just with combined arms tactics but a host of other problems as well. Moreover, we have seen (as in the 167th Rifle Division's tank assisted breakthrough on day one of Operational Group Chibisov/38th Army's offensive) that when the Soviet units at least partially integrated their various combat arms into a team (notwithstanding the artillery failures on day one for instance) it reduced the equation to more of a fair fight.

In addition, fuel shortages once again reared up at the most inopportune time for the Germans. As it was the 33rd Panzer Regiment was going through 50 metric tons of fuel per day. Yet the Germans were struggling to truck enough fuel up to support the 9th Panzer Division - with 100 tons in total all that remained at the distant supply depots in Kasternoe (where the rail lines ended). Another reminder that had the Germans concentrated the assets, especially logistical, to back Case Blau that the Soviet position may have been far worse by the time the year came to a close. Instead, the German leadership saw fit to continue to fritter away valuable assets in tertiary theaters like North Africa. Meanwile, in the VII Army Corp's area of operations casualties in the 9th Panzer Division, 340th and 385th Infantry Divisions had climbed from the previous day to 804 men for July 25th. As a result the Second Army ordered the involved German units to refit for another push the next day. So did their equally determined Soviet opponent.

Chibisov had been enraged by the breakdowns in not only communications and lack of initiative but also the unauthorized retreats that had plagued the 38th Army's combat operations. However, he recognized the pressure the Germans had put on his command. As a result he ordered the bulk of his infantry to dig in. Meanwhile the 11th Tank Corps as well as the 119th Rifle Brigade had arrived to bolster 38th Army. And bolster it they did.

With the addition of the 11th Tank Corps, Chibisov now had four tank corps with 330 operational tanks between them (with roughly 140 of those T-34 medium and KV heavy tanks). In comparison the 9th Panzer Division only had a half dozen of the 75mm long-barrelled Panzer IV tanks, which along with the smattering of StuG III assault guns were the only German AFV's with the firepower to go toe-toe with the T-34 and KV tanks. To say that this represented an overwhelming numerical advantage is an understatement. But as usual the question remained: what would the Russians do with their continued numerical dominance and how was it that the Germans could continue to not only compete under such circumstances but carry the battle to their foe.

Part of the answer to that question is that Chibisov, regrettably continued to parcel out his armor. He planned to strike the German positions but not with not all four tank corps operating together (and mind you there were still at least three independent tank brigades already bolstering his infantry) but at least initially with just the 2nd and 7th Tank Corps. Furthermore, he put the 1st Tank Corps in a back stop position behind his infantry with orders for only part of the tank corps to attack (and problematically to do so independently of the other tank corps). In Chibisov's planning this meant that the 1st Tank Corps would also not only backstop the infantry but be in position to crush the 9th Panzer Division as the 2nd and 7th Tank Corps theroretically enveloped the panzers and drove them into the dug in Russian infantry and tanks. Meanwhile the 11th Tank Corps would also attack, but again not in direct conjunction with the rest of Chibisov's armor. Yet again he split a tank corps up. In this case the 11th tank corps was ordered to detach some of its armor, pair it with the 21st Cavalry Division and conduct a reconnaissance-in-force (with as it turns out 17 Matilda II lend-lease tanks) near the 284th Rifle Division's positions. 

Perhaps because of Chibisov's convoluted planning and its attendant delays, the Germans beat him to the punch once more. Planning on the fly over the night of the 25th/26th General Hell ordered the 385th Infantry Division to kick start its attack once more while the main blow would again be delivered by the German panzers. For it's part the 9th Panzer Division formed a new kampfgruppe and within hours was ready to move. The speed and flexibility with which this was done had to be shocking to the Russian commanders attempting to learn in the most unforgiving environment in the world - combat. This time the 9th Panzer Division's lead kampfgruppe would be led by the veteran commander of the unit's motorcycle battalion and consisting of: the 33rd Panzer Regiment (minus one battalion), the 59th Kradshutzen Battalion, II/11th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 5th Battery from the attached 71st Artillery Regiment, the II Battery of the 50th Panzerjager Battalion and II/102nd Artillery Regiment. The remainder of the 9th Panzer Division would initially cover this kampgruppe's flanks and then move up when elements of the German 340th Infantry Division arrived.

The German attack began at 0700 hours as bombers hit the Soviet defensive positions followed immediately by a combined artillery/mortar barrage effectively suppressing the Russian heavy weapons. Then came a tank-infantry assault that hammered the combined forces of various elements from the 167th Rifle Division, 118th Tank Brigade, and 340th Rifle Division. Though the Soviet infantry had plenty of anti-tank guns the circling Stuka's and accurate German artillery covered the German tanks and infantry, allowing them to close with and eliminate the Russian gun crews. For instance, the Soviet 177th Anti-tank artillery battalion lost two weapons to bombs from German close air support with another two guns silenced by German armor. Meanwhile, the Germans managed to kill the commander of the 124th Howitzer Artillery Regiment and wipe out his observational post. The artillery battalions deployed several kilometers removed from the battlefield had thus not only lost their eyes but with no guidance from above began to retreat toward the Don River to the east. Again it had been a German combined arms clinic that took only a half hour to breach the Soviet defensive front and begin rolling up the now isolated Soviet infantry.

However, this time the Russians initially responded well. The 118th Tank Brigade's Motorized Rifle Battalion as well as the 1st Guards Tank Brigade's 2nd Tank Battalion, liberally equipped with T-34's, stopped the German armored wedge that had begun the exploitation phase of the breakthrough. The German tankers, having outdistanced their infantry, artillery, and anti-tank weapons, however, didn't panic. They instead went into defensive positions rather than challenge the Russian tanks head-on and unassisted. What is often misunderstood about German breakthroughs, is that at least initially and when confronted with superior opponents they proceeded to deliberately execute the time honored tactics that again and again had enabled them to best opponents with superior firepower. In this case and as the T-34's awaited the head on tank-on-tank clash they assumed was inevitable, several German tanks and other supporting units engaged in some long-range harrassing fire and active reconnaissance while the bulk of the armor regrouped out of sight. Meanwhile the German infantry arrived, wheeling up their anti-tank guns as they came. Sure enough and within minutes the Soviet 2nd Tank Batallion commander heard fighting on his left and right but lacking any support from the rest of the 1st Tank Corps could only listen as the German panzers simply outlanked his positions.

While this was happening Rotmistrov's 7th Tank Corps had also begun its attack. However Rotmistrov failed to concentrate his still considerable firepower and the Germans dodged a bullet as Rotmistrov's initially promising attack into 9th Panzer Division's rear sputtered out after a few hundred yards. Rotmistrov/Chibisov's decision to detach the 87th Tank Brigade and send it off on a tangent five kilometers away from the main body of the 7th Tank Corps had irrepairably weakened the attack's punch. Even worse however, the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade and its heavy KV tanks was left in reserve. Thus the 7th Tank Corps attack was only conducted by its motorized brigade and a single battalion from a single tank brigade, employing only two dozen out of 100 operational tanks - with most of this meager number being T-60 light tanks. At the same time the 11th Tank Corps, originally slated to participate in Chibisov's offensive, was instead ordered to react to the German initiative by forming another back-stop defensive line, removing another 4 KV, 3 T-34, 47 T-60, and 8 Matilda tanks from the battlefield. Meanwhile the 2nd Tank Corps (3 KV, 30 T-34, 29 T-60 for 62 operational tanks on July 26th) also spent the day in defensive positions as Chibisov also cancelled its planned attack in light of the German breakthrough.

And that's how four Soviet tank corps with a combined 330 operational tanks on July 26th (no less the numerous independent tank brigades in the region) found themselves not attacking in a concentrated fist. Rather, they were ordered into largely reactionary defensive moves while the Germans seized the initiative. All of this happened even as the Germans could only deploy a quarter of the Soviet wealth in armor. Yet the Germans leveraged their initial breakthrough to not only get inside Chibisov's decision-loop but put the entire 38th Army in a precarious position. That's because the 9th Panzer Division spent the day consistently avoiding Soviet centers of resistance (like the threat posed by the 1st Tank Corp's 1st Guards Tank Brigade and its T-34's) and advancing through the stout but lesser resistance offered by the 167th Rifle Division and remnants of the 118th Tank Brigade. By the end of the day the German spearhead as a result had not continued east and into the tank corps Chibisov had set up as a blocking force. Instead the 9th Panzer Division had turned to the southeast, avoiding the Soviet concentrations and armor and penetrating to within only six kilometers of the front held by VII Army Corp's 387th Infantry Division, and inexorably encircling a significant portion of the 38th Army.

This prompted a general retreat on the part of much of the Soviet 1st Tank Corps, 2nd Tank Corps, the 167th Rifle Division, 193rd Rifle Division, 340th Rifle Division, the 104th Rifle Brigade, 201st Tank Brigade, and 118th Tank Brigade (with the latter completely exhausted and at this point in the battle down to three T-34 and four T-70 tanks). These units represented the near entirety of the spearhead of Chibisov's original Operational Group/38th Army that had initially thrust into the German VII Army Corp's defensive positions some five days prior. However for a significant portion of Chibisov's command the retreat had begun too late.

The 9th Panzer Division completed its thrust to the southeast and linked up with the German infantry, closing the pocket. The Germans had trapped inside a narrow river valley the Soviet 193rd Rifle Division, two rifle regiments from the 340th Rifle Division, part of the 167th Rifle Division's 520th Rifle Regiment, and the 1st Tank Corps' 49th Tank Brigade's 253rd Tank Battalion as well as the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade's 445th Motorized Rifle Battalion. Though the 340th Rifle Division's regiments continued to largely fight well, the 193rd Rifle Division disintegrated, with its commanding officer mostly losing control over his men. As it was and again problematically, few of the trapped units knew what their neighbors were doing no less what was happening outside the pocket. As a result there was no attempt to form a coordinated response. Panic quickly spread as the Germans poured fire into the pocket. German anti-tank guns wheeled onto the hills overlooking the cauldron knocked out all nine remaining tanks from the 253rd Tank Battalion while German machine guns, air strikes, and artillery proved equally efficient in destroying the 445th Motorized Rifle Battalion. Meanwhile Chibisov had realized what was going on and ordered three of his four tank corps to attack (once more and regrettably leaving the 11th Tank Corps and its 62 operational tanks in its defensive positions).

Unfortunately it again took far too long for the Soviet tank corps to assemble. To his credit Chibisov was hounding his commanders to move but in particular the 2nd Tank Corps (which with its 60 operational tanks had been best positioned to provide immediate assistance to its trapped comrades) had dithered. Now, part of this delay is understandable - given that the tank corps original commanding officer had disappeared days before. Nevertheless, as the hours stretched on, and the new command team struggled to, among other things, locate the commanding officer of the supporting artillery assigned to support their attack, these delays became more than critical - they proved fatal.

It was only at 2100 hours that the 2nd Tank Corps finally moved out in one coherent combat grouping (doing so for one of the only times in the battle to date). After advancing a quick five kilometers they were perplexed to find that once again the Germans were shying away from engagement. Meanwhile, nightfall once more proved far from kind to the men of the 2nd Tank Corps. The 26th and 27th Tank Brigades ended up opening fire on each other in the dark, resulting in one of the 27th Tank Brigade's T-34's being knocked out. Meanwhile another friendly fire incident wounded a company commander from the motorized machine gun battalion. Finally, the 2nd Tank Corps reached its geographical objective but having failed to pin and destroy the enemy. There, the commander stopped his advance to set up an elaborate set-piece assault against a village held by German troops that he had encountered. This was scheduled for 0500 hours on July 27th - all of his occuring while the Germans continued to pound the pocket of trapped Russian soldiers. As if this wasn't bad enough Rotmistrov's 7th Tank Corps spent much of the day trading fire with German troops, making only half-hearted efforts to advance before elements of the 7th Tank Corps did in fact advance only to take terrain holding little operational significance to the drama playing out within the dwindling pocket. Both tank corps then ceased operations for the remainder of the night. A mere eight kilometers seperated the 2nd and 7th Tank Corps from the men being slaughtered in the pocket.

As the pocket fell apart the German 387th Infantry Division reported it had regained its original defensive positions from the 21st. This meant the 38th Army's gains had been eradicated and its offensive had failed. The VII Army Corps original lines had been restored, the 38th Army's breakthrough crushed, and the only task left for the Germans was to finish mopping up the pocket. The day's fighting had been hard but the level of casualties had dropped by half compared to the first day's of the 38th Army's (at that time Operational Group Chibisov and also known as the 4th Army at times during the transition) offensive - with the Germans incurring 409 total casualties on the day. Moreover, instead of these casualties being concentrated in two divisions (as larger losses had been on day one), these losses were spread across four divisions: the 340th, 385th, and 387th Infantry and the 9th Panzer.

The 9th Panzer Division had for the third time in three weeks acted as a successful "fire brigade" and was pulled from the line to rest and refit once more as the key component of Second Army's reserve. It still had 85 tanks operational (only 11 fewer than two days prior when it entered the fight): 5 Panzer I, 17 Panzer II, 59 Panzer III, and 4 Panzer IV (three of these being the 75mm long-barrelled gun equipped models).

By the morning of the 27th the 38th Army had mostly gone over onto the defensive. Of its four tank corps, only elements of the 1st and 2nd Tank Corps attempted to attack. Unfortunately and even though they were operating virtually side-by-side, communication and coordination between the two was virtually non-existent. Both attacks were stopped cold by heavy fire and fierce resistance from German forces mostly occupying their original defensive positions from six days prior. No further effort had been made to help the trapped elements of 38th Army who without any firm command failed to attempt an organized break-out. Instead small groups filtered out between gaps in the German lines.

Total losses suffered by 38th Army in the pocket are unknown. What is also known is that in total the Germans claimed taking 3,785 men as prisoners of war during the battle. It must be surmised that the vast majority of these prisoners were those caught in the pocket. Moreover, we do know that the 193rd Rifle Division alone lost 7,500 men in the week's fighting. This is because it reported on July 30th, as it was being withdrawn by Briansk Front for refitting, that in total the division numbered only 4,100 survivors, very little equipment (half of the men reported to duty with no weapons) and its officer corps absolutely shredded. For comparison sake and though not caught in the pocket, on July 30th the 237th Rifle Division (which had taken a beating in its own right) still had 8,234 of the original 12,500 men it had entered the battle with on July 23rd.

To further put these numbers in perspective the 9th Panzer Divsion and 385th Infantry Division during the entirety of the battle suffered 1,066 casualties (with only 165 of those being KIA). All told, the German units involved in the battle suffered 3,700 casualties in total. In comparison the Soviet rifle and cavalry units alone suffered 26,000 casualties while the tank and motorized units suffered at least an additional 3,500 casualties (with data lacking for the 27th Tank Brigade and 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and thus an accurate accounting at this time impossible). Thus, we have total Soviet personnel losses at an astounding ratio of approximately 9:1 versus the Germans. Given the Red Army's manpower deployed in the Western and Southern Soviet Union at that time numbered approximately twice as many men versus the Axis forces arrayed against it we can see why the manpower reserves of the Soviet Union were very much a neccesity. They were not a luxury that could just allow the Red Army to simply bleed it's way to victory - as is implied by some quantitative based theorists arguing brute force won the war. 

Moreover, in terms of tank losses (different it must be remembered than tanks knocked out as such vehicles were repairable and returned to their parent organization provided control over the battlefield or timely recovery of the damaged vehicle), it appears that the 9th Panzer Division only lost two tanks as total write-offs. Both being Panzer IV's of all things and not one of the lighter and more vulnerable models. The Germans also lost one assault gun from the 201st Sturmgeschutz Battalion. Meanwhile, the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 11th Tank Corps as well as the 118th Tank Brigade suffered 123 irrevocable losses in tanks. The 201st Tank Brigade's total losses are unknown - though it is known that it began the battle with 34 operational Matilda and T-60 tanks and by July 29th only had 23 tanks in total remaining. Nevertheless, the 123 lost Soviet tanks when broken down is also surprising - as that total included 90 KV and T-34 tanks and thus only 33 of the less well protected light and lend-lease tanks lost.

Therefore, and even though the 38th Army enjoyed a 5:1 ratio advantage in operational tanks on the battlefield it needed it as the ratio of losses suffered reached 40:1 (123 against 3 German total losses). Something else to consider the next time someone tells you the Germans were doomed by the summer of 1941 because the Soviet Union and Allies were outproducing them in armor at rates of five or six to one. For that matter and in addition, one can also consider that several of the Soviet officers pointed not to German armor as the biggest problem - but German anti-tank weapons, which would remain lethally proficient throughout the war. Again here, the difference in outcomes between the war's early and middle years of frequent German success and German catastrophic failure later in the war wouldn't be due to a sudden lack of German anti-tank weapons which if anything proliferated even more (especially with the development of the panzershrek and it's kin) but the additional experience in combined arms tactics that enabled Russian commanders to better handle less mobile and well protected German anti-tank assets later in the war.

To step back and put these losses in further perspective we know that all told, from June 28th to July 24th the Briansk Front suffered 36,883 killed, missing, or captured and 29,329 sick or wounded. This meant that Briansk Front had lost a staggering 66,212 men of 169,400 participating in the fighting. Add in the Southern and Voronezh Fronts contemporaneous losses and the totals skyrocket to 370,495 dead, missing, or captured (permanent losses nearly equal to the entire number of U.S. military personnel killed in the entirety of the Second World War on all fronts combined) with 197,800 wounded or sick. This meant that between the three fronts 568,295 men were killed, captured, or evacuated as wounded/sick from an original force of 1,301,900 men. Meanwhile, German Army Groups A and B had taken Rostov and had both the Caucuses and Stalingrad in their sights. Moreover, the Red Army's forces in Southern Russia were very much on the verge of collapse as the exploitation and pursuit phases of Operation Blue kicked into high gear. NKVD blocking detachments would detain an astonishing 140,755 military personnel behind the entire front (and ostensibly deserting though significant numbers of the 51,000 men detained from from the Don and Stalingrad Fronts must have been merely retreating) while returning 131,094 to their original postings or higher level units in the period August 1st to October 15th alone. It was within this larger context that Stalin issued his now famous "Not a Step Back" Order Number 227 on July 28th, 1942. Many focus on the order's impact in terms of psychologically steeling a reeling Red Army but a careful reading of the Order's actual text shows something else - pure, unvarnished fear as seen in the first part of the order quoted here:

The enemy throws new forces to the front without regard to heavy losses and penetrates deep into the Soviet Union, seizing new regions, destroying our cities and villages, and violating, plundering and killing the Soviet population. Combat goes on in region Voronezh, near Don, in the south, and at the gates of the Northern Caucasus. The German invaders penetrate toward Stalingrad, to Volga and want at any cost to trap Kuban and the Northern Caucasus, with their oil and grain. The enemy already has captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuyki, Novocherkassk, Rostov on Don, half Voronezh. Part of the troops of the Southern front, following the panic-mongers, have left Rostov and Novocherkassk without severe resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, who love and respect the Red Army, start to be discouraged in her, and lose faith in the Red Army, and many curse the Red Army for leaving our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, and itself running east.

Some stupid people at the front calm themselves with talk that we can retreat further to the east, as we have a lot of territory, a lot of ground, a lot of population and that there will always be much bread for us. They want to justify the infamous behavior at the front. But such talk is falsehood, helpful only to our enemies.

Each commander, Red Army soldier and political commissar should understand that our means are not limitless. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR which the enemy has captured and aims to capture is bread and other products for the army, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with arms and ammunition, railroads. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic republics, Donetzk, and other areas we have much less territory, much less people, bread, metal, plants and factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of bread annually and more than 10 million tons of metal annually. Now we do not have predominance over the Germans in human reserves, in reserves of bread. To retreat further - means to waste ourselves and to waste at the same time our Motherland.

Therefore it is necessary to eliminate talk that we have the capability endlessly to retreat, that we have a lot of territory, that our country is great and rich, that there is a large population, and that bread always will be abundant. Such talk is false and parasitic, it weakens us and benefits the enemy, if we do not stop retreating we will be without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw material, without factories and plants, without railroads.

This leads to the conclusion, it is time to finish retreating. Not one step back! Such should now be our main slogan.

The final three sentence paragraph is what typically gets all the attention. Lost in that is the larger part of the order which is in so many ways shocking for its pleading nature and open acknowledgement that the Soviet Union was in deep trouble. Remember, the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule was perhaps the most secretive and paranoid great power in recent history. Terms like "Orwellian" and "Fake News" are thrown around today but they had real meaning when applied to life in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era in particular. It was exceedingly rare for the Soviet people to get even a glimpse behind the scenes at what was really going on. Even worse, if Soviet citizens looked too hard or asked the wrong questions they could be exiled to the gulags or worse. And yet here was Stalin essentially publically pleading with his people to understand that if they didn't get their act together the chances of the Soviet experiment surviving even the coming months no less existing as a viable rump state were very much in question. As it was, and regardless of the larger fight over petroleum resources that in part defined the 1942 campaigns in the Soviet Union, food security had become a serious issue for the Red Army (as mentioned earlier here) and Soviet population. The content of Stalin's order must be read as not only significant as a motivational tool for getting more out of his people but for what was a shockingly open and blunt admission that the Germans were on the verge of the unthinkable.

Meanwhile at Briansk Front General Rokossovsky was of course appalled by what had just happened, in particular directing his ire at Chibisov's command which had accomplished virtually nothing for the tremendous bloodletting that had occurred. Immense resources had been granted to Chibisov - including four tank corps and two independent tank brigades. This was a wealth of armor most rifle army's at that time in the war could only dream of having at their disposal. His post operation report rightly singled out the definciences in command that had plauged the operation. To that end Chibisov deserves ample blame. Chibisov rushed his orders at nearly every turn. How much of this was the fault of Rokossovsky and Stavka rushing from above is unknown. What is known is that time and again Chibisov would issue orders involving numerous tank corps and rifle divisions all expected to act within mere hours and with no real planning or intelligence regarding the enemy's positions or an accurate assessment of their intentions. Furthermore, Chibisov failed to exercise his leadership. For instance, and in comparison, though Rommel was often faulted for "leading from the front" - at times a senior commander must physically be present to push his subordinates to act. Nonetheless, for most of the battle Chibisov remained distantly removed. He thus failed to exert a level of control neccessary to turn his orders the success he had imagined for them. And this is not to cast too much blame at his leadership - as his subordinate commanders consistently failed to provide him with actionable information in a timely fashion regarding battlefield updates that would have significantly impacted his orders.

Regardless, and working our way down the chain of command, the tank corps in particular acted with, and I can't believe I'm using this word in conjunction with the Red Army, a timidity that was scarecly believable. More than once Russian tank brigades found themselves in position to lead entire tank corps through breaches in the German lines,. Instead they just stopped. Now part of this was simple inexperience. As these tactical level commanders acquired greater experience they would in 1944-45 be the men leading entire tank corps on independent and fearless jaunts dozens of miles into the rear of German lines - exhibiting the dash and iniative befitting the tradition of a Russian army known for its long history of superlative mounted cavalry. But 1942 was not yet that time.

From there, one has to wonder what would have happened had the initial offensive been pushed back even a day or two, thus allowing the component units to plan together and prepare effectively. Though one's mind instantly goes to the logistical shortages that hamstringed operations even the vaunted Russian artillery performed abysmally - with artillery preperations all too often completely missing their intended targets and evidence of not only a lack of experience but a lack of planning and sufficent reconnoitering of the German lines. It is stunning to consider that when the offensive began the primary breakthrough and exploitation units still hadn't ascertained the German's forward edge of defense, no less the main line. A lack of time for planning also impacted the infantry and armor with none of the combat arms performing particularly professionally during the battle. To that end, each of the key commanders involved in the battle failed to coordinate effectively with their neighboring units. Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades, and the like consistently operated as if in a vacuum with little to no effort made to coordinate when at several times in the battle the combined effort of an entire tank corps no less two or more would have been enough to form an effective shock grouping and blow an irrepairable hole in the German lines. The lack of synchronization between the four tank corps allowed a German panzer division to run circles around an armored force five times its size. As it was the only real breakthrough of German positions occured on day one; not coincidentally the one day that the Soviet armor and infantry performed even remotely close to working together as a team. And this is not to fault the bravery or determination of the Russian soldiers.

The Russians fought just as hard as their German opponents with most of the collapses that occured being the result of green troops being thrust into impossible situations (as could be seen with the tragedy of the 237th Rifle Division). Beyond skill and experience, one of the other factors playing a role here is the training. It is well documented that the Germans in 1942 still had a considerable edge in combat experience over the Red Army. However, it bears repeating that the German infantry involved in this battle had hardly more experience than their opponents. Both sides were using infantry and rifle divisions that for the most part were formed around the same time and earlier in 1942. The fact that the Germans peformed better speaks to a number of things but superior training programs has to be toward the top of that list.

Beyond that however, and endemic to the larger efforts of the Red Army, command, control, and communications failures were absolutely fatal to the offensive's chances. In complete contrast to German operations the insufficience of radios meant that all too often even well designed plans fell apart within hours of orders being given as there was simply little to no capability of higher headquarters to effectively control their subordinate formations. This was especially true in the case of armored operations. This lack of command and control was the key reason perhaps the most important unit with the best opportunity to have attained Briansk Front's larger objectives to completely unhinge VII Army Corps defenses and rupture Second Army - the 2nd Tank Corps - lost its commander hardly a day into the offensive and performed extremely poorly in some of the most critical situations determining the course of the battle thereafter. Overall, intelligence and reconnaissance efforts were appallingly bad. This led to all kinds of avoidable problems - not least of which in planning road marches. Time and again we saw Soviet tank forces taking far too much time to assemble only to never arrive where they were supposed to in anything like the coordinated grouping they could have formed. Of course the learning curve was steep. Even commanders as skilled as Katukov would become were still figuring things out. For instance, all too often during the battle his headquarters was located as far as 20 kilometers away from his tank brigades.

Moreover, the lack of coordination between Chibisov's army and the Soviet 2nd Air Army couldn't have been more complete. When Soviet aircraft showed up it was sporadic and their efforts were often directed deep into the German rear areas - rather than at the operational targets that mattered (like the 9th Panzer Division's concentrations of armor). A big part of this was because by 1942 the Germans had long since regarded attack aircraft as "flying artillery" and thus an integral part of combined arms operations with German forward observers embedded within frontline ground units and offering superb coordination with those flying above. Not so much on the Russian side of the hill, where effective ground-air-coordination was still in its infancy. For that matter, the Russians failed to concentrate their aircraft to support the offensive. Reports from both sides attest to the near continual presence of the Luftwaffe over the battlefield. Not only did this provide crucial situational awareness of what the Russians were up to for the benefit of the German commanders on the ground, but it played a vital role in slowing Soviet road marches, resupply and the like. The Luftwaffe also did a significant amount of damage, physically but also psychologically - as Russian infantry and artillery in particular often went to ground as soon as German aircraft appeared. What's even more impressive is that it was not like the German Second Army had a wealth of air support to draw upon. With the destruction of the Soviet 5th Tank Army in the weeks prior and the consequent move southeast by the bulk of Army Group B the majority of the German airpower in the region had gone with their spearheads. Nevertheless, even the small groups of often no more than ten or twelve attack aircraft played an outsize role over the battlefield, flying repeated sorties from nearby airfields and maintaining an almost constant presence overhead.

Thus, when I argue how draining Mediterranean operations were to the German war against the Soviet Union, I am not exagerrating. For instance, as seen here even otherwise minor numbers of otherwise available aircraft (or for that matter logistical support) could significantly impact the most important campaign in the war had it been properly supported by, at that time, the ample resources the Third Reich had with which to divest the Soviet Union of the economic basis for fighting a mobile armor intensive war. Contrary to those arguing that because of quantitative factors Germany had lost the war by the summer of 1941 (see David Stahel for an example of a modern historian making exactly this argument) what was happening in 1941-1942 was a qualitative race. As seen in the Briansk Front's July 21-29th offensive, even overwhelming numbers in favor of the Red Army failed to produce the battlefield outcomes they had desired. Moreover, and at the 1941-1942 point in this qualitative race the Germans held a significant edge over the Red Army.

Nevertheless, the Red Army was learning. It's men were gaining invaluable experience that would eventually allow the Red Army to successfully resurect the Deep Operational theories cast aside in the purges of the late 1930's and that would prove to be a war winning formula from the latter half of 1943 until the war's end. But it wasn't yet there in the summer of 1942, instead it was still heavily reliant on the numbers game to impact outcomes and it was not working out well. This is why we took such an analytical deep dive into the Briank Front's failed July 1942 offensive against the German Second Army's VII Army Corps and its two barely blooded and newly formed infantry divisions. At this time in the war, there were vastly more veteran and even elite combat troops in the rest of Army Group's A and B (or on the rest of the German Eastern Front) than with the German Second Army (the 9th Panzer Division notwithstanding). If there was anywhere where the sheer weight of numbers should have carried the day in the summer of 1942 it should have been here. But, and in a microcosm of what was happening elsewhere at that time, it didn't. Immense Soviet material and personnel advantages failed to produce the desired outcome because of German qualitative advantanges in key military measures. On the other hand, we can also see that when the Red Army did get it right (for instance 167th Rifle Division and 118th Tank Brigade's successful day one penetration of the German lines or when a combined infantry-armor force from the 7th Tank Corps overran a company of panzer grenadiers on July 25th) they came close to creating the opportunity to meet their stated goals at that time. Moreover, as 1942 wore on the Red Army improved (though in a one and a half steps forward one step back fashion) and "got it right" often enough. As a result, larger German strategic failings and mistakes (allowing the fight for Italy's Libyan colony to sap the effort in the Soviet Union) began to bite with a strength that would doom the German war effort by the latter half of 1943.