US 1st Armored Division Grant Tank at Kasserine Pass
Full Title: Armor identified as part of the 1st Armored Division; image shows a Grant tank advancing to support American forces during the battle at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, 1943. (WWII Signal Corps Photograph Collection)
The Battle of Kasserine Pass, which began on February 14, 1943, was one of the worst, if not the worst, tactical level defeat suffered by American mechanized forces in history. A number of reasons explain why the Germans handled the Americans so easily.
Perhaps most importantly, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and, to a lesser extant, General Hans von Arnim woefully overmatched both British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, in overall command over the allied forces in the region, and American Major General Lloyd Fredendall, commanding the US II Corps. Fredendall, the proximate figure in the debacle at Kasserine Pass, was anything but a front line leader. He largely relied on maps to deploy his men, and he rarely left his command post. For instance, during the winter of 1943 Fredendall made only one visit to the actual American front line defensive positions. As a result, Fredendall compounded Anderson's decision to spread the British First Army, of which US II Corps was a part, far too thin. Fredendall woefully deployed his troops in isolated outposts on the heights of several key passes and failed to establish a concentrated reserve capable of delivering a decisive counter blow against a potential attacker. Fredendall virtually doomed the 1st Armored Division in stretching it across nearly 100 miles of real estate, and even then only deploying two thirds of the 1st Armored at that; as Combat Command B had been detached from the 1st Armored and attached to another corps. Supporting the 1st Armored Division in defending this vast front stood just one French Division. The 1st Armored Division's Combat Command A (CCA) and Combat Command C (CCC) thus sat isolated in the German path with CCA split between widely separated djebels (hills). Fredendall held only one tank battalion and a reconnaissance battalion in reserve. This meant the Germans could isolate and defeat the Americans in detail, which is exactly what they did.
A second reason for the 1st Armored Division's defeat was simple inexperience. American GIs, lacking combat experience, performed poorly against the veteran German troops. American armored units deployed in piecemeal and repeated errors made by the British and French earlier in the war. The American Army Air Force fared miserably against the Luftwaffe and failed to support the American troops. Furthermore, American armored and anti-armor doctrine had been premised on a fatal misunderstanding in regards to German tactics. American doctrine ascribed to the belief German commanders normally attacked with fast moving panzers operating en masse. In reality, German commanders were ardent adherents of combined arms tactics, thought carefully at the tactical level and almost never acted recklessly; allowing them to carve up American defensive positions lacking the depth and mix of arms needed to defeat the Germans. In addition, when American armor was used to attack it was used almost as if it were a mechanized version of 19th century cavalry - charging straight into the German lines without the support of other combat arms. Thus German panzer divisions, wielding their artillery, anti-tank weapons, infantry, armor and other supporting units as a coherent defensive force, easily destroyed brave but foolish allied tank only counter-attacks.
Finally, some American equipment employed at Kasserine Pass was anything but up to the standards of the 1943 era battlefield. For instance, the M3 Lee/Grant medium tank, pictured above, with its high silhouette evoking the French Char B or Soviet T-35, was a far too easy target. In addition, the main gun, though a perfectly adequate 75mm gun, was mounted so low on the chassis as to exacerbate the tank's need to expose itself to enemy fire.
Picture Courtesy of Courtesy of U.S. Army
